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ABSTRACT 
A DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMS OF COMPLETION OF 
DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE CASE OF TURKEY 
DÜZGÜN KILIÇ 
M.A. Thesis, January 2018 
Thesis supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Özge Kemahlıoğlu 
Keywords: Democratic completion, Backsliding, Turkey, Erosion 
This thesis aims to study the problems of democratic completion in the case of Turkey. 
Discussions on backsliding into authoritarianism and erosion of democracies began to 
take more space in the democracy literature. The increasing number of criticism on 
populist-authoritarian tendencies of AKP government necessitates this study to detect 
the erosion of Turkish democracy and problems in democratic completion. This thesis 
attempts to problematize the concepts of democratic consolidation and backsliding and 
omissions of the literature. Results of Turkish case proposes that, despite the curbing of 
the tutelary power of Turkish military; the deterioration in the rule of law, absence of 
strong autonomous civil society organizations, political culture far-fetched from 
possessing democratic civic culture characteristics and increasing level of populist 
discourse and practices create fertile sociological ground for the backsliding of Turkish 
democracy by populist-authoritarian executive with strong electoral mandate. This 
study posits that the assumption of transition paradigm on the elimination of tutelary 
powers after transition would bring democratic completion, neglected the possibility of 
democratic backsliding in the absence of strong checks and balance system and 
democratic political cultural traits in the Turkish case.  
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ÖZET 
TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİNDE DEMOKRASİNİN TAMAMLANMASI SORUNLARININ 
TARTIŞMASI 
DÜZGÜN KILIÇ 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ocak 2018 
Tez danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Özge Kemahlıoğlu 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Demokrasinin tamamlanması, Bozulma, Türkiye, Yozlaşma 
Bu tez, Türkiye örneğinde demokratik tamamlanma sorunlarını incelemeyi amaçlıyor. 
Otoriterliğe ve demokrasilerin erozyona maruz kalması ile ilgili tartışmalar son yıllarda 
demokrasi literatüründe daha fazla yer kaplamaya başladı. AKP hükümetinin popülist 
otoriter eğilimlerine yönelik eleştirilerin sayısının artması, bu çalışmanın Türk 
demokrasisinin erozyonunu ve demokratik tamamlamadaki sorunlarını tespit etmeyi 
gerekli kılmaktadır. Bu tez, demokrasinin pekişmesi ve demokrasinin bozulması 
kavramlarını ve literatürdeki eksiklikleri sorgulamaya çalışmaktadır. Türkiye örneğinin 
sonuçları, Türk ordusunun vesayet gücünün azaltılmasına karşın; hukukun 
üstünlüğünün bozulması, güçlü özerk sivil toplum örgütlerinin olmaması, demokratik 
sivil kültür özelliklerine sahip olmaktan uzak siyasi kültür ve giderek artan düzeyde 
popülist söylem ve uygulamaların, Türk demokrasisinin siyasal ve siyasal temellerini 
popülist-demokrasinin aşılması, güçlü seçim desteğine sahip olan popülist-otoriter 
iktidar partisi tarafından Türk demokrasisinin geriletilmesine yönelik uygun bir 
sosyolojik ve yapısal zemin oluşturmaktadır. Bu çalışma, demokratik geçiş 
paradigmasının vesayet güçlerinin demokratik geçiş sonrasında tasfiyesinin 
demokrasinin tamamlanmasını beraberinde getireceği varsayımının, güçlü denge ve 
denetleme mekanizmalarının ve demokratik siyasal kültür özelliklerinin bulunmaması 
durumunda demokrasinin bozulmaya uğrayabileceğini Türkiye örneği üzerinden ortaya 
koymuştur. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A remarkable worldwide resurgence of democracy emerged in the early years of 1990s. 
The collapse of Soviet Union and the end of Cold War were the main reasons of this 
new phenomenon. In search of political legitimacy and to become a part of Western 
World through NATO or European Union, old Soviet satellite regimes started to declare 
their will to become part of democratic world. Snowballing effect of democratization 
led to a new era of democratic expansion through the world. 
Samuel P. Huntington’s classic article in 1991 defines the resurgence of 
democracy in modern world from 1974 to early 1990s with the newly introduced 
concept of “third wave” of democratization. After two waves of democratization and 
two reverse waves, third wave of democratization began in 1974 and reached peak point 
in 1990s. The deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian regimes, the 
unprecedented global economic growth of the 1960s, 1973 and 1979 Oil Crises which 
led to the collapse of the dominance of Keynesian model, led to energy deficit, increase 
in prices of oil which in turn increase the input costs results in a fiscal crises. Low 
economic performance causes the effectiveness, legitimacy problems and questioning of 
authoritarian governments (Haggard & Kaufmann, 1994). Economic deterioration, a 
striking shift in the doctrine of Catholic Church to defend democracy, policy changes of 
actors like European Union and “snowballing” effect of democratization led to a wave 
of democracy that brings at least thirty countries into the world of democracy 
(Huntington, 1991, p.12-13). After short optimistic atmosphere for the successful 
democratic transition, scholars began to be more critical with respect to calling these 
new regimes as democracies. After periods of discussions about the nature and structure 
of these regimes some scholars claimed that some of these regimes are swinging 
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between democracy and authoritarian forms of government rather than becoming a fully 
democratic regime. For that reason, labels offered by scholars in order to define these 
regimes that are standing in the grey zone between authoritarian regimes and 
democracies (Carothers, 2002, p. 9). Labels such as “semi-democracy”, “pseudo 
democracy”, “illiberal democracy”, “semi-authoritarianism”, “electoral democracies” or 
“partly free democracies” are used to define these regimes that are swinging between 
two poles or carrying elements from both types of regimes. Increasing number of 
studies began to analyze these hybrid regimes, their forms and how they differ from 
each other. Yet, many of these definitions have democratizing bias; handle this type of 
democracies as they are moving to democracy (Levitsky & Way, 2002, p. 51). 
After twenty-five years of the collapse of Soviet Union, some of countries 
among third wave of democracies have chance to consolidate their democracies while 
others lagged behind in the foundation of democratic institutions, procedures and 
functioning of the way of democracies. More and more scholars used the words like 
backsliding, recession, pushback, retreat, erosion in their articles in order to describe in 
which areas these regimes’ were to become unsuccessful to establish a full democracy. 
A near consensus emerged between scholars about the existence of “democratic 
recession”. Some even ask whether democracy is in decline both in number and as an 
ideational commitment that it is an ideal type of government to be reached. This debate 
has two sides/aspects. As Marc F. Plattner (2015) asserts, one of it deals with what is 
actually taking place on the ground; how many countries are democratic or is their 
number rising or shrinking or what is the situation with respect to such liberal 
democratic features as rule of law. The second concerned about how democracies in the 
world are viewed in terms of legitimacy and attractiveness (Plattner, 2015, p. 6). In the 
first dimension, Levitsky and Way (2015) empirically show that democracy score 
remained the same or increased according to the scores of four prominent global 
democracy indices (Levitsky and Way, 2015, p. 46). According to their measures, there 
is no need to be worry about democratic downturn because it lacks empirical 
foundations. The reason behind this illusion was observers’ optimism to count any 
country where authoritarian regime fell down. Researchers began to conflate 
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authoritarian breakdown with democratization and labeled “new democracies” wherever 
dictatorship fell and opposition ascended to power (Levitsky & Way, 2015, p. 49). 
Many of these regimes have now seen a consolidation of authoritarianism, but because 
their regimes were wrongly classified as democratic in the first place, this should not be 
seen as evidence of democratic decline (Plattner, 2015, p. 7). At the same line, Larry 
Diamond (2015) found that the past decade has been “a period of at least incipient 
decline in democracy” (Diamond, 2015, p. 142). There has been no expansion in the 
number of electoral democracies in the world, oscillated between 114 and 119. This 
number began to decline after 2006. Larry Diamond counts 25 breakdowns of 
democracy in the world, not only through military or executive coups, but also 
degradations from minimum standards of democracy. But more importantly, as 
Diamond (2015) observes, there has also been a trend of declining freedom in a number 
of countries and regions since 2005 (Diamond, 2015, p. 147). Many and many 
democracies have been under the thread of this pervasive and increasing level of abuse 
of power, bad governance, shrinking political space for public debates, freedom of 
speech and media, political rights and civil liberties. A menu of manipulation emerged 
in countries where transparency, rule of law, checks and balances are weak and 
democratic institutions and procedures are fragile. In countries where populist leaders 
are in power these areas are their first targets to be manipulated. Transparent and strong 
media, independent high judicial institutions, rule of law etc. are seen as an obstacle for 
these leaders to consolidate their political positions in order to maintain power. Populist 
leaders set up their political discourse as if these institutions and concepts are hostile 
against people’s interests. For that reason, leaders do not hesitate to publicly blame and 
demonize institutions, criticize their bureaucrats and protectors. Leaders’ another 
strategy was to present these institutions as the last fortress of political, military and 
business elites who ruled country according to their self-interests of an elitist class and 
keep country from becoming “real democracy”. In some democracies existing 
democratic procedures and institutions were eroded in the hands of populist leaderships, 
elected directly with the help of democratic processes. I argue here that, the Turkish 
democracy seems presenting this kind of an example. A menu of manipulation in 
electoral, judicial and legislative area, together with the oppression of opposition 
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parties, freedom of speech and media made Turkey a perfect example for the league of 
countries relegated from democracy. 
Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been controlling the 
majority of seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA, TBMM) since 2002. 
The economic crises of 2002 and the failure of coalition governments throughout 1990s 
paved way for new political actors in Turkey. In their first election, AKP had achieved 
to control the two thirds of the seats in legislative assembly hence formed a single party 
government. Party successfully alleviated the effects of 2001 economic crises. 
Increasing level of budget used for social policies, inflation and interest rates are 
lowered, big infrastructure projects are started and improvements in education and 
health industry helped party in expanding the electoral support base of party. The 
support of liberal intellectuals and ongoing accession talks with EU, declarations of 
party leaders favoring Turkey’s NATO ties supported the public legitimacy of AKP in 
its struggle against Turkish military. EU constitutionality regime welcomed by the 
Party, lead to legal and constitutional reforms, which the party was encouraged to curb 
the political role of Turkish military gradually. Party criticized high ranks of 
bureaucrats in judiciary and state agencies as being the protectors of elites’ interests and 
guardians of Kemalist establishment; criticized media and secular business groups for 
inviting the military to intervene in civilian politics. Republican coalition1 consisting 
from military, judiciary, academia and media was presented as an obstacle for AKP to 
carry out its political agenda. AKP and personally Erdoğan placed himself as the “voice 
of the people” against their struggle with Republican coalition. These populist images 
and discourses intensified during AKP’s reign, has changed over time. I argue here and 
will provide support in the upcoming chapters that the party did not hesitate to use this 
populist discourse especially after Gezi Parkı protests in 2013 with more Islamic and 
Neo-Ottoman framework. 
                                                 
1  In this study, I will refer to the term “Republican Coalition” for describing the institutions forming secular 
characteristic of Turkish state, namely Turkish military, HSYK, high ranks of judiciary, Republican People’s party, 
universities and some part of Turkish business associations and media in Turkish politics. 
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In 2007, in their second general election, AKP came to power with strong 
electoral support. Party was strong enough to push back declaration of Turkish army2, 
delegitimize its major opponents, secular characteristics of Turkish military and state 
institutions of Kemalist regime in politics. Same year, a constitutional amendment made 
in 2007 altered the tenure and election procedures of presidency into five plus five year 
tenure with direct election by the people itself. The presidential office would be chosen 
by popular vote first time in Turkish politics, in line with the 2007 constitutional 
amendment. From 2008 to 2013, Turkey was shaken up with Ergenekon conspiracy and 
Sledgehammer trials against the coup plotters in military and so-called “deep state”, 
who were accused of plotting against civilian government. Most of these people were in 
active duty in military, which led to turnover in military cadres and shuffled the 
upcoming promotion in the high ranks of the Turkish military. These cases coincided 
with the transformation in the Turkish media. Ownership of some of mainstream 
Turkish media outlets have passed to AKP affiliated business groups. These media 
group’s presentation of the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials for helped the 
delegitimization of Turkish military.3 With this contribution coming from media, AKP 
successfully weakened its historically hostile military from politics, through reforms 
forced by EU conditionality regime. 
2010 Referendum was another source for expanding the power of AKP 
government and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Controlling the HSYK was vital for 
AKP to eliminate one of the members of aforementioned secular coalition. AKP 
supported by Gülen movement4 aimed to transform the structure and composition of 
board. With 78% turnout rate, 58% of voters said “Yes” to constitutional referendum. 
                                                 
2 In April 12, 2007 Turkish military issued a declaration blaming AKP as the center of being anti-Republican forces 
against regime. Military’s main aim was to block Abdullah Gül’s –one of the founder of AKP and minister of 
Foreign Affairs - candidacy for Presidency. Gül was seen as incompetent and incompatible with the secular 
characteristic of Turkish state. Military failed to block with strong electoral success of the AKP in 2007 general 
elections. Abdullah Gül became 11th President of Turkish regime. 
3 Many of active duty personnel of Turkish military was accused of plotting military coups against AKP government. 
Ergenekon and Sledgehammer Cases were seen problematic in terms of severe violations on rule of law and on 
evidences against defendants. 
4 Gülen movement was a religious movement founded by Fethullah Gülen. He choosed to self-exile in United States 
after his trials in late 1990s. He was accused of plotting and organizing religious movement against secular and 
Republican characteristic of Turkey. His congregation was mainly organized around education institutions and 
bureaucracy. Movement was a loyal supporter of AKP government policies in elections and Constitutional 
amendment in 2010 Referendum. 
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Result of the Constitutional referendum helped AKP government control the 
appointment and electoral processes of HSYK through increasing number of seat 
appointed by TGNA and President Abdullah Gül. With this Constitutional 
modifications, increased number of judges and prosecutors appointed by the President 
Abdullah Gül, whom has Islamic backgrounds.  
A wave of protests in 2013 Gezi Parkı in İstanbul was a severe shock against 
AKP government. Hundreds of thousands of people gathered in streets to protect one of 
the last green spaces in İstanbul, which led to heavy clashes between protesters and 
police forces, led to political stalemate in Turkey. Same year, another blow came from 
the Gülen movement. Waves of police investigations arose in 17th of December and 
25th of December, 2013 with the accusation of bribery, corruption, fraud and money 
laundering against three ministers of AKP government, their sons and several 
bureaucrats (Arango, 25.11.2013). Fethullah Gülen movement, which once upon a time 
was an ally and main supporter of AKP government in academia, media and judiciary 
began to criticize the Party as an authoritarian government even called Erdoğan as 
dictator (Dokuz8Haber, 18.07.2016). Despite these two events, AKP and Prime 
Minister Erdogan succeeded in June 2014 local elections and then 2014 presidential 
elections. Prime Minister Erdoğan became the first president of Turkey elected by the 
popular elections. 
Under these circumstances, in 2014, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had 
won country’s first direct presidential election with 52% support and extending his rule 
for another five years who is currently in power more than ten years. After his victory in 
popular elections, Erdoğan had done what he promised; create de facto practices of 
politics, declare his claim to exceed the traditional boundaries of Presidency. For 
example, he did not promise to be an impartial and neutral president which was against 
article 101 of the constitution in effect (Hürriyet Daily News, 08.07.2014). Erdoğan 
aimed to extend the Constitutional limits of presidency. Presidents are able to call 
national security councils, appoint judges and several high rank positions for state 
agencies, veto legislation also call for an early election if a government cannot be 
formed. In some of his speeches, Erdoğan claimed that the presidential system is the 
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most suitable one for Turkey (Hürriyet, 01.06.2015). His main strategy was 
transforming the Turkish political system from parliamentary system to a presidential 
one. During this time, before referendum that introduced the Presidential system, 
Erdogan declared that he was in need of malleable figure for prime ministership. 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu handpicked by Erdoğan to the party 
leadership, has installed in the role in 2014. According to Erdoğan, this was a move to 
an era of strong President and strong Prime Minister. Neither Erdoğan stayed within the 
limits of presidency, neither Davutoğlu a caretaker role in politics. After 2014 
presidential elections, Erdoğan was seeking to transfer executive power from prime 
minister to president and legally consolidate his de-facto presidency. Five months after 
losing majority government in June 2015 general elections, Davutoğlu’s AKP has 
comeback with victory in November 2015 snap elections. The high-stakes vote, took 
place in a climate of mounting tension and violence following an inconclusive June poll 
in which the conservative, Islamic-leaning AKP failed to secure an outright majority for 
the first time since coming to power in 2002 (Henley & Shaheen, 2015). Yet, despite 
the electoral victory of Davutoğlu, tension between these two politicians intensified as 
Davutoglu did not give his full backing for Erdoğan’s plans for Presidentialism. In May 
2016, resignation of Davutoğlu is forced by the demand of Erdoğan himself. 
Another unexpected political event has happened in the mid of 2016. On the 
night of 15 July 2016 Turkey experienced another coup attempt in its history. A small 
group mostly consisted from midlevel ranks of Turkish military organized mostly in 
İstanbul and Ankara aims to seize strategic locations such as airports, bridges, General 
Headquarters of Chief of Staff and Special Forces, satellites and TV channels. The mass 
mobilization of party grass roots, effective use of religious discourse, organization and 
mosques –such as salaa’s from mosques-, and municipality services, the counter 
aggressive of loyal police forces against military and the role of media that stand behind 
the government had played significant role in failure of the attempted coup (Esen & 
Gümüşçü, 2017). An hour after attempt, Erdoğan and PM Yıldırım had spoken against 
the coup in live TV. Their call for citizens to rally against the “invasion of country by 
followers of small groups of Gülen movement in military” created a mass mobilization 
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of citizens to protect regimes from a military coup. This mass mobilization might have 
hindered some of non-pro-Gülen officers to support the coup and may cause low level 
of participation of Turkish military. It was apparent that the denial of the coup attempt 
by Chief General and General of First Brigade based on İstanbul and public statements 
of opposition parties against the coup were another source of major blow for putschists. 
After the failed coup, parliament passed martial law. Erdoğan was the president 
formally has been operationalized under the martial law that helped him pass laws that 
he would not dreamed of in pre-coup period such as purge of thousands of civil servants 
from different departments of bureaucracy and academia, abolishment of military 
schools, seizure of billions of dollars firms affiliated with Gülen movements, closure of 
numbers of civil society organizations, radio, TV channels and newspapers. Erdoğan 
was right on his evaluation on coup attempt, having described it as a “gift from God,” 
(Esen & Gümüşçü, 2017: p. 69).  
After the attempted coup, Erdoğan urged AKP to introduce 21-article 
constitutional amendment that enhanced the power of the head of state and officially 
replace parliamentary system with the existing presidential one. In 2017 Erdoğan’s 
main project of Presidentialism ultimately passed in constitutional referendum and 
expanded the powers of the President (Özpek & Yaşar, 2017: p. 11). With this result, 
Erdoğan achieved to obtain enough vote for constitutional amendment that modify 
Turkish politics into presidential one and also, create a presidential seat who can control 
of his party since amendment allowed president to be member of party. 
Before Presidential Referendum, Solution to Kurdish Question Process has been 
finalized. Intensified clashes with PKK after July 2015 elections in southeast part of 
Turkey brought an end to ongoing Kurdish Solution Process. Co-chairs Selahattin 
Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, whom clearly showed their strong opposition against 
Presidentialism project of Erdoğan, have been jailed for their alleged links with 
terrorism in November 2016 after their parliamentary immunity were abolished. 
As historical narrative from the beginning of 2002 elections to today’s many of 
the positive expectations about the future of Turkish politics has been failed. Many 
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scholars and pundits support AKP’s policies for removing Turkish omnipotent 
military’s veto power in politics, increasing the chances of accession to European 
Union, enlarging civil liberties and freedoms regarding the Kurdish issue and governing 
with respectable economy policies. As I argued in following chapters, for these people 
modifications in these political areas have made Turkey more democratic than in 
previous periods at the beginning of 2000s. 
AKP has gradually entrenched its own political hegemony through extending 
control over the judiciary, TGNA, state institutions, bureaucracy and media. Media has 
always been at the center of interest for AKP government. Many of newspapers have 
been purchased by economic groups that are connected with AKP’s inner circle as 
Buğra & Savaşkan (2012) gave briefly the examples of Akın İpek and Ethem Sancak. 
More media workers fired or forced to resign because of the pressure on the media 
groups (Freedom of the Press, 2017). As many observers and indexes such as Freedom 
House, World Press Freedom Index manifest as I showed in following chapters, 
freedom of media diminished and nearly disappeared in modern Turkey. Purges and 
deposition of state bureaucrats and officers from judiciary and security departments are 
turning to daily issues. 
From 2010 to 2017, under AKP rule, the freedom of speech and opposition, civil 
liberties, political freedoms and rights are gradually eroding according to the Freedom 
House Freedom of the World Index especially after 2013. In 2013, civil liberties 
changed from 3 to 4, freedom rating from 3 to 3.5 where 7 defines the worst condition 
for freedoms. In 2017, Freedom House is reporting that the civil liberties of Turkey 5/7, 
political rights 4/7 and overall rating as 4.5/7, which is the worst of this decade 
(Freedom House, Freedom in the World Reports 2010-2017). Turkey can no longer be 
evaluated as a democratic type of regime. Especially after the 2010 Referendum and 
2013 Gezi Parkı protests, Turkish democracy eroded gradually. Tendencies toward 
majoritarian style of rule, demonization of dissents and criminalization of opposition 
parties, stifling political atmosphere created by AKP controlled media led to increase of 
number of critics towards the Turkish regime. Backsliding from the democracy 
intensified with the 15 July failed coup.  
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Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the successful leader of AKP, has been centralizing his 
personal power gradually since 2002, with the help of success in consecutive elections 
(Kingsley, 16.04.2017). Being charismatic and experienced politician, having Islamic 
background, using religious discourse, Erdoğan benefited his talents in a predominantly 
conservative and nationalist country. His charismatic leadership, his success in 
elections, religious discourse and his conservative characteristics helps him in building 
populist policies in reaching out to conservative and religious electorate. Until 2010, 
AKP policies was somewhat restricted with secularist institutions –namely military, 
judiciary, and universities- such as in the case of 2007 Turkish military’s declaration in 
pre-Presidential election. Therefore, AKP was emphasizing more the importance of EU 
reforms, which the party could be benefited for restricting the role of military in 
politics, macroeconomic stability, accession to EU, social policies and abolishing some 
of rigid secularist laws. However, after 2010 as AKP and its leader consolidated their 
power, the discourse has become more Islamic, more Sunni-Muslim especially after 
Gezi Parkı protests in 2013 (Aslan, 20.02.2015). Party began to see the politics as “us 
versus them”. Business groups that are close to party corridors are awarded with big 
state procurements. The firms having connections and affiliations with the AKP receive 
more than the unaffiliated/non-partisan foreign firms, firms that are connected to 
opposition parties and non-partisan business associations (Gurakar, 2016: p. 5). Media, 
freedom of speech and opposition media’s accession to the news can be limited by the 
pressure from AKP such as through blocking websites or denying media accreditation 
(DailyOnline, 10.11.2015). These efforts made Erdoğan able to skew the playing field 
of Turkish politics. Erdoğan has now become the founder of dominant party regime and 
also the popularly elected president since August 2014 elections.  
There is an ongoing tendency to divide 15 years old single party government of 
AKP into two periods. In the first period, because of the advancement in the accession 
talks with EU, agenda required for EU conditionality regime and intention of party to 
demilitarization of civilian politics, curbing of the political power of military and 
recognition of the Kurdish identity led many, both from domestic or foreign world to 
support AKP. The party’s denial to accept the conditions proposed by military 
 11 
declaration in 2007 and its struggle to eliminate the political space available for military 
caused optimistic evaluations about the future of Turkish democracy. However, 
contrary to these optimistic predictions, withdrawal of Turkish military from politics 
and elimination of tutelary powers did not bring democracy to Turkey. Rather, lack of 
strong and independent check and balance system and strong public institutions could 
not resist a majoritarian political force, which in turn leads to foundation of dominant 
party system. AKP exploited the existence of tutelary powers and heritage of illiberal 
practices of Kemalist regime for consolidating its support base through populism. AKP 
was applying the populist discourse even from the beginning, but it become more 
evident and Islamic later on. The conservative democrat and pro-Western and pro-
NATO policies and discourses of the party later were abandoned to Islamic and Neo-
Ottomanist ones. Therefore, many failed to be conscious of that the party has the 
populist characteristics from the beginning. 
This study will focus on the problems of democratic completion in the case of 
Turkey. I will explain and summarize what are the factors that block/prevent a country’s 
complete transition to democracy through the arguments proposed in the literature. 
Discussions on backsliding into authoritarianism and erosion of democracies began to 
take more space in the democracy literature recently. The numbers of countries in all 
around world that are experiencing backslidings are rising as in the examples of 
Venezuela, Poland and Hungary (Fischer & Taub, 2017) (Salmi, 2017). In this study, I 
will discuss the backsliding into authoritarianism in the case of Turkey. Beside this, as I 
pointed in above, contrary to conventional wisdom or say the arguments of public 
intellectuals of Turkey, withdrawal of tutelary institutions did not bring 
democratization/consolidation to Turkey. Therefore, it would be wise to discuss how 
some scholars of the Turkish democratic consolidation literature failed to interpret the 
policies of AKP as advancement towards democratic consolidation and did not foresee 
its populist and authoritarian shift? While doing this, I will apply and compare to the 
typologies offered by Andreas Schedler and Nancy Bermeo. 
In doing so, first, study will focus on the definition of democracy and 
institutions that make democracy possible in order to understand how democracies 
 12 
differ from each other. In the second chapter, study will aim to outline conditions that 
cause democratization and areas that complete democracies to become institutionalize 
and backsliding by giving literature review from democratic transition and resilience 
and backsliding. In the third part, study’s case, Turkey will be in the center, I will 
discuss the conditions that failed to make democracies resilient in Turkish case one by 
one. Our case will be Turkish democracy from 1983 democratic transition to 2017 
Presidential Referendum. 
Turkish democracy lacks conditions such as rule of law autonomous from 
executive interventions, independent media and freedom of expressions, autonomous 
and strong civil society, and favorable political culture properties, which are critical 
conditions for avoiding the democratic erosion. General properties of Turkish political 
culture are also far-fetched from the civic political culture. System lacks interpersonal 
trust, social capital, tolerance that a democracy necessitates. These institutions are 
pillars of checks and balances system, that could hinder the populist-authoritarian 
regressions, can prevent political system from slow death of democracy. Therefore, the 
assumption of transition paradigm of elimination of tutelary powers after transition 
would bring democratic completion failed in Turkish case. Under the conditions of 
weak checks and balance system and democratic institutions and unfavorable political 
cultural traits, after curbing the political space available for tutelary powers, Turkish 
democracy experienced backsliding into authoritarianism by democratically elected 
government. 
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CHAPTER II 
DEFINING DEMOCRACY 
Second half of the 20th century had been marked by an unprecedented expansion of 
democracy. Increasing number of countries adopted democracy as their form of 
government. Millions of people started to be ruled by democratic type of government or 
at least started to elect their rulers. From ancient periods to modern world, “democracy” 
or “democratic” had become one of the insistently used words to define specific type of 
government. Throughout history, the meaning of the words has been reshaped-
transformed and started to define a more complex political regime or a system of 
governance. As time goes by, the meaning of democracy began to be used in a specific 
area, system and regime type. A remarkable consensus has emerged concerning the 
minimal conditions that polities must meet in order to merit the prestigious appellation 
of “democratic” (Schmitter & Karl, 1991: p. 75). In time, political scientists were 
started to compromise over the meaning of democracy, its preconditions, institutions, 
and procedures.  
Considering the study’s research question, we need to clarify the meaning of 
democracy and how prominent definitions of democracies differ from each other on 
what aspects. Throughout this chapter, I will briefly explain the definition of 
democracy, its procedures, institutions and principles. In this chapter, study will 
examine procedures that make political system to a democracy. Study will answer the 
question of what are the components of democracy that change democracies from other 
regime types and diminish subtypes of democracy.  
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2.1 Definitions of Democracy  
Elsewhere, Samuel P. Huntington indicates, democracy is one public virtue, not the 
only one, and the relation of democracy to other public virtues and vices can only be 
understood if democracy is clearly distinguished from other characteristics of political 
systems (Huntington, 1991: p. 10). What Huntington tried to implicate is we need to 
distinguish democracies from other regime types. And virtues of democracy can only be 
understood through comprehending its differences. In order to discuss democracy, first 
we need to clarify what we mean by defining “democracy”. To discuss a concept, 
democracy, which many scholars attributed different meanings, dimensions, conditions 
to it, I found it necessary to start with this clarification. Following the historical 
trajectory of development on the definitions of democracy from procedural meanings to 
a more complex one might help our conceptualization of democracy through analyzing 
definitions of prominent political scientists. 
Joseph Schumpeter introduced a seminal definition of democracy in his book 
called Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942). The author defined the democratic 
method as “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which 
realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the 
election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will” (Schumpeter, 
1942: p. 250). Schumpeter, through this procedural meaning presents a non-normative 
definition of democracy. People itself, through free, fair and periodic elections will 
decide on what is good or bad for their country which Schumpeter argues that there is 
no such common good. Periodically repeated free and fair elections constitute the 
central institution in which citizens reflect their views and propound their common 
good. In this definition, democracy is acknowledged as the most powerful collective 
decision-making system in which citizens choose their rulers among competing 
candidates. Thus, Schumpeter emphasizes that there must be political elites competing 
for a specific public office, more than one candidate. The word “common good” 
connotes definite answer to all sets of questions that people all agree what is good or 
bad for them or their society. In his definition, Schumpeter argues that will of every 
normal people can be manufactured. However, it would be compelling for sole 
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individual to decide upon each issue with all the other citizens. There is no such a thing 
that everybody will agree on through rational argument. And for getting rational 
decision people should get informed impartially and get involved in political affairs. 
Different groups and individuals attributed different meanings to same concepts or 
problems. If there is no consensus in the society over specific issues, irreducible 
attitudes and conflictual situations begin to emerge which may in turn cause clashes. In 
order to solve this question, significant problems can be decided by a body of delegates 
or a committee whose members will be elected by popular vote.  
Dahl introduced the term polyarchy, procedural definition of democracy and this 
term enables him to distinguish political democracy from ideal –normative- system of 
democracy. After Second World War, democracy had gained two different meaning; 
Western democracies and public democracies. Each state began to claim that their 
political regime is democracy, or some other revealed their desire to become full 
democracy. The concept ‘democracy’ began to lose its scientific meaning, when states 
started to announce their political system as democracy, even if they are not matching 
with the criteria of democracy. For that reason, Dahl proposed another concept, 
‘polyarchy’, which would be more legitimate for academics to be used instead of 
corrupt usage of democracy. Dahl assumes that a key characteristic of a democracy is 
the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, 
considered as political equals (Dahl, 1971, p. 1). The only characteristic that Dahl 
considers regarding to define a system ‘democratic’ is political system’s quality of 
responsiveness to its citizens. Competition and participation (inclusiveness) are 
essential in move towards polyarchies. In order to have this political system in a nation 
state, all citizens must formulate their preferences, must signify their preferences to 
their fellow citizens. The government by individual and collective action and must have 
‘as people’ their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government, that is 
weighted with no discrimination because of the content or source of the preference 
(Dahl, 1971, p. 2). Mutual security of government and opposition increases the chances 
of opposition (Dahl, 1971, p. 16). Hegemonic, dominant party system could pose 
serious risks for regimes in becoming polyarchy. Once governments are formed, they 
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should be tolerant for opposition while their authority respected by citizens. For that 
reason, in order to form democracy a type of government, system has to meet the 
criteria of responsiveness to its citizens. Beside this, eight requirements are proposed by 
Dahl in order to meet the necessary conditions of democracy. Freedom to form and join 
organizations, freedom of expression, right to vote, right of political leaders to compete 
for support and votes, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, 
institutions for making government policies depend on votes are institutional guarantees 
required for carrying out democracy among a large number of people. Eight different 
guarantees constituting two dimensions of democratization; these are public 
contestation and inclusiveness. Democratic regimes vary in terms of their extents in 
these two dimensions. When a regime grants right to vote in free and fair elections, to 
some of its citizens, it moves toward greater public contestation, but the larger the 
proportion of citizens who enjoy the right, the more inclusive the regime (Dahl, 1971, p. 
4). At this point, we should differentiate preconditions that cause democracy from 
dimensions that distinguish subtypes of democracy like responsiveness, participation 
and access. Each of these might be essential component of democracy but as Schmitter 
and Karl asserted (2013) “they should instead be seen either as indicators of this or that 
type of democracy, or else as useful standard for evaluating the performance of 
particular regimes” (Karl & Schmitter, 2013, p. 38) but not the preconditions or part of 
the definition that make democracy possible. 
Martin Seymour Lipset (1959) defined democracy as a political system which 
supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. It is a 
social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision-making among 
conflicting interest groups which permitted the largest possible part of the population to 
influence these decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders 
for political office (Lipset, 1959, p. 71). Lipset’s definition emphasizes several points 
and implies number of specific conditions. Democracy, according to Lipset, a “political 
formula”, a system of beliefs, legitimizing the democratic system and specifying the 
institutions, parties, a free press which are legitimized by one set of political leaders at 
the office and another one or more set of leaders out of office, who act as a legitimate 
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opposition attempting to gain office (Lipset, 1959, p. 71). Lipset’s definition is stressing 
contestation over public and popular offices, and competition between different 
ideologies whose supporters are out of offices, attitudes and political parties through 
which population will reflect its collective decisions by means of elections.  
Huntington, in his Third Wave of Democracy (1991) contributed to the definition 
of democracy which is highly influenced by Dahl’s perspective. Huntington’s study 
defined a political system as democratic if its most powerful collective decision makers 
are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely 
compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote 
(Huntington, 1991, p. 7). So, as like Robert Dahl, Huntington emphasized contestation 
and participation dimensions of democracy. These two definitions are crucial in 
distinguishing, comparing and defining political system as democratic according to 
Huntington. Elections which are free and fair are the essence of democracy, the 
inescapable sine qua non (Huntington, 1991, p. 9). Free and fair elections are the core 
element of democracy; however it is not the only precondition that makes a system a 
democracy. Today, populist leaders aiming to guarantee their strong electoral mandate, 
mostly focus on their electoral success and fall in the trap of electoralism. In the eyes of 
these populist leaders, elections are the only source of legitimacy.  
According to Adam Przeworski et al (2000), in terms of definitions of 
democracy, Schumpeter and Dahl give emphasis to competition and contestation 
respectively (Przeworski et.al., 2000, p. 14). Przeworski et al, just like Dahl attach 
importance to contestation dimension of democracy. Regimes that allow some, even if 
limited, regularized competition among conflicting visions and interests, and regimes in 
which some values or interests enjoy a monopoly buttressed by the threat or the actual 
use of force are two dimensions that Przeworski incorporated into the definition of 
democracy. According to Przeworski et.al. democracy is a regime in which those who 
govern are selected through contested “elections, the outcome of which is uncertain for 
the government and non-government parties and candidates (Przeworski et.al., 2000, p. 
15). This narrow definition emphasizes –rulers- seeking to get an office and 
contestation for these offices. Simply, democracy is a system in which parties lose 
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elections (Przeworski et.al., 1999, p. 10). Therefore, offices have to be filled by 
elections through contestation for the office. This contestation emerges when there 
exists an opposition, struggles for winning office. Alternation in office constitutes prima 
facie evidence of contestation (Przeworski et al, 2000, p. 16). Therefore, existence of 
more than one party is one of our requirements for contestation. Przeworski et.al. assert 
two other criteria in order to define political system as democratic. Two offices; chief 
executive office and seats at the legislative organ of the government must be filled after 
the electoral processes. For a regime to be qualified as democratic, the executive must 
be directly or indirectly elected through popular elections and must be responsible only 
directly to voters or to legislature elected by them (Przeworski et al, 2000, p. 19). At 
this point, I should also remind of the temporal nature of the political outcome. Office 
seeker once gained the control of the office, cannot use office’s power in order to 
undermine contestation or make it impossible for opposition to win the next time. This 
regime could be anything but not a democratic regime. 
In order to emphasize different dimensions of democratic regimes, many 
scholars reproduce new definitions of democracy. One of these definitions is proposed 
by Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens in Capitalist Development and Democracy 
(1992). Their definition of democracy focuses more on responsibility dimension and 
emphasizes importance of suffrage in political systems. In the study, representative 
democracy defined by regular, free, fair elections of representatives with universal and 
equal suffrage, responsibility of the state apparatus to the elected parliament and the 
freedom of expression and association as well as the protection of individual rights 
against arbitrary state action (Rueschemeyer et.al., 1992:42). In the first part of this 
broad definition, authors accentuate general suffrage as principle of the democracy. All 
citizens without any restriction should be able to take part in politics with equal 
opportunity. All citizens must be granted their right to vote. Exclusion from free and 
fair elections on the basis of ethnic and religious identities, literacy, wealth, or 
profession is not part of democratic type of government. State apparatus must be 
responsible directly to citizens or committee or legislative organ which has 
representative power of the nation. Lastly, political parties, civil society organizations 
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and citizens should be feeling free to express their attitudes, share ideas and opinion, 
and persuade other with their political preferences in the public realm. Beside these, 
individual rights must also be protected from arbitrary state action.  
In their article, Schmitter & Karl (2013) define modern political democracy as a 
system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public 
realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their 
elected representatives (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 34). Their definition seems like an 
aggregation of other definitions through emphasizing several different dimensions of 
democracy such as institutions, the role of culture and political actors. At this point, I 
believe that scrutinizing each aspect of their definition would contribute our study 
significantly. 
A regime or a system of governance is an ensemble of patterns that determines 
the methods of access to the principal public offices, the characteristics of the actors 
admitted to or excluded from such access, and the rules that are followed in the making 
of publicly binding decisions (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 34). This system of 
governance must be shared, practiced and approved by all actors in order to function 
properly. 
Democracy depends on the rulers who occupy specific authority and power over 
others. Democracies are regimes that elect its officials and representatives through 
elections and also bind them through accountability to their electorate for the next 
elections. Elected rulers emerged as a result of competition process which differ 
democracies from dictatorships. What distinguishes democratic rulers from 
nondemocratic ones are the norms that condition how the former come to power and the 
practices that hold them accountable for their actions (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 34). 
The public realm encompasses the making of collective norms and choices that are 
binding on the society and backed by state sanctions (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 34). 
Citizens are also crucial in democracies. Any restriction that excluded one part of the 
society could not be considered as democracy. Equal and universal suffrage is vital for 
democracies. One of the most important successes of the 20th century in the political 
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history was the abolition of restriction over the criteria for political inclusion. 
According to Rueschemeyer et.al. democracy was achieved by those who were 
excluded from rule and who acquired the social power –namely working classes in 20th 
century- to reach for a power to reach for a share in the political process (Rueschemeyer 
et.al., 1992, p. 46). The ideal of democracy is advanced by those who fight for the 
principles of democratic rules and procedures in order to gain political power. This 
situation not only broadens regimes’ legitimacy within the country but also make it 
sustainable to reversals by increasing inclusiveness dimension of the democratic rule.  
Democratic regimes should permit visions, ideas, and ideologies to compete. 
Competition is related to free, fair and regular elections. Competition allows citizens to 
make choice among competing alternatives and rank/choose according to their merits, 
weakness or characteristics. One of the significant fallacies about democracy is its 
equation with regular elections, defined electoralism by Terry Lynn Karl. Some equated 
elections with democracy, seen it a sufficient condition of democracy. Democracy 
should be beyond that free and fair conducted election. Fairly, free and regular elections 
are definitely the core element of democracy and they should be fairly conducted and 
counted. Through regularly conducted, free and fair elections, governments and rulers 
will be responsible for their actions in the office. This would increase vertical 
accountability of the rulers to their electorate and will increase the quality and 
effectiveness of democracy.  
Another commonly accepted image of democracy is identification of it with 
majority rule, by combining the votes of more than half of those eligible and present is 
said to be -democratic, whether that majority emerges within an electorate, a parliament, 
a committee, a city council, or a party caucus (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 35). 
Successful democracies are those which apply majority rules under strict supervision 
through legislative and constitutional review, but also those not pass any legislation that 
would harm minority rights. Using majoritarian or plesbicitarian decision-making 
mechanisms can be dangerous without any legal and institutional review. Ethnic, 
religious, political minority rights must be protected in democracies. These protections 
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can take different forms like constitutional provisions such as Constitutional Court’s 
overview over the constitutional modifications or court decisions. 
Cooperation is the last dimension of Karl & Schmitter’s definition of 
democracy. Voters, groups, individuals collective action capacities are important for 
democracies, parties and assemblies. They must be capable of acting collectively 
through parties, associations, and movements in order to select candidates, articulate 
preferences, petition authorities, and influence policies (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p.36). 
2.2 Institutions That Make Democracy Possible 
Democratic institutions, rules and procedures are significant in order to compare 
political systems, analyze whether they are improving within their own democratic 
system or not. For example, the main struggle for the pro-democratic forces in the 19th 
century was for general suffrage. However today, since most of the democratic 
countries adopted standard suffrage principles, democratic forces are now seeking to 
more advance in deepening the democracy such as for more inclusive participation to 
political processes. Number of these conditions expanded and became much more 
complex throughout the last two centuries. Adoption of these institutions did not take 
simultaneously, rather gradually introduced to systems. For the minimum requirements 
of democracy I will follow Dahl’s conception of democracy. The political institutions of 
modern representative democracy requires elected officials, free, fair and frequent 
elections, freedom of expression, access to alternative sources of information, 
associational autonomy, inclusive citizenship. They are the defining elements of 
democracies, not wholly developed in a short period, though are all are consequence of 
a long process of struggle for democracy. Once they are all introduced to a political 
system, they must function properly. As Schmitter and Karl indicate specific procedural 
norms, must be followed and respected. Throughout this section, I will follow 
procedures defined by Schmitter and Karl. They are not sufficient conditions in order to 
define a polity as democratic, but necessary ones. However, these procedures are not 
significant if there is no functioning rule of law. Any polity that fails to follow the “rule 
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of law” with regards to its own procedures should not be considered democratic 
(Schmitter& Karl, 2013, p. 36). 
Elected Representatives. Modern large scale democracies require elected 
representatives. Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally 
vested in officials elected by citizens (Dahl, 2013, p. 74). As number of people that 
participate in the political decision making process increase the role and the power that 
elected representative hold increase as well. As far as the magnitude of the political 
system increases, politics and procedures become more complex, number of political 
institutions will rise and pursuing lawmaking process turn out to be harder. In order to 
incorporate citizens into these processes, democracy necessitates elected representatives 
that speak and stand for according to the wishes of their voters, control the agenda of 
legislative process or represent party policies in legislation. 
Democracy requires professional politicians as representatives as well. 
Politicians today need ample party and personal resources to win elections, require 
specialized knowledge in order to hold technocrats accountable, and must surround 
themselves with experts in polling and the like in order to stay in office (Schmitter, 
2013, p. 46). This may lead to disenchantment of voters from their representatives or 
reduce their chances to access politicians since it become more professional. However, 
politicians that have social capital, procedural knowledge and experience would 
contribute to the institutionalization of the political processes such as rules of that of the 
rules of procedures in the parliament.  
Free, Fair and Frequent Elections. Each citizen of a nation should be free to 
vote in elections. Any restriction that would inhibit any citizen from his or her right to 
vote is violation of democratic procedures. Elections must be fairly conducted and fairly 
counted. Each of the citizens must have equal opportunity to vote and all votes must be 
counted as equal. To be free means that citizens can go to the polls without fear of 
reprisal; and if they are to be fair, then all votes must be counted as equal (Dahl, 2013, 
p. 78). Finally, elections must also be frequent and must be conducted between 
scheduled time periods. However, there are also limits on being free to vote in elections. 
 23 
For example, in most of countries prisoners are not allowed to vote in elections. There 
are also limits on the voting age, which is mostly 18 and those below this age limit are 
deprived of voting in elections. 
Free Expression. Citizens have a right to express themselves without danger of 
severe punishment on political matters (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 36). They should 
declare their political preferences and persuade other citizens to vote for their party or 
participate their social movement, civil society organization. To acquire civic 
competence, citizens need opportunities to express their own views; learn from one 
another; engage in discussion and deliberation; read, hear and question experts, political 
candidates, and persons whose judgments they trust; and learn in other ways that 
depend on freedom of expression (Dahl, 2013, p. 78). Free expression is important 
especially for the opposition parties. They must be able to defend their views, 
ideologies and reflections in ongoing political processes which are central in 
democracies. Considering the erosion of the democratic rule, it is not surprising to see 
that early steps of any authoritarian political power mostly focus on to restrict freedom 
of expression. 
Alternative Sources of Information. The availability of alternative sources of 
information is one of the basic criteria for democracy. Citizens must have a chance to 
reach alternative and independent sources of information in order to make right choice. 
Regimes that manipulate, control or produce a media that loyal to it or a media 
controlled by a monopoly is not considered as democratic regimes. Citizens must have 
access, then, to alternative sources of information that are not under the control of the 
government or dominated by any other group or point of view (Dahl, 2013, p. 78). 
Governments that apply censorship, manipulation of media or using state power in 
order to weaken pluralism of media not only undermine freedom of media but also 
hinder citizens’ participation to politics. Alternative sources of information should exist 
and also protected by law. For example, in order to solve the problem of corruption, 
office holders’ abuses of power, transparency, accountability would be the remedies. 
These remedies, as well, require free press and the media that can expose corruption 
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scandal and inform voters for their future decisions. Accountability will function better 
if democracy has alternative sources of information. 
Independent Associations. Democracy requires independent political 
organizations. Political parties, civil society organizations, trade unions, interests 
groups, lobbying groups are all part of democratic politics. These associations are where 
politics unfolds, where elected representatives recruited or gained political skills. 
Associations provide opportunities for people to discuss, deliberate, increase their 
associability, social networks and help promote interpersonal trust, sharing attitudes, 
and information or produce resources for social movements. For example, political 
parties provide access to government, create shortcuts to tell voters who are who, help 
reduce the information costs of voting and put candidates in for public office 
(Mainwaring & Scully, 1995, p. 2-3). Citizens have the right to form several of 
alternative and independent associations or organizations. 
Inclusive Citizenship. Inclusive citizenship means that no one who is subject to 
the laws of the land can be denied the right that other citizens possess (Dahl, 1998, p. 
86). Inclusive citizenship implies full access to the rights of citizenship, citizens’ 
participation into political processes. 
All these institutions enable to capture the essence of the procedural meaning of 
democracy, polyarchy. These are the minimum requirements for democratic countries. 
Beside these institutions Schmitter & Karl offer two other procedures that might be seen 
as prior conditions of those proposed by Dahl. According to Schmitter & Karl (2013), 
popularly elected officials must be able to exercise their constitutional powers without 
being subjected to overriding (albeit informal) opposition from unelected officials 
(Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 37). What Schmitter & Karl imply with this proposition is 
power and capacity of the elected officials must not be confined, restrained by civil 
service, military officers or business groups. Existence of a tutelary and veto power or 
specific “guaranteed and protected” political areas that are absent from the control of 
civilian rule would be detrimental for democracy. Huntington also warns about the 
same point. Political leaders must share power with other groups in society. If those 
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democratically elected decision makers become, however, simply a façade for the 
exercise of much greater power by a non-democratically chosen group, then clearly that 
political system is not democratic (Huntington, 1991, p. 10). And a political system that 
contains any of such powers could not be considered as democratic. Democracies are 
where elected representatives’ decisions hindered through several ways such as 
constitutional provisions and through restraints from guarding military officers or civil 
servants might be dragged into “electoralism” easily.  
Another proposition of the Schmitter & Karl (2013) is that the polity must be 
able to act independently of constraints imposed by some other overarching political 
system (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 37). With the development of blocs, alliances, 
spheres of influence, and a variety of “neocolonial” arrangements, the question of 
autonomy has been a salient one (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 37). Taking binding 
decisions in international areas because of the force used by external powers are 
problematic. In democratic countries, decisions are produced/approved by 
legislative/executive organs which must be accountable to the people and political 
institutions. 
Guillermo O’Donnell also made a contribution to Dalh’s list. According to him, 
elected and appointed officials should not be arbitrarily terminated before the end of 
their constitutionally mandated terms as like actions of Alberto Fujimori of Peru and 
Boris Yeltsin of Russia when they fired members of the Supreme Court or closed their 
countries congresses (O’Donnell, 1996, p. 35). O’Donnell’s second additional criterion 
is that there should be an uncontested national territory (O’Donnell, 1996, p. 35), which 
is actually originally introduced by Dankwart Rustow in early 1970s. 
Through examining democratic procedures, institutions and requirements what 
democracy is summarized above. However, in order to reach the ideal of democracy all 
these procedures and institutions must function properly. They are necessary but not 
sufficient condition for consolidated, properly functioned advanced democracies and 
any single set of preconditions are inadequate to define democracies. Extent of these 
prerequisites is also central in regard to distinguishing subtypes of democracy. 
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2.3 How Democracies Differ 
Democracy does not consist of a single, unique set of institutions. There are many types 
of democracies, and their diverse practices produce a similarly varied set of effects 
(Schmitter & Karl, 2013). Post-Cold War era has been marked by an unexpected 
expansion of democratic type of government because of the collapse of Soviet Bloc 
countries. Many saw these countries as hybrid regimes that oscillate between 
democratic and authoritarian type of government. This situation attracts scholars to 
focus on “democracy with adjectives” (Collier & Levitsky 1997) in order to define 
partial democracies. Even if they meet the requirements of democracy most of them fall 
into the danger of what Andreas Schedler (2013) called “multiparty elections without 
democracy (Schedler, 2013, p. 188)”.  
There is not such a black and white duality in regime studies. Even authoritarian 
or democratic regimes are varied among themselves. Every polity somehow may have 
mixed combinations. Whether democracy or not, political regimes in several areas can 
have institutions that combines democratic features or vice versa. Illiberal practices can 
live in institutionalized free and fair elections systems. Therefore, we should not ignore 
the critics of “whole system” thinking, who eschew efforts at regime classification 
altogether and seek to identify the ways in which each political system combines 
democratic and undemocratic features (Diamond, 2002, p. 33). Combinations of these 
democratic and undemocratic elements lead to discussions of political systems that are 
deficient from the requirements of democracies in several areas. The definitions of 
hybrid regimes emerged between these discussions where the political regimes 
oscillated between democracy and authoritarianism.  
In these regimes, institutions of democracy may live together with authoritarian 
practices. The free and fair elections may coexist with the highly restricted civil rights 
and liberties as in illiberal democracies (Zakaria 1997), multiparty elections with certain 
degree of competition which is restricted through several mechanisms in competitive 
authoritarianism (Levistky & Way 2002), or free and fair elections with the recognition 
of some degree of civil rights and liberties and opposition where the parliament and 
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judiciary seen as impediment for the representation of the national will in the body of 
leader (O’Donnel 1994), formal democratic institutions with strict supervision of 
military exercising the political power above elected governments (Przeworski & 
Wallerstein 1988), liberalized authoritarian regime called dictablanda or illiberal 
democracy democradura (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986), semidemocracies that are 
close to meeting the requirements of polyarchies (Linz, Lipset & Diamond 1988). These 
labels are created for defining certain types of regimes, implied either deficiency from 
requirements of democratic institutions or the evaluation of existence of authoritarian 
practices. These labels would contribute our study during discussions about the 
democratic transition of Turkey in 1983 and to determine AKP’s drift to 
authoritarianism. 
Complex and changing context of these components produces different types of 
democracies. On the basis of the works of Schmitter & Karl (2013), this study will 
briefly discuss the components that distinguish one subtype of democracy from others. 
Schmitter & Karl (2013) maintain that type of democracies change by potential 
combinations which are consensus, participation, access, responsiveness, majority rule, 
parliamentary sovereignty, party government, pluralism, federalism, presidentialism, 
checks and balances (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 38). Through discussing these 
combinations, my study will examine subtypes of democracies in following paragraphs. 
Given this process, study will examine how these combinations, their absence or 
existence, causes differentiation of subtypes. These indicators are not included in the 
generic definition of democracy but indicators that differentiate the type or this type of 
democracies. 
Consensus. Democracy is, by its nature, a system of institutionalized 
competition for power (Diamond, 1990, p. 49). Competition and conflict are embedded 
into the functioning of democracies. Democracy requires conflict –but not too much; 
competition there must be, but only within carefully defined and universally accepted 
boundaries (Diamond, 1990, p. 49). The boundaries of the game should be decisive and 
certain for all the players in the game. As conflicts are embedded in democracies, 
resolution of these conflicts requires consensus among competing/clashing ideas and 
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ideologies. Systems that are creating only conflicting ideas but not consensus would end 
up with stalemates. Political conflict runs the risk of becoming too intense, producing a 
society so conflict-ridden that civil peace and political stability are jeopardized 
(Diamond, 1990, p. 49). And it should be reiterated that, politics by nature is the art of 
resolving conflicting ideas. This creates one of the paradoxes in democracies. 
Democracy aims to resolve problems and while facing with conflicts. Therefore, there 
must be consensus over the playing field of democracy, its boundaries and limits. 
Playing field must be definite and certain and accepted by major political actors. Thus, 
democracy requires consensus on at least some rules of the game. Such as, all citizens 
may not agree on the substantive goals of political action or on the role of the state 
(although if they did, it would certainly make governing democracies much easier) but 
when they did, this would broaden chances of consolidation (Schmitter and Karl, 2013, 
p. 38). Among other cultural and economic prerequisites of democracy, agreement on 
national identity and borders make the formation and consolidation of democracy 
possible (Rustow, 1971). Again, if consensus is part of political culture of a specific 
country, democracy is more likely to emerge in that country. Political culture that has 
tendencies of moderation, accommodation, cohesion, consensus and compromise and 
habitually shared these concepts would foster the idea of democracy within political 
system.  
Disagreements among democrats over issues such as a unitary versus a federal 
state, a monarchical or republican form of government, or the type of electoral system 
may create questions about the legitimacy of the emerging democratic government, the 
decision making processes, and indeed the future of the political system (Linz & 
Stepan, 1996, p. 4). Decisions that are receiving during the democratic transition 
periods would be crucial for the future of democratic regimes and their chances of 
eliminating democratic breakdowns. When decision makers enable to form a consensus 
over the structure of the political system, electoral laws, separation of power, political 
institutions, democracy will be more durable and resilient against backslidings.  
Majoritarian democracy may cause exclusion of minorities from government, 
may alienate the excluded ones from politics, may cultivate separatist ideas and unrests, 
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may polarize voters, and may abolish freedom of expression and the culture of 
discussion. Consensus based decisions can also avert the resurgence of the 
confrontations and historical cleavages that belongs to past political developments. 
Consensus over political structure of the country between political actors would 
definitely contribute resilience of political regimes. For example, chances of possible 
conflicts in the political system will be more if political actors did not reaching 
consensus during the formation of constitution. This kind of historically conflict-
producing areas –such as exclusion of specific political groups from in politics may 
cause persistently unconsolidated democracy. These areas may skew the playing field in 
terms of favoring incumbent government or specific group that was powerful during the 
democratic transition. In the periods of political modifications or crisis, politically 
strong actors may affect the construction of future regime and if this process managed 
by enclosed political elite more conflict is potential. Under these circumstances, an 
increase in the chances of production of a kind of hybrid or flawed regime rather than 
full democracy will be highly possible. 
Participation. All citizens may not take an active and equal part in politics, 
although it must be legally possible for them to do so (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 38). 
Participation in the political processes under the legal protection seems like absorbed by 
most of democracies today, even in weak ones. Participation must be equal and free for 
all in the society. Control of specific elite groups, class, military or committee or a 
societal group over the political system is definitely inimical to democracy. For that 
reason, extent and level of participation of regimes is crucial for the evaluation of 
regime types. 
Exclusion of certain groups from participation is a dangerous game. Considering 
the danger of separatist and secessionist movements, if this exclusion is based on ethnic, 
ideological and religious cleavages, exclusion may even become more dangerous and 
harmful to democracy. Exclusion of specific ethnic groups may cause unlawful protest, 
violent acts and terrorist organizations by excluding groups in order to attract attention. 
This may encourage state apparatus in order to provide political order through strict 
measures at the expense of fundamental rights and liberties of people. As we know, 
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citizens are generally more prone to accept these political measures during times of 
political violence and crises. And these times are fertile grounds for political actors to 
carry out their authoritarian tendencies and restrict democratic ways of participation. 
Progression to the democratic type of government or at least protection of it may be 
thwarted through these measures. 
Participation emphasizes that there must be no any restriction for any part of 
citizens to participate political processes. It is not only about general suffrage but 
forming political parties, civil society organizations, interest groups and social events. 
Exclusion of any specific group from politics on the basis of differentiated dimensions 
would harm the idea of democracy. Democracy will broaden with deepening of political 
participation, participation of not just voting from one election to another but by 
participation in decision making processes from local scale to national one.  
Access. Citizenship implies that individuals and groups should have an equal 
opportunity to express their preferences if they choose to do so (Schmitter & Karl, 
2013, p. 38). Political system must provide enough spaces for all opinions and 
expression of all these political visions must be free for all. Restriction over the 
expression of political ideas, or prohibition of condition that allow parties to do 
propaganda or control the news sources in order to restrict access of citizens would 
move away countries from full democracy. Media and other news sources, for that 
reason, are subjects of authoritarian governments’ pressures. New kind of authoritarian 
politics not only target media or journalist directly but somehow skew the media for 
their side. Incumbent governments through state advertisements, tax agents, or through 
blocking distribution of newspaper and intervention to newsprint supply or introduction 
of new media laws not only restrict opposition party’s chances of expressing their 
political opinions but also control media groups to promote their incumbency.  
Responsiveness. The government will be responsive if the regime is democratic. 
Rulers may not always follow the course of action preferred by the citizenry, but when 
they deviate from such a policy, they must ultimately be held accountable for their 
actions through regular and fair processes (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 38). The main 
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desire of the politicians is to reelect in next elections. For that reason, they may choose 
to follow policies that are not preferred by the citizens but for themselves. So, political 
elites must be accountable in terms of their actions to the electorate even if they follow 
their own agenda. And the punishment of the politicians by the voters must be in the 
limits of democratic methods.  
Majority rule. Positions may not be allocated or rules may not be decided solely 
on the basis of assembling the most votes, although deviations from this principle 
usually must be explicitly defended and previously approved (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, 
p. 38). Any candidate or a party that combines more than half of the votes must be 
eligible to perform its incumbency if the office does not require more than half, in such 
circumstances as the changing constitution. However, democracy is not only a system 
of majority rule. Minorities and their rights must be protected by the democratic system 
itself through legal rules and institutions. Political structure must limit the decisions that 
can harm the rights of minorities. On the other hand, as I indicate above, existence of 
specific veto powers over the civilian rule may also be detrimental to majority rule. 
There can be limits imposed on the policy preferences of the majority party by the 
military or specific capitalist class or partisan courts. When policies of these two 
contradict, tutelary powers may limit or object to the policy acts of civilian rule. 
Parliamentary sovereignty. The legislature may not be the only body that can 
make rules or even the one with final authority in deciding which laws are binding, 
although where executive, judicial, or other public bodies make that ultimate choice, 
they too must be accountable for their actions (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 38). As like 
the other branch of the government, legislature is not free from being accountable for its 
acts and laws. At the same time, any concessions given to the legislative branch of the 
government would also violate separation of power principle and undermine the quality 
of democracy. Checks and balance system of the political system can guarantee the 
separation of power. Through that any acts that would harm the separation of power 
such as increasing power of legislative branch of the government can be controlled by 
the other two. 
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Party government. Rulers may not be nominated, promoted, and disciplined in 
their activities by well-organized and programmatically coherent political parties, 
although where they are not, it may prove more difficult to form an effective 
government (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 38). Democracy requires talented political 
elites. Competent rulers can deepen and advanced the functioning of democracies since 
they experience the practices, rules and norms beforehand. Unorganized, undisciplined 
and inexperienced governing bodies may cause low level of political performance and 
may pose trouble for effective government. Parties can train and recruit experienced 
political elites needed by political system. 
Pluralism. Pluralism affirms the belief that diversity and dissent are values that 
enrich individuals as well as their polities and societies (Sartori, 1997, p. 58). Where 
there are monopolies of representation, hierarchies of association, and obligatory 
membership, it is likely that the interests involved will be more closely linked to the 
state and the separation between the public and private spheres of action will be much 
less distinct (Schmitter and Karl, 2013, p. 38). Democratic contestation requires 
pluralism. Free challenge of ideas, freedom of expression, and culture of debate would 
be strong in plural societies, which in turn promote democracy. Pluralism would be 
weak where state plays important role and control each aspects of life. Separation of 
public and private spheres is a prerequisite for a plural society. Monopoly of 
representation and hierarchical order and membership, combination of state and civil 
society in one strong organization are detrimental to the conditions that provide fertile 
grounds for pluralism. Broad civil society originates in political system where state is 
distinct from public spheres. For example, if government or state controls the economy 
than capitalism and market economies have difficulty to develop in this country. This 
would be destructive for pluralism and therefore civil society to encounter and balance 
the power of state apparatus. Controlled economy is likely to produce ill conditions for 
development of democracy by restraining other groups’ chances of reaching state 
resources. 
Federalism. The territorial division of authority may not involve multiple levels 
and local autonomies, although some dispersal of power across territorial and/or 
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functional units is characteristic of all democracies (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 38). 
Federalism provide basis for functional and territorial division of power. Ethnic conflict 
has always been at the top of detrimental issues that would harm the quality of 
democracy. Federalism can become problem solving institutional arrangement for 
ethnically and religiously divided societies. Regionally based ethnic and religious 
conflicts and demands for more participatory democratic processes can be solved by 
federal institutions. Federal systems are particularly effective in managing ethnic 
tension because they utilize a variety of mechanisms for reducing conflict by dispersing 
conflict by transferring much of it to state and local governments (Diamond, 1990, p. 
58). Federal institutions can help resolve ethnic, religious, tribal problems within that 
territory without becoming topic in national level. Federalism through giving more 
resources and control power for local officers can help local actors to solve their own 
issues. Federalism can promote inclusivity level of political system by providing 
resources and have a say for ethnic groups in political processes. For that reason, 
federalism as an institutional arrangement helps promote democracy for ethnically 
divided societies. On the other hand, federalism can be also exacerbate historical 
cleavages in deeply divided societies, may fuel regional conflicts, since ethnic identity 
provides clear lines to determine who will be included and who will be excluded 
(Horowitz, 1993, p. 18). Because in divided societies, being in and out of politics also 
determines the access to the material benefits. In some countries, federalism may not be 
the cure for problems of minorities. When we say federalism as a solution, we imply 
that it will mitigate the conflict and will reduce the level of ethnic, regionally dominant 
political requests. However, minority identities may be so strong to be pushback, 
alleviated by the political structure of federalism. In these examples, federalism may not 
be the cure for resolving questions of divided societies.  
Presidentialism. Presidential systems are make up one of the most important 
form of government dimensions in democracies. In presidential systems an executive 
with considerable constitutional powers –generally including full control of 
composition of the cabinet and administration- is directly elected by the people for a 
fixed term and is independent of parliamentary votes of confidence (Linz, 1990, p. 52). 
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President’s dependency on legislature in order to pass law produced specific attention 
for scholars to work. Scholars that are not in favor of presidential systems mostly speak 
of two perils of presidentialism. First, dual legitimacy implies the danger of double-
headed ruling power. Problem of “dual legitimacy crises” emerges if president and 
majority party in legislature elected from different parties. Presidential systems that 
have concentrated, cohesive, organized political parties more prone to future conflict 
since the deputies are not willing to cooperate with president rather than their party’s 
official agenda. If president is not backed by his or her coalition or majority party or 
lose it, then he/she must find solution to pass bills in assembly. If pork and barrel 
politics and patronage are not sufficient, or if parties are ideologically strict and loyal to 
their party, presidency would be more prone to stalemates and conflicts. Since both of 
presidency and legislative organ are popularly elected, their claim to speak on behalf of 
“the people” would produce such threats to democracy. Under these circumstances, 
system could easily fall into the danger of stalemates and deadlocks if the regime ruled 
by a president and legislative majority that oppose each others’ political agenda. 
Experiences -especially those are in Latin America- showed that such situations create 
favorable conditions for military forces to intervene politics as a mediating power. 
Another important problem emerges because of the essence of the system; fixed 
term at the office. Presidents’ tenure at the office for a fixed term shape and adjust 
behavior, future and plans of all political actors. Preventing system from the danger of 
power concentration is the main concern behind the idea of term limit. One of the main 
critiques against presidential systems is its nature of facilitating the personalization of 
power. Prominent political scientist Juan Linz in his legendary Perils of Presidentialism 
(1990) also points this paradox. Linz said; 
   “On the one hand, such systems set out to create strong, stable executive with 
enough plebiscitarian legitimation to stand fast against the array of particular 
interests represented in the legislature. On the other hand, presidential 
constitutions also reflect profound suspicion of the personalization of power: 
memories and fears of kings and caudillos do not dissipate easily (Linz, 1990, p. 
54)”. 
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So, presidential systems on one hand are fulfilling the needs of effective and strong 
executive and on the other hand, exacerbating the suspicion of personalization of 
presidential power. 
Checks and Balances. Governments should be monitored by legislative and 
judicial branch of the government. Democracy obligates each branch of the government 
to stay accountable to other branch of the governments which called horizontal 
accountability. Along horizontal accountability, vertical accountability -elections, free 
media, independent civil society- too, hold political actors accountable to citizens. Civil 
society and media can also serve as watchdog of the political system and form societal 
accountability to check the democratic procedures. Governments or executives that are 
far from efficiency or could not meet the demands of their constituents will be punished 
by civil society and free press and will lose its chances of reelect for next term. 
Democracy rests on checks and balances which, taken together, serve to protect the 
polity from abuses of power and the dangers of political extremism (Toledo, 2013, p. 
155). Its existence can produce hegemony of moderate attitudes and in turn, facilitate 
compromise and tolerance for become part of the political culture.  
Consensus, participation, access, responsiveness, majority rule, parliamentary 
sovereignty, party government, pluralism, federalism, presidentialism and checks and 
balances are central concepts in order to distinguish diminished subtypes of 
democracies. These subtypes differ from each other with their existence or deficiency 
from the political system. Mix of these components produces different types of regime, 
which will help us in forthcoming sections to understand on what areas study’s case 
differ from each other, on which components they have weakness or absence that makes 
them subtypes of democracy or deter them from further deepening of democracy. 
Conclusion 
Democracy literature provides substantive sources for defining what democracy is and 
what it is not. Seeking to construct a general definition for democracy as a concept led 
to proliferation of democracy definitions. This is not only stemming for reaching out a 
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general definition but also because of the very nature of research and its question. 
Therefore, conceptual stretching applied by scholars determines number of dimensions 
–contestation, responsiveness, participation- incorporated into study’s definition of 
democracy. 
Democracy requires the realization of some of preconditions as I argued above. 
Completion of some of these conditions determines the qualification political system.  
Establishing of these democratic institutions, that put forward by several academics, can 
led to completion of democracy. In order to have a complete democracy, regimes must 
meet with these conditions. However, not all regimes can complete these preconditions, 
therefore differs from complete democracies. The gradual development of democratic 
institutions or deficiencies from these institutions creates new types of democracies, 
which called democracy with adjectives. Absent or differentiation from some of these 
institutions cause a literature on the varieties of democracy differed from each other by 
means of distinguished procedures and components. Increasing number of label for 
defining specific types of regimes began to circulate in the literature. Their deficiencies 
such as restriction on civil rights and liberties while having free and fair elections of 
democratic institutions led to emerge of new types of definition of regimes. The 
coexistence of illiberal or authoritarian practices together with democratic institutions 
led to definition of the regimes as subtypes of democracy.  
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CHAPTER III 
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, CONSOLIDATION, BACKSLIDING 
Emergence of democracy after the so-called third wave of democracies raised concerns 
about their chances of survival of these new democracies. The main concern was 
whether these new regimes can be considered as democracies and chances of their 
sustainability towards potential anti-democratic pressures. Transition of these new 
regimes was a source of attention for many scholars studying the endurance of new 
regimes and their chances of confronting potential authoritarian regressions. Most of 
these countries were far away from forming stable democratic institutions. Many lacked 
a functioning and effective state authority and bureaucracy. For that reason, not only 
democratic transitions but also consolidation of these regimes started to be studied by 
academics. Scholarly interest for democratic transition contributed to the arguments 
about crafting political institutions that might help promote endurance and consolidation 
of these regimes. Newly emerged examples help broaden the literature about the 
consolidation of democratic regimes.  
This chapter will specifically focus on the issue democratic transition, failure in 
democratizations and conditions that makes a democracy resilient against backsliding. 
What are the factors that cause democratization and failing to have durable democracy? 
In which areas, democracy should be strong to push back authoritarian pressures. What 
kind of aspects of these areas might increase the level of resilience of democracies? To 
give an example, what kinds of elements of civil society help promote democracy or 
weaken it? Literature reviews might help us reply these questions and also help us to 
understand other examples and reasons that cultivate new ideas. Study will also try to 
understand the dynamics of consolidation of democratic regimes, to become advanced 
and endured. Democratic practices should develop and promoted in specific areas. In 
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order to define “consolidation of democracies”, we need to know where the democratic 
transition is completed. We need to know reasons for democratic transitions, failures of 
democracies; their backsliding. First, this study will focus on democratic transition 
literature. For that reason, it would be wise to know in which areas democracies should 
be open gates for transition and resilient against undemocratic pressures. Because, as I 
will show in following sections, democratic consolidation somehow related with the 
conditions and strategic behaviors of actors during and after transition. We will apply to 
democratic transition literature, definitions of democratic consolidation and how 
scholars perceive areas that make a democracy durable. In following sections, study will 
focus on definitions of democratic resilience. We will apply the literature of democratic 
consolidation and its definitions.  
In this section, study will analyze the democratic transition literature in order to 
evaluate democratic transition of Turkey in 1983. Then, areas making democracy 
resilient against authoritarian push backs and backsliding literature will be our topic. 
Specific properties of these areas would promote and increase in the level of endurance 
of democratic regimes. Most of these properties are the common traits of consolidated 
democracies. However, this does not mean that democracies would have never been 
breakdown; rather assume their political structure would be better performing against 
authoritarian pressures. Even today, there is a possibility of breakdown of consolidated 
democracies. Through examining these traits, this study will examine facilitating factors 
that make democracies more resilient. Based on these factors, the study will examine 
the facilitating conditions of democratic resilience with the Turkish case in the next 
chapter. 
3.1 Democratic Transition 
A subfield of political science has emerged with the so called third wave of 
democracies. Authoritarian regimes, military and personal dictatorships have broken 
down, moved to different type of regimes in all around the world. This new phenomena 
opened gate for new questions. What are the preconditions for democratic transition and 
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consolidation of it, who are the agents of these changes, are these transitions supported 
by external forces (Landmann, 2000)?  
According to Lipset (1959) modernization causes democracy. Economic 
development causes the likelihood of being democratic regime. Lipset (1959) was the 
first in shed light on the correlation between the economic development and democracy. 
Controversy begins with this question, whether the relationship is correlated or 
causational between these two variables. With modernization, Lipset implied sets of 
variables that determine the level of modernization, such as wealth, education, 
urbanization, expansion of middle class. Barro argues that correlation between primary 
education and democracy is recognized in this relationship (Barro, 1996). However, 
there were also deviant cases for this correlation such as India. Despite its being defined 
as democratic regime, in terms of the level of economic development, GDP per capita, 
economic inequality and living standards, India were one of the least in the world in 
terms likelihood to form democratic regime. Therefore, the role of economy in the 
studies of democracy was getting more significance. Economic success of these newly 
established regimes became one of the core issues for countries in their sustainability of 
regimes. Once established, these new democratic regimes should sustain economic 
development and resolve problems of efficiency and political legitimacy. Severe 
economic crises could be potential cause of the breakdown of the new age of 
democracies that took place after 1970s. Suffering economic deterioration can be reason 
for questioning legitimacy of governments which might lead to the legitimacy crisis. 
Legitimacy crisis was the reason of breakdown of some of political regime such as 
Germany after 1920s. Overlapping of deteriorating of legitimacy with economic crisis 
would make a regime more vulnerable for breakdown which might finalize with 
democratic transition. According to the empirical study of Przeworski et.al. (1996) 
democracies are performing better when they confront with economic crisis from 1987 
onwards (Przeworski et. al., 1996). However, economic development arguments of 
democratic transition are neglected and insufficient and challenged by Guillermo 
O’Donnell. Author showed examples from Latin American regimes from 60s and 70s, 
where some of the most developed Latin American countries democracy faced with 
 40 
democratic breakdown such as Argentina in 1966 and 1976, Brazil in 1964 and 
Uruguay in 1973.  
Modernization theory postulated a positive correlation between capitalist 
development and democratization and thus failed to anticipate the “new 
authoritarianism” that swept through the relatively industrialized Latin American 
countries (Haggard & Kaufmann, 1995, p. 4). In bureaucratic authoritarian model, late 
industrialized countries faced the breakdown of democracy together with increasing 
inequality. As the industrialism advanced, benefits that the system is provided for 
different sectors of society have changed. When the domestic market for consumer 
goods was satisfied, demands of working classes were increased and resulted in high 
inflation, balance of payments and foreign debt deficit. According to the work of Collier 
(1979) high level technocrats were linked with foreign capital, and for them, in order to 
attract multinational capital country need less distribution, less subsidiaries, more 
capital accumulation and less rights for working classes. The dominant political 
coalition is formed after the collapse of democracy by technocrat class in close 
association with foreign capital in order to promote advanced industrialization. For 
elimination of mobilization of working class, number of strikes and reduction for 
wages, dominant classes –generally military, technocrats, bureaucrats, business 
associations- were coalesce for introduction of new authoritarian regimes. The result of 
this process is the exclusion of popular sectors of society from politics. Structural 
problems of the economy have an effect on the problems of democratic transition. 
When the transformation of economy and transition to democracy are accompanied by 
the same time, both systems could pose great dangers for newly emerged democracy. 
His study shows that the dual transformation could create more challenges for regimes. 
Another implication of Collier’ study can be the difference of interests between the 
popular sectors of society and the ruling coalition. This clash of interests can be ended 
up with the breakdown of regime and this difference can create a specific class or 
groups that are excluded from the system that are open for future populist policies.  
Przeworski & co-authors (2000) claimed that the economic development does 
not cause democratization; it reduces the likelihood of democratic breakdown, thus 
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increasing the number of rich democratic countries even though it has no causal effect 
on transition to democracy (Przeworski et.al. 2000). Their argument is inconsistent with 
arguments of O’Donnell about the breakdown of more economically developed Latin 
American democracies. Maybe, their study neglected the strategic behaviors of classes 
and sectors with the transformation that economic development brings such as making 
the society a much complex one. According to their study, economic development 
increases the likelihood of democratic stability but not causes democratization. The 
relationship is stemming not from being economically wealthier but resulting from the 
political stability that rich countries have, therefore leads to high number of rich 
countries with democratic regime. This argument challenged by Boix & Stokes (2000), 
by expanding the time period of dataset, that economic development contributes to 
democracy, it is an extremely important predictor of transition prior to 1950, though has 
only a small effect in the post-1950 periods (Geddes, 2007, p. 321).  
For Linz & Stepan (1996), preceding regime type and initiator –military, 
dictator, oligarchy, technocrats- of the transition are two most important variables for 
successful democratic transition (Linz & Stepan, 1996). They also claimed that in order 
to solve the confusion about the dependent variable in transition studies, they defined 
thresholds –liberalization, transition, consolidation- for determining the phases of 
democratization of a regime. For example in Latin America, because of the overgrown 
bureaucracy, high degree of monopoly and protectionism, weak tax collecting system 
cause inflation, unemployment, resource misallocation as well as to generate volatile 
changes in relative incomes, in the short run of the reforms (Przeworski, 1991). Yet, the 
durability and performance of newly introduced reforms and policies depends on their 
capacity to resolve existing problems. Success of these new reforms, policies and 
institutions might help build legitimacy and public support for new regimes. 
Studies of Acemoglu & Robinson (2001, 2005) and Boix (2003) focus more on 
the income equality determinant of democratization and concluded that democratization 
is more likely if income distribution is more equal. According to Acemoglu & Robinson 
(2001), elites are willing to cede some power rather than risk the costs of revolution 
when they believe democracy not to cause extremely redistributive taxation policies 
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(Geddes, 2007, p. 321). In the low levels of inequality, an increase in the inequality can 
promote democracy through increasing the threat of revolution. However, at higher 
levels of inequality, elites will repress them rather than offering concessions because of 
their fear of the redistributive consequences of democratization (Geddes, 2007, p. 321). 
If elites threatened by the upcoming potential revolution, they would increase the level 
of redistribution for sustaining existing political system. Another option would be 
transition to democracy while making the redistribution conceivable. Boix (2003) 
argues that income equality and capital mobility reduce elite fears of democracy, first 
because it reduces expected redistribution by popular governments and the second 
because it provides capital holders with an exit option if taxes become confiscatory 
(Geddes, 2007, p. 336). His effort was huge in explaining the correlation between 
economic developments with democracy on the basis of the micro relationship as such 
in redistribution. 
Causes of breakdown of authoritarian regimes and transition to democracy are 
varied; from change of socio-economic factors to the old regime type of a country. 
Huntington’s Third Wave of Democracies (1990) proposes explanatory factors for these 
questions. Deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian systems, global economic 
growth of the 1960s, changing doctrine of the Catholic Church, changes in the policies 
of external actors, snowballing effects of democratization are the reasons behind 
democratizing regime change in the 1970s and 1980s (Huntington, 1972). According to 
him, deepening political legitimacy problem of authoritarian regimes because of the 
poor economic performance of authoritarian regimes accelerate breakdown of 
authoritarian regimes. Broad base economic development, industrialization, increasing 
in the level of education and living standards can contribute to democratization and 
rapid economic growth can undermine authoritarian regime if combined with short term 
economic crisis (Huntington, 1968). For Huntington, transformation of political 
alignment of Roman Catholic Church in favor of democracy against authoritarian 
regimes is another reason behind the democratization. The pressure and effect of major 
external powers such as EU, USA and non-governmental organizations in promoting 
democratization, human rights and liberties together with the snowballing effect of the 
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democratization for geographically close countries are influential in transition to 
democracy. Huntington’s preconditions for democratic transition are probably 
significant for specific geographies and countries rather than being general model for all 
democratic transition, an all-embracing model for transition. His preconditions also 
neglected the role of classes, elite alignment and attitude and role during the transition. 
Power relations in the society, between classes, state, civil society and military draw 
attention by other prominent scholars.  
Some of researchers propose that ex-colonial heritage is also factor in being 
democracy such as Weiner (1987), Payne (1993). According to the study of Lipset 
(1993) once being an ex-British colony is the variable, highly correlated with 
democracy.  
Following O’Donnell & Schmitter (1986) one needs to differentiate 
democratization of the state from democratization of the regime while latter requires the 
modifications in relations between state institutions and civil society. Civil society, 
however, as Larry Diamond (1994) claimed is essential component of democratic 
consolidation but not for the transition. Civil society can work only within 
institutionalized political structures. For Putnam (1993), practical performance of 
institutions is shaped by the social context, within which they operate. Civic 
involvement; active participation in public affairs, development of ideas of equality, 
trust and tolerance are environmental factors that varied and shape institutions and how 
they functions (Putnam, 1993, p. 86-91).  
Nancy Bermeo’s study (1997) discusses the effect of popular mobilization and 
violence in transition to democracy from an authoritarian rule. Bermeo defines a theory, 
what she calls “moderation theory”, which proposes mobilization is beneficial for 
democratic transition but it should be moderate. Elites of previous regime can abandon 
from their decision of transition to democracy. Moderation is not one of the 
prerequisites for democracy yet they can decrease the level of polarization. 
According to Lipset (1959), middle class was the main agent of democracies, 
while Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens (1992) claims that the organized working 
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class is the most crucial in promoting the democracy, while landowning class of the 
society is the prominent social group, barrier to democratization. Any policy 
strengthening the working class and reduce the capacity of landowning class would 
make significant contribution for democratization according to their seminal work. 
Conversely, Samuel Huntington (1968) claimed that if the political mobilization 
capacity of a country outstrips the level of political institutionalization, then the political 
order would be damaged as the institutional capacity of a country could not handle with 
the mass mobilization. 
Considering the arguments that I briefly outlined above, literature seems shaping 
by structural, socio-economy based, and actor based arguments. Some of scholars 
propose the requirements of specific factors for the democratic transition while others 
focuses on the strategic behaviors of the actors during the times of transition as in the 
studies of Acemoglu & Robinson (2001; 2005). Scholars such as Lipset (1959) and 
Rueschemeyer et.al. (1992) argue that specific social groups –middle class, working 
class- are more inclined to transition to democratic regime. In light of these arguments, 
1983 Turkish transition from military government did not fit the propositions of class 
based arguments; rather structural approach can be more illuminating in the Turkish 
case. 
In 1983, Turkey reinstituted the multiparty politics after 3 years of interruption 
since 12 September 1980 military coup. The political turmoil because of weak coalition 
governments, intensified clashes between the extreme right and left political 
movements, deteriorated macroeconomic outlook shaped Turkish politics until military 
coup. Fragmentation of the multiparty political system, campaign strategies of political 
parties for promising more material benefits and inclination of centre left Republican 
People’s Party to the left of political spectrum (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008, p. 18) led to a 
conflicting political atmosphere for military coup which they could exploited as the 
reason of the intervention to the politics. According to putschists, coalition governments 
were evil, far away from bringing political stability and economic development; 
therefore system requires strong executive and strong government. Electoral system and 
10% national threshold system that can provide effectiveness and strong executive is 
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placed in the Constitution. Kalaycıoğlu defines this system as an executive supremacy 
over legislature (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008, p. 18). On the other side, some of conditions that 
Collier (1979) argues seems to have similarities in 1970s. Turkish business circles were 
in favor of less distribution, fewer subsidies, more capital accumulation and less right 
for working classes in pre 1980 period as in the case of technocrat preferences of 
bureaucratic authoritarian models. The pressures on the balance of payments and the 
general level of prices; growing number working class organizations and strikes; 
radicalized syndical organization (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2015, p. 69-70) deteriorated the 
capital accumulation of private business.  
Turkish case of transition to democracy is an example of Third Wave 
Democracies, where the military rule ended with a new Constitution followed by 
general elections. In some of the examples from transition literature that focuses on the 
class based analysis, the strategic behaviors of social actors or the mass mobilization of 
working class lead to transition to democracy. However in Turkey since they were 
repressed during and the post-coup period, working class did not effective to force 
military for possible transition. Rather, Turkey was a case where pact-building, 
‘consensual rule-making’ and ‘explicit and formal compromises’ among rival actors 
have been comparatively weak (Somer, 2016, p. 485). Transition to democracy in 1983 
was determined directly by the Turkish military, the only hegemonic actor during the 
period of the transition, since political parties were abolished; civil society and business 
groups were excluded from the Constitution making processes. The exclusivist nature of 
the Constitution formation continued in the Referendum when the coup leader General 
Kenan Evren “recommended” citizens to vote “Yes” in the ballot box. Therefore, 1982 
Constitution, which is criticized as being authoritarian and dominantly favoring the 
executive; had been writ down under the strict supervision of Turkish military by the 
members chosen by higher ranks. Military guaranteed the ideology of Constitution and 
its veto power in the system. The Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren elected as 
President in the Referendum, several member seats were created in the independent 
state institutions such as in RTÜK and Higher Education Board (YÖK). National 
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Security Council was founded and immunity for the putschists guaranteed in the 
Constitution as veto powers.  
Foundation of veto powers and guaranteed areas for military, problem in 
meeting with the procedural minima of democracy made the democratic transition of 
Turkey in 1983 open to question. In order to talk about the transition, new regime must 
meet with the minimum requirements of the democracy, namely the conditions that are 
proposed by Dahl. Democratic transition of 1983 was much more of a “formal” 
transition to civilian rule rather than democracy. Elections were under strict intervention 
by the military in 1983. Military even had their candidate in elections, Kenan Evren 
signaled Bülend Ulusu as the suitable candidate for premier. Therefore, Rodriguez et.al. 
(2014) claimed that Turkey had an incomplete democratic transition during the 1980s 
(Somer, 2016, p. 485). The free and fair elections were adopted in 1987 elections. 
Democracy was under the guardianship of military and its Republican coalition ally, 
judiciary. Therefore, certain level of democratization and reforms due to EU 
conditionality regimes and the weakening of the tutelary power of secular coalition 
created an illusion of democratization or even a democratic consolidation at the 
beginning of AKP rule and Ergenekon and Sledgehammer operations. 
In the light of these discussions, study will discuss the democratic consolidation 
and conditions that make democracies resilient. In following chapters, this discussion 
will route us to deficiencies between the existing conditions of Turkish democracy and 
the ones make it consolidated. 
3.2 What is Becoming Resilient Democracy  
Many scholars perceive consolidation as the last station in the prolonged road of 
democratic process. For some of them, consolidation is the point where democratic 
regime achieved to obtain characteristics of survival that has never going to be 
breakdown. Others refer to “consolidation” with its aspects of persistence, maintenance, 
endurance, resilience, irreversibility and stability. For them, something that becomes 
consolidated seems as if it becomes resilient to interventions, immune to political and 
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economic shocks; institutionalized in its political structure. Scholars tend to describe 
regimes as consolidated in which they are resilient to authoritarian regressions, 
economic and societal deterioration, or performing serious progress to an advanced 
level of democracy. However, this does not mean that scholars reach an agreement over 
the definition of the term consolidation. Definition of the term seemed a bit vague and 
nebulous for some part of researchers. Complexity of the meaning of consolidation is 
creating confusion for academics specialized in democratic consolidation, which poses a 
serious risk for our study that has to be overcome. 
Consolidation as a concept seems to have two dimensions. Separation between 
these two meaning is stemming from disparate meanings and features attributed by two 
groups in the definition of democratic consolidation. Scholars ascribe different 
meanings for the consolidation which also depends on what they understand from 
democratic consolidation. First dimension is the one that associates consolidation with 
stability, endurance, persistence, and maintenance. For the supporters of this dimension, 
consolidation refers to a condition in which regime can resist against the threat of 
authoritarian regressions, that regime’s capacity of confronting potential and existing 
destabilizing factors is consolidated.  
For the other side of this dimension, consolidation seems to require more than 
immunity against authoritarian regressions. Advocates of this dimension attributed 
compelling tasks for democratic consolidation in order to confront destabilizing factors. 
According to them, structural changes in political, societal or even cultural areas have to 
be materialized for a fortified democracy. This definition of consolidation implies 
institutionalization through structural changes; relating democratic consolidation with 
regimes’ progression to higher degree of democratic quality through changes in political 
and sociological structure. 
Andreas Schedler revealed a reasonable explanation for this contrast. Through 
using subtypes of regimes between authoritarianism and democracy, Schedler (1998) 
used liberalization, democratization or erosion concepts in order to define consolidation. 
From Schedler’s perspective, consolidation can involve varied connotations if one 
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observing erosion from electoral or liberal democracy to authoritarianism or vice versa. 
In this transition, Schedler equates democratic consolidation as avoiding an 
authoritarian regression; from electoral or liberal democracy to a “better” regime that he 
called “advanced democracy”. Democratic consolidation means a democratic 
deepening; from liberal democracy to an electoral democracy; democratic consolidation 
means avoiding a “slow death” of democracy which means erosion from electoral 
democracy to liberal democracy; democratic consolidation means completing 
democracy (Schedler, 1998, p. 94). His study makes it clear that the meaning of 
consolidation depends on the type of regime that we are studying. The term “democratic 
consolidation” was meant to describe the challenge of making new democracies secure, 
of extending their life expectancy beyond the short term, of making them immune 
against the threat of authoritarian regression, of building dams against eventual “reverse 
waves” and rendering the democracy “the only game in town” (Schedler, 1998, p. 91).  
For many, consolidation lacks of a unique and a core meaning that meet with the 
criterions of all these components. Those who concerned with the protection of 
diminished subtypes or democratic regime from destabilizing factors and possible 
authoritarian regression are emphasizing the need of endurance and immunity of 
democratic government, while other analysts associated consolidation with 
advancement to a high quality/degree of democratic regime. For the former, 
eliminating, neutralizing or converting disloyal players –military backed autogolpes, 
antidemocratic business elite, even disenchanted populations- represents the primary 
task of democratic breakdown (Schedler, 1998, p. 96). For them, erosion of democratic 
regime in principles like rule of law, separation of power, free and independent media 
and fairness of electoral processes or commonly known “slow death of democracy” 
must be thwarted by the democratic mechanisms. For the latter, changing in social and 
political structure on even in political culture is necessary.  
Many scholars also support this dimension and perceive democratic 
consolidation as a process of what O’Donnell called “second transition”, which begins 
with the inauguration of democratic government and ends –if all goes well- with the 
establishment of a consolidated democratic regime (Mainwaring et. al., 1992, p. 2). 
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Interlude of this process requires deepening and advancement of democracy in several 
areas of democratic type of regime. “Process of moving away from some ‘diminished 
subtypes’ of democracy toward a ‘non-diminished subtypes’, deepening liberal 
democracy or institutionalizing democracy’s basic ground rules” called by Schedler as 
completing, deepening and organizing democracy (Schedler, 1998, p. 97-101). 
However, this view exacerbates conceptual ambiguity of democratic consolidation as 
well. Anticipation of reaching to a more advanced or a kind of normative democratic 
quality of democratic regime is making “democratic consolidation” a kind of a 
boundless concept based on the premise that it would never breakdown. 
In their study, Linz & Stepan (1996) are referring to consolidation in order to 
define a political situation in which democracy has become “the only game in town” 
(Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 5). Democracy can be considered as “the only game in town” 
in cases where it behaviorally, attitudinally and constitutionally consolidated, 
democratic norms, values and institutions deeply internalized and routinized by the 
public and actors in political, social and psychological life. Behaviorally, democracy 
becomes the only game in town when no significant political groups seriously attempt 
to overthrow the democratic regime or secede from the state, attitudinally, when even in 
the face of severe political and economic crises, the overwhelming majority of the 
people believe that any further political change must emerge from within the parameters 
of democratic formulas and constitutionally, when all the actors in the polity become 
habituated to the fact that political conflict will be resolved according to the established 
norms and that violations of these norms are likely to be both ineffective and costly 
(Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 5). Citizens and political actors of consolidated democracies 
must stay within the scope of democratic methods even in the face of economic and 
political crisis, shocks or deteriorations. Any measure and policy preferences outside of 
the constraints of democratic rules, norms and procedures or ousting democratic regime 
and institutions could be anything but the characteristics of consolidated democracies. 
Public must perceive that democratic processes and methods are the only legitimate way 
for solving problems within the boundaries of democracy. Same definitional condition 
proposed by Adam Przeworski as well. Przeworski (1991) argues that democratic 
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consolidation occurs when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic 
institutions (Przeworski, 1991, p. 26). According to this definition, public and actors 
must deeply internalize the rules of the game, accept and routinely practice them. Since 
people are aware of any violation of the formal and informal rules will be costly for 
them; strategic behaviors, future costs will discourage them from violations of the rules. 
Therefore, in regimes with law-based rule, the chances of violation of constitution or 
norms would be less likely to occur considering the actors are informed about the costs 
that will face. In these situations, the actual behavior of actors will be close to formal 
rules, since they do not mind to violate rules, because it will be costly for them. For that 
reason, consolidated regimes are more likely to be formed in those countries where “the 
gap between the formal rules and actual behaviors are close to each other” (O’Donnell, 
1996, p. 41).  
Gunther, et. al. (1995) seems to define consolidation along the same line with 
Linz and Stepan. According to them, when all significant groups provide attitudinal 
support and behavioral compatibility with the new democratic institutions and the rules 
of the game, democracy is sufficiently consolidated (Gunther et. al., 1995, p. 7). 
Democratic regimes are sufficiently consolidated so as to survive and remain stable in 
the face of such serious challenges as major economic or international crises, or even 
serious outbreaks of terrorist violence (Gunther et. al., 1995, p. 8). Their definition at 
first stipulated a condition for the political groups’ attitudinal and behavioral 
commitment to the democracy, then emphasize the regimes’ need of survival for 
democratic consolidation. Definition of Gunther et al. seem more on the line of Linz & 
Stepan’s (1996) conceptualization of democratic consolidation.  
Their second definition is on the line of negative notions of democratic 
consolidation which emphasize the confrontation with authoritarian regression. 
Accepting the rules of the game by all significant political actors might partially provide 
legitimacy for the political regime, but this situation does not necessarily incorporate 
institutionalization or stability and endurance of the regime.  
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Attitudinal and behavioral commitment to democratic values and institutions can 
be necessary condition for democracy but not the sufficient condition for consolidation. 
On the other hand, regime durability and endurance do not necessarily imply 
consolidation of democracy as well. As Haggard & Kaufmann (1994) asserted that, 
many new democracies survived severe economic shocks, but their durability did not 
necessarily imply increasing legitimacy and acceptance of “the rules of the game” 
(Haggard & Kaufmann, 1994, p. 6). Larry Diamond focuses on this “legitimacy” aspect 
of consolidation as well. According to him (1994), consolidation is the process by 
which democracy become so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that 
is very unlikely to break down. It involves behavioral and institutional changes that 
normalize democratic politics and narrow its uncertainty (Diamond, 1994, p. 15). Linz 
& Stepan (1992), Diamond (1994), Haggard & Kaufmann (1994) are commonly on the 
line of “the only game in town” definition, which expects attitudinal, behavioral, 
constitutional and even psychological institutionalization of rules and behaviors from 
actors.  
J. Samuel Valenzuela’s definition is much more in the line of “confronting 
authoritarian regression”. In his definition, the scholar associates consolidation with its 
stability, its immunity, durability and persistence against disintegration and secession. 
However, stability cannot be equated with progress towards creating a fully democratic 
regime; what enhances stability may detract from the democratic quality of a regime 
(Valenzuela, 1992, p. 59). Elimination of destabilizing factors might be achieved by the 
means of rule of law. Undemocratic tools and ways could not be the solution for 
resolving the problems of potential reverse waves. Animosity produced political actions 
might in turn produce another counter waves at the end of this process. Consolidated 
democracies are those in which regime reversal and potentially destabilizing factors that 
are far-fetched from reality (Valenzuela, 1992, p. 58). A regime that consolidates its 
democracy is the one that does not have any perverse elements that might undermine 
quality of democracy. Valenzuela asserted that the danger producing perversion areas 
that can undermine democratic methods. The existence of non-democratic tutelary 
powers, subsistence of reserved domains in policy making decisions and discrimination 
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in the electoral process such as excluding minority party from elections are perverse 
elements that will make the democracy non-consolidated (Valenzuela, 1992, p. 69). 
Chances of democratic consolidation will fail unless these elements are eliminated from 
playing field. Many of these elements might be the residuals of the facilitating 
conditions of first transition; namely transition from authoritarian rule to democratic 
one.  
For some, democratic consolidation is a complex and uncertain process from 
becoming a democratic government to democratic regime. According to O’Donnell, 
democratic consolidation can be perceived as the second transition –first one is 
transition to democracy- which eliminates the chances of confronting with authoritarian 
regression in near future. According to Guillermo O’Donnell (1992),  
   “Consolidated democracy or a democratic regime as one where there is 
political democracy in which democratic actors no longer have as one of their 
central concerns the avoidance of a authoritarian regression, and consequently 
do not subordinate their decisions (and omissions) to such a concern; where 
social and political actors who control significant power resources habitually 
subject their interrelations to the institutions specific to political democracy by 
means of practices compatible with the reproduction of these institutions –
institutions which, whether they liked it or not, these actors calculate will last 
indefinitely; where the habitual nature of these practices and the strengthening of 
these institutions sustain the “procedural consensus” which Schmitter and I 
discussed in our cited work, and promote the uncertain nature of outcomes of 
fair and competitive elections; where this set of political relationship is 
increasingly consistent with the extension of similarly democratic (or at least 
non despotic and non-archaic) relations into other spheres of social life; where 
rulers and officialdom subject themselves to the distinction between the public 
and the private and there exist reasonably effective mechanisms to sanction anti-
republican actions on their part” (O’Donnell, 1992, p. 48-49). 
O’Donnell’s perspective is standing between two camps of definitional 
differentiation. For O’Donnell, democracy becomes consolidated when political actors 
no longer observe the threat of authoritarian regression. If this happens, avoiding 
authoritarian regression will no longer be the political actors’ main concern. Perversions 
and threat of authoritarian reversals will be definitely eliminated and have no longer 
concerned by the actors. Their policy preferences will not impinged on the decisions 
ordered by any tutelary power. Institutions and rules of the games will be definite for 
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the actors who are habitually subjected to them. Formal and informal rules should be 
habitually accepted and internalized by the actors. This will not only decrease the level 
of uncertainty in the game but would also reduce the gap between observed behaviors 
and expectations. Existence of these conditions in political arena is the evidence of 
democratic consolidation. His definition of democratic consolidation requires more than 
institutionalization of democratic procedures. If elections and their surrounding 
freedoms are institutionalized, it might be said that polyarchy or political democracy is 
“consolidated”, likely to endure (O’Donnell, 1996, p. 37). However, the process of 
transforming democratic government to democratic regime requires more than the 
institutionalization of these democratic procedures but also affirmative behavioral, 
attitudinal and psychological transformations that are coherent with democracy.  
There is no proof that democracies are inevitable, irrevocable, or a historical 
necessity (Schmitter, 1994, p. 57). They maybe not the most efficient, responsive, 
accountable regime type either. But, at the same time, this type of government is less 
evil than other type of regime. For that reason, making the democracy immune, 
persistent, strong and able to withstand against authoritarian regressions is a historical 
necessity. And for this aim, one has to examine the conditions that make democratic 
consolidation possible. 
3.3 Backsliding of Democracies 
Nowadays, the optimism about third wave of democracies is lost. Troubles such as the 
rise of populist leaders even in the consolidated democracies like Trump’s victory in 
United States of America, refugee crisis in Europe, Brexit, Euro crisis and global 
economic recession leads to pessimistic anxiety about global political turmoil and the 
future of democracies. Last few years marked the increasing number of questions just 
as; whether the democracy is in decline, is there a retreat from democracy, is democracy 
backsliding or are we observing the slow death of democracy? All of these questions 
focusing to detect the issues of hybrid regimes and whether the retreat of democracy is 
in question? These questions are implying that there are ongoing problems in 
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democracies around the world that demand that the scholars need to find elements to 
explain this phenomenon. 
As I emphasize above, there is a possibility for breakdown of consolidated 
democracies. Consolidated democracies are not irrevocable concepts that they can never 
weaken or even breakdown. They can breakdown if they lack some core elements of 
what makes a democracy resilient or by autogolpes, or military coup etc. In today, 
breakdown of democracies or backsliding into authoritarianism by the incumbent 
become more prevalent from of subversion. Milan Svolik (2017) observed that the 
checks –public disapproval- on incumbent are often fails if the society is deeply 
polarized. In these societies, partisan voting and identification of voters with party or a 
leader is more obvious. Voters in polarized societies are indeed willing to trade off 
democratic principles for partisan interests and that their willingness to do so increases 
in the intensity of their partisanship (Svolik, 2017, p. 1). Elections became a central in 
these country’s leaders in order to provide support of partisans since it is costly for them 
to change their votes. Therefore, in these regimes, polarization creates favorable 
conditions for backsliding into authoritarianism by the incumbent, through manipulating 
democratic processes.  
Democracy necessitates protection of its core values and procedures. Today, 
studies observing numbers of threats against democracies, which can corrupt these 
requirements of democracy even in consolidated ones. These democracies prove their 
resilience against authoritarian regressions during times of economic and political 
turmoil. However, consolidated democracies can be resilient until they are not resilient 
against pushback. Retreat of factors that make a democracy consolidated can make a 
democracy backslide.  
Is democracies are backsliding? According to Mechkova et. al. (2017), the 
answer is yes. According to data from 1976 to 2016, the average degree of democracy 
in the world is decreasing within regime types compared to pre-2000 period, 
democracies becoming less liberal and autocracies less competitive and less repressive, 
where in few countries even backsliding from democracy to autocracy like Thailand 
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(Mechkova et. al., 2017, p. 162). In liberal democracies, declines stem from non-
electoral arenas such as rule of law, restrictions on media, journalism, freedom of 
expressions, and so, while in electoral democracies electoral processes are highly 
controlled by the incumbent at the expense of opposition. Backsliding is the state-led 
debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that sustain an existing 
democracy (Bermeo, 2016, p. 5). Serious weakening of democratic institutions leads to 
backsliding of democracy. Extensive weakening of democratic institutions both in terms 
of scope and depth may end up with the breakdown of democracy.  
According to Foa & Mounk (2016) citizens of number of consolidated countries 
in North America and Western Europe have become more cynical, less hopeful for 
democracy and willing to express support for authoritarian alternatives. Therefore, the 
claim is that worsening democratic legitimacy led to backsliding (Foa & Mounk, 2016, 
p. 7). Citizens have less faith that they can affect politics. Especially, devotion of 
millennials –born after 1980s- to democracy is lesser than older generations of their 
countries. What Foa & Mounk claimed seems parallel to what Linz & Stepan proposed 
in 1978. According to Linz & Stefan (1978) democratic consolidation requires 
behaviorally, attitudinally and constitutionally consolidated democratic norms, values 
and institutions that are deeply internalized and routinized by the public and political 
actors. Low level of commitment of political elites to the democratic system and to low 
support for democratic norms and institutions by the public omits one of the significant 
ingredients of the democracy for resilience. Decline in these areas through cynicism, 
political apathy, unwillingness to follow and get involved in political processes may 
lead to inclination toward populist alternatives. Democracy is not just free, fair and 
frequent elections but requires support, participation and activism of people for 
protections of civil rights and liberties and minimum requirements of democracy.  
Freedom House provides no evidence that the quality of institutions protecting 
political rights and civil liberties deteriorated across Western democracies from 1972 to 
end-2016 (Norris, 2017, p. 3). Therefore, there must be others reasons for the 
presupposition of existing or potential decline in democratic institutions in all around 
the world. Behaviorally, the most important destabilizing threats for democratic regimes 
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are terrorism and the rise of populist authoritarianism. Incapacity of security forces 
from preventing terrorist attacks in Western metropolis in the last three years and the 
rise of populist authoritarian leaders that do not follow the conventional practices of 
observed liberal democracies, mistrust of the establishment, demonizing media and 
judiciary while challenging the core values of pluralism, social tolerance, rule of law, 
human rights, and freedoms in Western societies (Norris, 2017, p. 3). Terrorism in the 
center of Western democracies probably created a sense of insecurity among public, 
which led to support for more security based political measures. Therefore, it may 
produce inclination towards populist-authoritarian policies and support for right parties 
which traditionally support security based policies, less tolerant parties against refugees, 
freedoms of media and expressions as in the examples of Geert Wilders of Holland and 
Mariene Le Pen of France. 
Where backsliding involves rapid and radical change across a broad range of 
institutions, it leads to outright democratic breakdown or authoritarian rule and where 
backsliding takes the form of gradual changes across a more circumscribed set of 
institutions, it is more likely to produce political systems that are ambiguously 
democratic or hybrid (Bermeo, 2016, p. 6). There we can claim that the pace –instant or 
gradual-, actors, scope and number of institutions that are exposed to populist-
authoritarian pressures determines the endpoints of backsliding process. Elimination of 
political institution can be initiated by many actors such as popularly supported, 
democratically elected presidents as well. Bermeo (2016) offers six different types of 
backsliding for conceptualization of the term. According to her, there is a dramatic 
decline in frequency of classic (military intervention), executive (self-coups, 
autogolpes) coups and election day vote frauds between 1950-2014 (Bermeo, 2016, p. 
6-8). Therefore, number of democracies being target of military coups or electoral fraud 
is declined between 1950-2014. First two can be seen as military, economic or political 
elites’ intervention to democracy, which could be the reason of dramatic breakdowns 
rather than gradual erosion of democracy. The reason in the decline of election day vote 
frauds can be the civil society organizations’ ability to conduct election monitoring. 
Promissionary coups frame the ouster of an elected government as the defense of 
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democratic legality and make a public promise to hold elections and restore democracy 
as soon as possible (Bermeo, 2016, p. 6-8). In executive aggrandizement type of 
backsliding refers to slow erosion of democracy without executive replacement. This 
form of backsliding occurs when executives weaken checks on executive power one by 
one, undertaking a series of institutional changes that hamper the power of opposition 
forces to challenge executive preferences (Bermeo, 2016, p. 6-10). The last type, 
manipulation of elections strategically, through harassing opponents, modifications for 
election rules for favoring the incumbent etc. Election fraud generally needs strong 
organizational capabilities or exploitations of state institutions like judiciary, election 
councils or security forces. Therefore, it can be applied by incumbent governments that 
seek to maintain their office. Executive aggrandizement refers to inclination to 
authoritarianism with the eliminations of democratic institutions one by one.  
Scholarly attention was mostly focused on the clear cases of breakdowns, 
transitions and consolidations of democracies and factors that correlate with these 
phenomena. However, backsliding is somewhat an elusive concept. Even if its 
definition is clear; the type of backsliding, elements and mechanisms that lead to 
backsliding depend on the type of regimes that we are talking about. In liberal 
democracies, as Bermeo (2016) and Norris (2017) show, there is no decline in 
constitutional framework of democratic institutions. Rather, backsliding happened 
through deteriorations in the civil rights and liberties. One explanation of this situation 
can be that, constitutional amendments/modifications about the structure of democratic 
institutions such as electoral system or the structure of judiciary necessitates more 
procedural and legal effort than targeting media, academics, pundits etc. Therefore, 
populist leaders may focus on attacking freedom of expression and media and civil 
society first. These institutions are crucial in holding the incumbent accountable, 
increasing the transparency of the system; they are more “easy” targets for populist 
leaders than attacking the judiciary or electoral system of regimes. Populist leaders’ 
attacks against social tolerance, moderation, solidarity, cooperation, disengaged civic 
activism that holds people together for protecting democratic institutions. Further 
erosion in the democratic institutions will eliminate the last "democratic" characteristic 
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of these flawed regimes, and then led to shift these hybrid regimes into authoritarian 
regimes.  
3.4 Traits that Make Democracies Resilient  
Whatever its faults, this mode of political rule –democracy- was clearly preferable to 
any of several forms of autocracy (Schmitter, 1994, p. 57). There is a widely shared 
belief that democracy is less evil than other types of government systems. Proliferation 
of democratic countries has always been supported by international organizations and 
democratic countries. Spread of democratic values, legitimating the democratic 
procedures in the eyes of the public, recognition of formal and informal rules and 
effective governments of states are the facilitating factors for democratic countries in 
order to disseminate democratic regimes around the world. 
Democracy has to be perceived as legitimate, accountable, effective and 
responsive for its citizens. It has to be seen in a higher and a precious position that 
citizens do not want to lose at all costs. In order to achieve this, democracy must 
function effectively and answer the needs of the people responsively. These perceptions 
should be deepened in areas such as institutions, values, political culture or economy. 
The aim of this part of chapter is to analyze the supportive conditions that help 
consolidate a democracy. Obviously, there is not a single type of democratic 
consolidation process or a mechanism. Each consolidated democracies has their own 
historical trajectories, stages and narratives, domestic conditions.  
One does not preclude the possibility that at some future time it could break 
down and there is not only one type of consolidated democracy (Linz & Stepan, 1996, 
p. 16). The threat of populism, emergence of new set of problems that democracy did 
not confront previously, great economic and political shocks or highly popular anti-
democratic leadership can transform democratic waves into authoritarian regressions. In 
order to prevent such situations, institutions must be crafted by means of taking into 
consideration of countries social, economic and political properties and historical 
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backgrounds. If successful democratic consolidation is the goal, crafters of democracy 
must take into careful consideration the particular mix of nations, cultures, and rising 
political identities present in the territory (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 28). 
There must be a state for consolidation of democracies. No state, no democracy 
(Stepan & Linz, 1996, p. 15). Congruence between the polis and the demos facilitates 
the creation of a democratic nation-state; it also virtually eliminates all problems of 
“stateness” and should thus be considered a supportive condition for democratic 
consolidation (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 24). For completion, democratic transition must 
be completed and political system, at least, must meet the criteria of polyarchy. 
Consolidation of democracy depends upon the foundation of the regime that at least 
meet with the minimum requirements of polyarchy. Because, only democracies can be 
democratically consolidated. The first condition for the consolidation of democracy is 
the completion of democratic transition that provides establishment of polyarchy. It is 
misleading to discuss the issue of democratic consolidation if the transition from any 
kind of authoritarian regimes or a subtype of regimes is not completed. Foundation of 
minimum prerequisites of democracy is essential for gradual institutionalization of 
democracy. 
The problem of Turkey starts in this point. Turkish democracy after formal 
transition to democracy in 1983 took a form of defective democracy due to the 
existence of tutelary powers. Therefore, Turkey can be regarded as a tutelary 
democracy, a diminished subtype of democracy. Restrictions on freedom of expression 
and media, alternative information and associational autonomy, existence of tutelary 
and veto powers, hindered the country’s democratic completion. Turkey was on the 
continuing process of democratization although the existence of several unfavorable for 
full democracy. For that reason, it is not possible to talk about the democratic 
consolidation. Yet, this would not withhold us from the further discussions. What are 
the conditions of Turkey to help in build an institutionalized democracy? What are the 
shortcomings of Turkey for becoming a consolidated democracy in the future?  
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3.4.1 Civil Society 
Lively civil society must exist for stable democracies. Their interest and values will 
play major role in the stability of democratic regimes. For Linz & Stepan (1996), civil 
society is an arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and 
individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create 
associations and solidarities, and advance their interests (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 7). 
For Larry Diamond (1994), civil society is the realm of organized social life that is 
voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, and autonomous from the state, and 
bound by a large order or set of shared rules (Diamond, 1994, p. 5). Several points seem 
common in these two definitions. Civil society is self-organizing and generating, 
voluntarily participated associations and interest group organizations. These 
characteristics might provide basis for sharing and promoting values that are needed by 
democracy. Civil society can play role in promoting the functioning of democracy such 
as civic competence, solidarity among citizens, moderation, interpersonal trust, 
compromise, toleration for other people’s ideologies. Through creating these 
democratic attributes and integrating them successfully into political culture of a 
country, civil society can contribute to democratic consolidation via moderation of 
extreme views, respect for other ideas, collaborating for specific task and most 
importantly help promote civic competence. 
Civil society can bound the exercise of arbitrary state power. Civil society is an 
intermediary organization, situated between the state and private sphere. The most 
striking property of civil society is its ability of limiting state power. It involves citizens 
acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, and ideas, 
exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state, and hold state 
officials accountable (Diamond, 1994, p. 5). Civil society can force politicians and 
public officers to be accountable to its citizens. Women and trade groups, associations, 
ethnic and religious groups can constrain arbitrary rule of state; can control abuses of 
state resources; can form societal accountability with the help of media in order to 
defend civil rights and liberties, can help flow of ideas and ideologies and can buttress 
pluralism and diversity within the system and can be part of checks and balances system 
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of democracy. This realm of spontaneously created social organizations separate from 
the state structure that underlie democratic political institutions and they are less 
manipulable by public policy, and indeed often bear an inverse relationship to state 
power, growing stronger as the state recedes and vice versa (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 8). As 
civil society increases its role in public realm or deepens its social roots with society, 
states’ intervention to civil society institutions would be less likely. This pressure 
against state authority or effort for making the state more accountable might conclude 
with forcing state for policy changes or concessions with public. However, this huge 
effort requires rule of law to protect its own organization. For that reason, civil society 
and rule of law are two interconnecting areas that support each other in order to 
consolidate democratic system. 
Another function of a democratic civil society is recruiting and training new 
political leaders (Diamond, 1994, p. 9). Civil society can be a step for significant 
success in civil society arena for politically competent citizens; volunteers can gain 
experience in politics and connect with political parties. Study of Robert Putnam’s 
(1993) shows the social organization such as networks, norms and social trust that 
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit (Putnam, 1993, p. 67). 
Education will play crucial role in this point. Education will bring civic engagement, 
informed citizens, will support political participation and will increase the level of 
social capital. In order to come together for specific reasons traditions of civic 
engagement must exist and the trust for each other will facilitate this possibility. 
According to Putnam (2000), there is a causal mechanism between trust and 
participation; “virtuous circle” both affecting each other. For him, voluntary 
membership to social organizations like bowling clubs, sport clubs, religious 
organizations, etc. will increase the level of trust. Networks of civic engagement will 
promote social trust and social capital and formation of civil society organization is 
most likely depends on these elements which in turn will increase the level of 
interpersonal trust and tolerance for minorities. According to Uslaner (2002), there is 
only one causal arrow and that is from moral trust to civic engagement. Uslaner claims 
that social organizations as Putnam said only make people socialize with their own class 
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or those with similar background. Therefore, it does not increase general trust but 
individual one. This situation might even be harmful for general trust since it can create 
in group, particularistic trust rather than a trust to others.  
Another important role that civil society can play is its social mobilizing effects. 
Civil society can increase political efficacy not only through recruiting politicians but 
also with supporting political participation and civic duties such as electoral watchdog, 
non-partisan election-monitoring, and hold politicians accountable for the public and 
check violations of public authorities. Civil society’s effort of election-monitoring can 
change the results, can certify the fairness of elections and can avert election fraud. 
Armed with certain amount of civic competence, citizens may hold elected officials 
accountable. A robust civil society, with the capacity to generate political alternatives 
and to monitor government and state institution and expenditures, can help transitions 
get start, help resist reversals, help push transitions to their completion, help 
consolidate, and deepen democracy (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 9). Civil society is one of 
the crucial areas of democratic consolidation and as Larry Diamond (1994) pointed out 
“a vibrant civil society is probably more essential for consolidation and maintaining 
democracy than for initiating it (Diamond, 1994, p. 7). 
Civil society is an essential component of democratic consolidation but not the 
transition. Civil society can contribute to the functioning of democracy through the 
mechanisms that I indicate above within institutionalized political order. Because in pre 
democratic transition period, old regime forces could not allowed vibrant civil society 
and may manipulate them. Another strategy could be being selective about civil society 
institutions. Regime can only allow associations that are loyal to regime forces. For that 
reason, civil society can function properly only after introduction of democratic regime. 
3.4.2 Political Society  
Civil society must be non-partisan and autonomous from political society. 
Distinctiveness of these two areas is important, but also their complementarily is 
crucial. Political society can be a mediating power between civil society and state or a 
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channel that represent policy changing demand of civil society. By political society, 
Linz & Stepan (1996) mean that arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself to 
contest the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus 
(Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 8). 
The building of a consolidated democracy involves in part an affirmation and 
strengthening of certain institutions, such as the electoral system, revitalized or newly 
created parties, judicial independence and respect for human rights, which have been 
created or recreated during the course of the first transition (Valenzuela, 1992, p. 58). 
Normative positive appreciation of those core institutions of a democratic political 
society –political parties, elections, electoral rules, political leadership, interparty 
alliances, and legislatures- by which society constitutes itself politically to select and 
monitor democratic government (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 8). Institutionalization of 
political party system and parties itself, their internal organization and leadership, 
electoral system and election rules can contribute to consolidation of democratic 
political society. And these prerequisites must be appreciated by the wide range of 
society. 
3.4.3 Rule of Law  
Government must be subjected to law and oversight of the courts. No democratically 
elected government is above law (Valenzuela, 1992, p. 63). Not only government but 
also all kind of regional power, ethnic, political or economic groups and political 
leaders; in short, all significant political actors without any privilege must be subjected 
to independent and autonomous law and oversight of the courts. Existence of any 
tutelary power above law will be the first destabilizing factor in political system in order 
to establish consolidated democracy. 
The elected government and the state administration are subjected to a network 
of laws, courts, semiautonomous review and control agencies, and civil-society norms 
that not only check the state’s illegal tendencies but also embedded it in an 
interconnecting web of mechanisms requiring transparency and accountability (Linz & 
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Stepan, 1996, p. 19). Rule of law, through protecting civil society, any other review and 
control agencies can contribute to transparency and accountability of the system. Beside 
this, civil rights and liberties backed by network of law and courts would help increase 
the quality of democracy. Another point that I want to emphasize is judicial oversight. 
Emerging after World War II, constitutional courts became the significant fortress of 
protecting the civil and minority rights, liberties and confronting violations of rules and 
procedures and other type of constitutional policies. Constitutional monitoring backed 
by the power of law can be supportive element of democratic consolidation. If the rule 
of law supported by the constitution had written in a consensual process, integrated all 
significant political groups and take political leader’s support, than respect for the laws 
and courts might have been more likely to happen. The extent of judicial independence; 
rule of law, judicial oversight and the role that constitutional courts in politics are 
significant factors on advancement of democracy in a country. 
3.4.4 Economic Society 
As both theoretically and empirically shown, economic conditions and indicators play 
significant role in both transition and consolidation of democracy. Suitable conditions 
are supportive of formation and then, endurance of democratic governance. Modern 
consolidated democracies require “a set of socio-politically crafted and socio-politically 
accepted norms, institutions, and regulations”, which Linz and Stepan call economic 
society that mediates between state and market (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 11). 
Economic markets are necessary but not sufficient conditions for democracy 
(Maravall, 1995). Consolidation of democracy in pure market economy or in pure 
command economy is less likely to emerge. As studies of several scholars indicated an 
effective, legitimate and stable democracy needs re-distributional policies in pure 
market economy as like society needs intermediary organizations and pluralism in pure 
command economy. Since, civil society is acknowledged as one of the significant pro-
democratic force and necessary condition for consolidation and its association with 
market necessitates this kind of economic order in country. On the other hand, in order 
to prevent political apathy, alienation from political system and cynicism; state must 
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provide material benefits, social services, keep inflation moderate and sometimes 
market intervention for the lower strata of the society. For that reason, economic 
organization must be found on the balance between those two in order to derive support 
and sustain for democratic system. 
In their distinctive study, Przeworski et. al. (2000) found two general finding. 
Once a country has a democratic regime, its level of economic development has a very 
strong effect on the probability that democracy will survive (Przeworski et. al., 2000, p. 
40). Economic growth has contributive effect on the survival of the democratic regimes. 
The faster the growth of economy, the more facilitating conditions emerges for the 
survival of democracies. Scholars have revealed that democracies survive if they 
generate economic growth and if they control distributional pressures by allowing some 
inflation and reducing income inequality (Przeworski et.al., 1996, p. 50). More 
moderate inflation and income equality have facilitating effect on democratic 
consolidation and increase probability of more stable democracy. Drawing from the 
study of Boix (2003), Boix & Stokes (2003) argue that “democracy is caused not by 
income per se but by other changes that accompany development, in particular, income 
equality” (Boix & Stokes 2003, p. 540). They claimed that the economic development is 
an extremely important predictor of transition prior to 1950, but has only a small 
(though statistically significant) effect in the post-1950 period. 
Increasing growth would likely to support distributional policies, wealth and 
reducing unemployment rate will change social strata. Under the condition of moderate 
inflation and economic inequality; widening middle class would be reason behind the 
political moderation, reducing support for extremist parties, stronger civil society and 
dispersion of middle class values such as tolerance, trust among society (Lipset, 1959, 
p. 84). Increase in the income level of a nation will affect political values and promote 
democratic norms. For that reason, sustaining economic growth is crucial for 
democracy’s survival and stability. Political leaders of newly emerged democratic 
countries must focus on this area and craft their institutions with reference to economic 
growth. Even where democratic regimes are held in place, weak economic performance 
can undermine attitudes and behaviors that are important for democratic consolidation 
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(Haggard & Kaufmann, 1994, p. 6). Economic deterioration and rising inflation have 
been closely linked with social tension. Lower classes of the society are not vulnerable 
to economic crisis and are also more likely to produce social events. Political system 
must provide material benefits to this part of society not through clientelism, favoritism 
or patronage, but as it is citizen right. For that reason, policy performance by new 
democratic governments should be positive for the sake of legitimating democracy, but 
the context of severe economic crises makes such an outcome doubtful (Mainwaring et. 
al., 1992, p. 9). The relationship between legitimacy and macro-economic outlook must 
be kept in the mind of political leaders. 
Modernization increases the receptiveness to the type of norms and values that 
mitigate conflict, penalize extremist groups, and reward moderate democratic parties 
(Lipset, 1959, p. 83-84). In countries that are experiencing protracted economic 
deterioration chances of confronting political cynicism and apathy, strikes, public 
demonstrations, decline in political participation more likely to emerge. Increasing 
inclination towards extreme, revolutionary or antiestablishment political groups and 
their actions, at first, would produce destabilizing factors, and might pose risk to the 
erosion of democracy. If a democratic regime lost citizens’ faith towards democratic 
political system, then authoritarian cures for economic prescriptions may become more 
favorable for alienated part of society. 
Przeworski et. al. (2000) empirically verified that growth matters for regimes 
survival –especially per capita income indicators-, changes in the overall distribution 
have no clear effect on the stability of regimes but democracies are somewhat less 
stable when the share of the bottom 40% declines (Przeworski, 2000, p. 109-121) and 
lastly, democracies are much more likely to survive in affluent countries. According 
Diamond & Plattner (1995) democracy cannot be consolidated unless it eventually 
generates the basis for sustainable growth. 
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3.4.5 Elimination of Tutelary Powers and Reserved Domains 
Building an effective democracy very often requires abandoning or altering 
arrangements, and institutions that may have facilitated the first transition (by providing 
guarantees to authoritarian rulers and the forces backing them) but that are inimical to 
the second (Valenzuela, 1992, p. 58). Existence of a tutelary or veto power or specific 
“guaranteed, protected” political areas absent from provision of civilian rule is 
detrimental to democratic regime. However, these concessions are significant in 
reaching consensus especially with those who hold power in authoritarian era for exit 
strategies during democratic transitions.  
Guarantees provided for authoritarian elite, military and police forces, 
judiciaries or dominant business groups in exchange for the introduction of democratic 
methods are facilitating conditions in the times of democratic transition. Constitution 
written in the supervision of tutelary powers, specific laws for the protection of old 
authoritarian powers, reserved domains such as higher ranks of judiciary or specific 
ministries out of civilian control are generally known methods of exit guarantees. These 
areas can be considered as sources of destabilizing factors and regime reversals. In the 
long term these easing transitional conditions turned to drawbacks for the democratic 
type of government. Advancement in the democratic way of government requires 
abolishment of these areas and concessions and subordinating military to the democratic 
government. 
Democracy cannot be consolidated if the military continues to challenge the 
democratization. They should not be interfering to democratic political system, 
restraints to their specialized area.  
3.4.6 Political Culture 
In 1959 Lipset asked his inspiring question of why rich countries are more likely to be 
democracies than poor ones. There must be many replies to this question and from 
1960s onward. One of these replies focuses on the aspects of political culture that a 
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country has. Political culture was seen as one of the supportive factor of a democratic 
political system. The term “political culture” refers to specifically political orientations 
–attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role 
of self in the system (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 12). Almond & Verba (1963) define 
the democratic political culture as civic culture which seen as an allegiant political 
culture in which political participation is mixed with passivity, trust, and deference to 
authority. This deepest level includes phenomena such as family structure, religion, 
moral values, ethnic consciousness, “civic-ness,” and particularistic historical traditions 
(Fukuyama, 1995, p. 8). 
The term “civic culture” refers to a culture of consensus, a pluralistic culture 
based on communication and persuasion; a culture permitted change but moderated it, 
culture of diversity and consensualism, rationalism and traditionalism (Almond & 
Verba, 1963, p. 6). This type of culture does not only protect pluralism, diversity, 
tolerance and trust among citizens, it can also help promote civil society and political 
society and provide a foundation for consensus based political atmosphere. The greater 
the degree of consensus among political forces over “national goals”, political 
institutions such as the constitution and rules of the games is, the greater the chances of 
solving historical cleavages and political, ethnic, religious conflicts. Consensus based 
politics can reduce political tension and promote political moderation through 
decreasing the level of political polarization and make political collaborations possible 
between parties. Prevention of zero-sum forms of politics would definitely support 
democratic consolidation. 
It appears that the acquisition through repeated practice of asset of democratic 
attitudes –in politics as well as in other spheres- tends to spill over from its point of 
origin in the direction of other patterns of authority (O’Donnell, 1992, p. 20). 
Abolishment of authoritarian tendencies and practices at all level of society from family 
to macro-politics would support democratic methods in all areas of life. The acquisition 
of democratic beliefs and attitudes seems to be contagious: if we practice them in 
certain types of activities, it is likely that we will extend them and/or support those who 
attempt to do so (O’Donnell, 1992, p. 20). In order to consolidate democracy, attitudes, 
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behaviors or even psychological appreciation of democracy must be accepted and 
internalized. This can be possible with the practice of democracy which in turn tends to 
spill over and help fight against the despotic patterns of authority at all level of society. 
If citizens are practicing and routinely applying a more moderate, participatory and 
inclusive behavior in life, then these personal behaviors can transmit to political culture 
and generate and promote of these attributes. Education level of the masses can also 
become crucial. It would not be wrong to say democracy will probably be more endured 
if citizens are more educated and demanding, when they actively participate in political 
topics, and are aware of their citizens’ duty. When the ideal citizen profile meets with 
the favorable economic conditions, civic culture will more likely emerge and begin to 
promote democracy in that country. 
However, the question of whether democracy brings democratic political culture 
and values or political culture itself brings democracy is still a question on the table. For 
many years the role of political culture is downplayed by many researchers on the 
transition to democracy literature. Specifically, political belief attitudes towards the 
political systems emerged as an intervening factor for the relationship between 
economic development and democracy. Through democratic practices, democratic 
beliefs and practices will diffuse around the political institutions. Inglehart (1997) 
claimed that economic development, cultural change, and political change go together 
in coherent and even predictable patterns. Developments of these social institutions will 
increase education then will create a facilitating political culture that promotes 
democracy. Once industrialism has embarked, socioeconomic changes and related 
syndromes are likely to appear; from mass mobilization to the changes in gender roles 
which then will bring new societal changes to democratic political institutions. 
According to Inglehart’s empirical research from same article, individuals' attitudes to 
the functioning of democratic institutions was limited in quality and depth. According 
to Lijphart (1980), the reverse causal relationship is possible in which democratic 
stability promote the civic culture. For Limongi & Przeworski (1997) transition to 
democracy is mostly determined at the elite level regardless of the underlying economic 
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and cultural conditions. However, this does not mean that civic aspects of political 
culture will bring democratization by itself. 
One criticism is whether the civic political culture is a product or a producer of 
democratic systems. For the study of Schmitter & Karl (1991), civic culture is much 
more a product of democracy. Because, formation of civic culture taken time for it to 
become a habitual practice. In pre-democratic transition period, aspects of civic culture 
are less probably ingrained in the society. For that reason, proliferation of factors that 
will bring civic culture very likely depend on the habituation of democratic practices. 
Traits such as tolerance to minorities, interpersonal trust, moderation, and respect to 
each other should be established in society. For that reason, ingrained of these aspects 
of political culture requires the process of regime consolidation. 
3.4.7 Commitment of Political Elites 
Democracy requires competent politicians who know political procedures, experienced 
in political processes and commit to the democratic practices. Commitment of political 
elites and parties to democracy is a necessary condition for stable democracy. Political 
elites must create institutions that represent interests in society and exercise moderating 
power over those interests (Mainwaring, 1992, p. 310). Democracy is a game that 
requires politicians’ commitment to it to become stable in order to make it more stable 
and effective. 
Democracies are more likely to survive when political actors have a strong 
normative preference for democracy and when they avoid radical policy positions 
(Mainwaring & Linan, 2013, p. 124). By commitment to democracy, we mean 
politicians value, internalize, practice and embrace the democratic methods in politics, 
holding normative preferences for democracy and these preferences can support 
democratic regimes’ survival and endurance. If formerly authoritarian political elites 
commit to democracy after democratic transition, chances of democratic consolidation 
become possible. 
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Regime breakdown will be more likely to emerge with the management of 
authoritarian leaders who disrespect and violate democratic procedures. If radical actors 
win state powers, can control the institutions, they can impose high costs on the other 
actors, making it tempting for the losers to resort to coups as a way of preventing major 
and extremely difficult-to-reverse costs (Mainwaring & Linan, 2013, p. 130). This can 
open gates for authoritarian leaders to skew the playing field. In order to advance 
toward the consolidation of democracy, we see that democratic actors must at least. (a) 
neutralize those actors who are unconditionally authoritarian, either by isolating them 
politically or by turning them into fragmented sects who cannot threaten the survival of 
the regime, and (b) in regard to neutral actors, promote preferences or at least practices 
which are compatible with the functioning of democracy (O’Donnell, 1992, p. 22). 
Political elites that are deeply committed to democracy would prevent country from 
such situation or even push it for further advancement.  
Conclusion 
Consolidation of democracy depends on the foundation of a regime that at least meet 
with the minimum requirements of polyarchy. Because, only democracies can be 
democratically consolidated. Democratic consolidation is not the consolidation of 
regime. Democratic consolidation requires institutionalization of democratic norms, 
procedures and institutions that make a system democracy. Consolidation of regime 
rather implies the consolidation of institutions or mechanisms in any type of regime. 
The first condition for the consolidation of democracy is the completion of democratic 
transition that provides establishment of polyarchy. It is misleading to discuss the issue 
of democratic consolidation if the transition from any kind of authoritarian regimes or a 
subtype of regimes is not completed. We can claim that the completion of democratic 
transition is different from the consolidation which is referring to a situation of 
institutionalization or stabilization of the democracy. Foundation of minimum 
prerequisites of democracy is essential for gradual institutionalization of democracy. 
Tutelary power above civilian politics with reserved domains or pressures on media and 
freedom of expressions are deficiencies and their existence presents barriers for 
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becoming a full democracy. While transition to democracy is still ongoing elimination 
of tutelary powers and any kind of illiberal or authoritarian practices can be eliminated. 
However, consolidation does not refer to advancement through stages per stages; rather 
a gradual process disseminates democratic ways, norms and institutions in political life. 
For that reason, consolidation of democracy must be differentiated from consolidation 
of subtypes. 
One of the problematic traits of the concept “consolidation” is that it does not 
mean that these democracies would never breakdown. The premise that consolidation is 
irrevocable or inevitable is bound to be fail. Democratic consolidation connotes wide 
variety of meanings. As I scrutinize above, for some of the scholars democratic 
consolidation refers to a level of sustainability against authoritarian regressions and 
backslidings, endurance of regime and stability of democratic institutions what I have 
called “endurance” line of definition. For the other line, democratic consolidation refers 
to institutionalization of democratic practices in political, cultural and social structure 
that makes “the democracy the only game in town”. The latter requires attitudinal 
affirmatives for the democratic regimes. 
In a democracy, specific properties of the system can contribute to immunity of 
democracy in confronting reverse pressures. Pluralism both in economy and political 
life, commitment of people to democratic methods, vibrant civil society that is not 
manipulated by the state, democratic political society and elimination of all 
authoritarian practices can strengthen the resilience of democratic system. Each of 
democratic consolidation areas has their own facilitating condition for democratic 
consolidation. But, the general framework of these conditions refers to sharing 
democratic values and practicing the democratic methods through inclusive 
participations to political processes. The golden rule of democratic consolidation is 
practicing democratic methods. Democracy disseminates through practicing and 
adopting of democratic practices in all way of life. 
It should be noted that the institutional crafting of democracies can play 
significant role in both democratic transition and consolidation. Transition period, 
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concessions to old regime, creation of new institutional arrangements for the system, 
constitution forming periods and how these processes are managed vital for futures of 
democracy. Exclusivist political methods, institutions that produce authoritarian 
practices or cultural traits that accentuate obedience can be eliminated by the well-
established political institutions. Even if each country has their own historical-
traditional trajectories, precisely selected institutions can be cure for old problems, 
while providing concrete solutions for future ones. Therefore, democratic consolidation 
of countries may depend on their idiosyncratic political and economic history. 
Therefore, historical case studies can be optimal methodology for observing the 
consolidation of specific democracies. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EROSION OF TURKISH DEMOCRACY 
In this chapter, I will focus on the Turkish democracy as a case after 1983 to 2017 
presidential referendum. This was the year that country took democratic transition from 
military government to multiparty politics. In 1946, Turkey formally made the 
transition to democracy after World War II in order to become an ally of the Western 
World. There were several reasons behind this decision. Turkey was in need of military 
and political allies in order to protect itself from the menace of Socialist Bloc and 
Stalin’s territorial claims over Turkey (Yılmaz, 1997). Severe pressures on uni-party 
system (Kalaycıoğlu 2008), displeasure of Turkish public after the WWII and the 
economic recession throughout WWII period (Pamuk, 2010) were other reasons behind 
this political decision. However, the relationship between Turkey and democracy was a 
bit intense, disputed in its early years. Multiparty politics has been interrupted by 
military interventions in several times. In 1960 and 1980, the Turkish military 
intervened in Turkish democracy directly with a military coup. It abolished multiparty 
politics, closed TGNA and declared martial law. Following 1983, multiparty politics 
started under the shadow of mighty Turkish military with the new 1982 Constitution. 
New constitution created a new political atmosphere with a new dialect, new political 
forces, politicians and generation, which led to criminalization of leftist political 
movements, their chances of regeneration for future (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2009; 
Kalaycıoğlu, 2005). When the putschist focused pressures on the leftists political 
movements, the regime founded by the 1980 putschists confronted with dominant 
Islamist and populist political party in the beginning of millennium. 
In the first part, I will outline the factors that have been suggested in the 
literature and discuss each for the case of Turkey. Following the Turkish political 
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developments under the AKP rule after 2002 general elections; this study will focus on 
a general overview of Turkish politics with a historical and structural background on 
political events, including elections and the strategies that make AKP powerful will be 
the center of attention. In the second part, I will focus general structure of rule of law, 
civil society, political culture, populism and media and freedom of expressions.  
4.1 Turkey under AKP Rule  
In the 1990s, the Turkish democracy has faced two new challenges: the rise of political 
Islam as represented mainly by renowned Islamists such as Necmettin Erbakan's 
Welfare Party (WP), and the rise of Kurdish nationalism. This need to be considered in 
the light of the emergence of globalism, the rise of micro nationalism around the globe, 
and religious fundamentalists movements in search for recognition to religious and 
nationalist identities and the rise of identity politics in the world, which in turn led to 
debates on the idea of unitary national state (Kalaycıoğlu & Çarkoğlu, 2007). The 
collapse of Soviet Union, weakening of social democratic welfare state policies in 
Western Europe, and revival of Islamic movements against leftist movements in Islamic 
countries, the effect of Iranian Revolution, the failure of Turkish leftist political 
movements for regeneration and neoliberal economic policies of the centre-right 
Motherland Party and the end of protectionist state policies after 1980 military coups 
led to decline of welfare state and create a sense of uncertainty in political order. These 
problems initiated the discussions regarding the unitary, social and secular characteristic 
of Turkish state. Collapse of USSR, Gulf War, Bosnian War, questioning of ethnicities 
created a state of uncertainty, in the minds of voters which also dragged them to vote 
for Islamic and nationalist parties (Kalaycıoğlu & Çarkoğlu, 2007). Weakening of leftist 
movements coincided with the rise of political Islam. Many social groups have been 
unable to protect themselves against this socio-political transformation. Islamic 
revivalist easily and successfully filled the void created as results of these 
developments. Shantytowns, newly emerged urban areas, newly migrated masses are 
mostly got under the network of Islamic movements, cemaats and tarikats (Ayata, 
1996, p. 112). Rising powers; Kurdish nationalism and Islamic revivalism challenged 
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the national ideology, Atatürkism. Islamists, after the mid-1990s started to steal the 
fame and stage of Turkish politics, gained several electoral victories after 1995, which 
was the result of biggest electoral shift in Turkish political history from center right of 
political spectrum to far right. Hence, the political engineering project of 1982 
Constitution had severe blow from 1991 and 1995 elections where coalition 
governments emerged and centripetal tendencies of the voters dissolved and shifted to 
rightist parties even if the coalition governments were centripetal. Fractionalization and 
volatility of votes have also increased (Turan, 2003, p. 156). 
1994 local elections can be considered as a critical historical challenge to secular 
ideology of Turkish state. WP successfully gained the major metropolitan cities. 
Following local elections, WP became the top party in 1995 general elections, formed a 
coalition government with Tansu Çiller’s centre-right DYP and Erbakan became the 
prime minister. WP successfully brought the problem of wearing headscarf –türban- to 
the national political level and successfully took advantage of the question in order to 
mobilize conservative masses especially women. Socio economically, least developed 
provinces of Turkey -mostly gecekondu areas and shantytowns-conservative masses and 
newly migrated Kurds living in metropolitan areas voted for the Welfare Party (Ayata, 
1996, p. 112). The effect of this new transformation also had an impact on civil society. 
New charity organizations like IHH, Deniz Feneri become more prominent and 
MÜSİAD has been founded in early 1990s. Conservatives and those who are sensitive 
about the so-called headscarf question even some of leftist liberal groups came together 
in civil society organizations. Rising usage of Islamic references and speeches of 
Welfare party politicians and public presence of Islam in public increased the tension 
between WP and Turkish military and ended with the declaration of Turkish military 
which lead to breakdown of WP, centre-right True Path Party coalition government.  
In 28th February 1997, declaration by the Turkish military against Erbakan’s 
coalition government led to resignation of government. Civil society organizations 
played an important role during the so-called 28 February process. The Confederation 
of Turkish Trade Unions (Turk-Is), Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions 
Small Traders and Turkish Confederation of Small Traders (TESK) chairs supported the 
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declaration of National Security Council which attacked Islamist Erbakan Government 
to the heart of counter-revolutionary activities against secular republic founded by 
Atatürk. With the infamous postmodern coup of 28 February 1997, when the National 
Security Council5 gave a declaration to the government asking it to take strict measures 
against the threat of rising Islamism in the country, the coalition government was 
dismantled (Yeğenoğlu, 2012, p. 229). After political bans to the leaders of WP, Virtue 
Party (Fazilet Partisi) established in 1998 as a caretaker party of WP. However, the 
difference about the role of Islam in politics created a split among the high rank cadre of 
the party between the traditionalist and reformist sides. Traditionalists have won the 
party congress, and reformists founded the Justice and Development Party –AKP- 
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi). 1990’s are important to understand conditions that bring 
AKP to power. In the following sections, I will show how AKP benefitted from the 90s 
politics for further support and for populist policies. 
Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP controlled the majority of 
seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) since 2002. In its first election, 
AKP had achieved to control two thirds of the seats in legislative assembly. In the early 
years of AKP’s majority government, party achieved decline in inflation, focused more 
on infrastructure development, consumption has boomed thanks to low-interest loans 
and social expenditures increased (Deliveli, 2015). These ratios were improved in 
comparison with the 2001 economic crises. Together with victory in 2002 elections, 
effective governance of economy contributed to the expansion of party’s electoral base. 
Even if AKP was founded by leaders with Islamic roots, they were able to gain votes 
from different positions of political spectrum such as nationalists, Kurdish and centre-
right political groups. AKP was indeed a coalition of centre-right, combining Islamic 
politics and nationalist views. However, it was also supported by small and effective 
political groups such as liberals (Waldman & Calışkan, 2017). At first, liberal 
intellectuals and supporters of EU integration process were suspicious about the party 
                                                 
5 National Security Council (NSC, MGK in Turkish) founded by 1980 Constitution. Council develeops national 
security policies together with Turkish military and civilian rulers. Council was many times criticized for being an 
“protected area”, created by 1980 Coup makers. NSC played an important role in the process after 1983. From the 
point of military NSC was a kind of an advisory council, in which military delivers its concerns on national security, 
foreign policy and current political issues. NSC was a channel for military to deliver their concerns, ideas and 
comments to civilian governments, rather than a mutual transfer of ideas about policies.   
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because of their Islamic sentiments, and then became defenders of AKP government as 
the party declared its allegiance to NATO and the accession process of the EU. Legal 
and constitutional reforms came out of by AKP, supported by the EU, opened the way 
for accession talks with Turkey in 2005. AKP was encouraged to curb the political role 
of Turkish military gradually. Party presented itself as a challenger against the political 
establishment and elite politics.  
During their first term in power (2002 to 2007), AKP successfully lowered the 
inflation and interest rates, managed to stabilize macroeconomic variables, opened way 
for the recognition of linguistic and cultural rights of Kurdish identity and allowed 
religious women enter in universities while covered with turban; enhanced the visibility 
of Islamic symbols in public and gave voice to conservative parts of society (The Silent 
Revolution Report, 2013). EU conditionality regime’s economic and political reform 
agenda and democratization process of AKP helped promote their political power and 
widened their electoral base. But, most importantly, these processes have helped AKP 
eliminate and delegitimize its major opponents, secular characteristics of the Turkish 
military and state institutions of Kemalist regime in politics. 
In 2007 general elections, AKP came to power with strong electoral support. 
Party was strong enough to push back declaration of Turkish army that accused AKP 
government of being hotbed of anti-secular activities against Turkish Republic. 
Military’s main aim was to block Abdullah Gül’s –one of the founder of AKP and 
minister of Foreign Affairs - candidacy for Presidency, which according to higher ranks 
of judiciary and military, was unfit to the presidency because of his Islamic tendencies. 
However, deadlock was successfully eliminated by AKP through early elections in the 
same year. The AKP won majority of seats in TGNA with the 46,6% shares of vote, 
which forced military to accept the presidency of Abdullah Gül. Electoral success of 
AKP in 2007 helped AKP to control not only the legislative branch of government, but 
also presidency, which according to writers of 1982 Turkish constitutions is a symbolic 
position elected by the TGNA, absent from partisan politics and protector of national 
interest of secular Turkish state. However, a constitutional amendment made in 2007 
altered the tenure and election procedures of presidency into 5+5 year tenure with direct 
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election by the people itself. Through direct elections, AKP could easily obtain 
presidency, head of executive in a country dominantly voting for centre-
right/conservative parties. Since the opposition parties were weak and conservative, 
centre-right voting blocs consists more than 50% of Turkish people, AKP would easily 
get more than 50% vote of electorate. This strategy would help to eliminate one of the 
tutelary powers in politics. However, in March 2008, chief public prosecutor petitioned 
Constitutional Court for the closure of AKP on the account of its anti-secular activities. 
The international support for the party by EU and USA and dominant support of 
Turkish media and business may have helped the Constitutional Court’s decision not to 
close. 
In 2010 another debate emerged around Supreme Board of Judges and 
Prosecutors (HSYK). AKP aimed to reduce the dominance of Republicans in the body. 
Victory of 2010 Constitutional referendum6 has helped AKP to control the appointment 
and electoral procedures of HSYK7 and made it subordinate to the executive branch of 
the government through appointments for the body. With the help of President Abdullah 
Gül, judges and prosecutors with Islamic background and those who could be loyal to 
AKP government were appointed to HSYK and higher ranks of judiciary (Özbudun, 
2014). After 2010, AKP was able to control legislative, executive and judicial branches 
of the government. Voters endorsed modifications to Turkey's current constitution, 
making the military more accountable to civilian courts and giving parliament - the 550-
seat TGNA- more power to appoint judges (BBC, 12.09.2010). 
Inclination towards majoritarian style of rule, demonization of dissents and 
opposition parties, restriction on freedom of expression, media and internet led to 
emergence of stifling political atmosphere, which in turn led to rising protests from 
                                                 
6 Supreme Board of Judges and Proecutors (HSYK) is key in controlling the high rank judiciary appointments. The 
most important constitutional modifications were the increasing power of TGNA in appointing the high judges. 
Controlling of HSYK was vital for AKP to decrease the power of Republicans within the Board. According to party, 
Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) was one of the last strongholds of conservative secularists 
together with the Turkish military and universities. HSYK did not hesitate to coalesce in joint declaration against the 
policies of Islamic parties together with universities. 
7 Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors is the institutional body of legal system of Turkish judiciary, plays 
significant role in appointments of judges and prosecutors. Body was estblished by 1982 Constitution, and its 
structure was amended in 2010 Constitutional Referendum. 
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opposition forces. A wave of protests in 2013 Gezi Parkı was a severe shock against 
AKP government and the way it represented itself as a democratic Islamic party. Same 
year, another blow came from the Fethullah Gülen movement. A wave of police 
investigations arose through 17th of December and 25th of December, 2013 on the 
charges of bribery, corruption, fraud and money laundering against three ministers of 
AKP government, their sons and several bureaucrats (Arango, 25.12.2013). Members of 
police department and prosecutors were linked with Fethullah Gülen Cemaati, which 
once upon a time were allies and supporters of AKP government. Parliamentary 
question for the investigation of accusations were rejected with the votes of AKP 
deputies. Politicians accused of bribery dropped from ministry positions however did 
not nominated for TGNA in the following elections. Despite these two events, AKP and 
Prime Minister Erdogan succeeded in June 2014 local elections and then 2014 
presidential elections. Erdoğan became the first president of Turkey elected by the 
popular vote. 
Under these circumstances, in 2014, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had 
won country’s first direct presidential election about 52% share of vote in the first round 
against Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, joint candidate of opposition parties of Republican 
People’s Party (CHP) and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Presidential election of 
2014 extended Erdoğan’s rule for another five years who is currently in power more 
than ten years. After declaring victory, Erdoğan addressed his supporters at party 
headquarters and said, “with the president being elected by popular vote, obstacles 
between Çankaya [the presidential palace] and the public have been lifted.” (Uras, 
11.09.2014). Erdoğan, once again recalled the gap between the old regime forces, elites 
and the public. Erdoğan blamed his rival, İhsanoğlu, as being the advocate of status quo 
and a symbol of old regime. During presidential campaign, Erdoğan reiterated 
repeatedly that through popular election presidential office belongs to the public, and 
the system will bring a new legitimacy to the Office. According to Erdoğan, previous 
system was in need of presidents that are guardians of the regime in old Turkey 
(HürriyetDailyNews, 08.07.2016). According to the designers of 1982 Constitution, 
presidential office has to be a symbolic, non-political and neutral position and 
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presidents should be advocates of constitution and characterize secular, social character 
of the state. Erdoğan’s candidacy was a direct assault to the characteristic of the Office. 
His main strategy was to stretch parliamentary system through de-facto presidency, 
emphasize more on executive power of the Office. He repeatedly said he will be an 
unconventional and active president during his campaign (Uras, 11.09.2014). In his 
speeches during the campaign, Erdogan promised to work towards a new constitution, 
to resolve the Kurdish issue, achieve higher democratic standards, make progress in 
Turkey’s European Union membership bid, and protect the public against the "circles in 
the state" (Aljazeera, 12.07.2014). After his victory in popular elections, Erdoğan had 
done what he promised; create de facto practices of politics. For example, he did not 
promise to be an impartial and neutral president (HürriyetDailyNews, 08.07.2014). 
Erdoğan maximized the powers of presidency even if it was limited by Constitution. 
According to Constitution, even if the Presidential Office defined as a ceremonial 
position, presidents are able to call national security councils, appoint judges and 
several high rank positions for state agencies, veto legislation also call for early 
elections if a government cannot be formed. Erdogan maximize these powers with the 
help of majority group of AKP in the TGNA. In one of his speeches, he asserts that 
“whether you will like it or not, the system has changed in Turkey, and this de facto 
situation has to be finalized constitutionally” (HürriyetDailyNews, 15.08.2014). In 
some of his speeches, Erdoğan claimed that the presidential system is the most suitable 
one for Turkey (Hürriyet, 01.06.2015). With policies of President Erdoğan, Turkish 
political system has moved away from parliamentary system in favor of a presidential 
one. To lead from the presidency he would, in practice, he desired to control the head of 
AKP, despite being required by law to step down of its official head (Yeginsu & Arsu, 
2014). Ahmet Davutoglu, veteran Islamist politician, was the architect of “zero 
problems with neighbors” policy and the intensified the use of Ottoman legacy and 
political discourse in politics. Davutoğlu handpicked by Erdoğan to the party leadership 
and installed in the role in 2014. According to Erdoğan, this was a move to an era of 
strong President and strong Prime Minister.  
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Mr. Davutoglu was expected to play a backseat role as Mr. Erdogan pushed to 
make the largely ceremonial presidency into an all-powerful position (Sims, 
05.05.2016). In contrast to the expectations, neither Erdoğan stayed within 
Constitutional limits, nor Davutoğlu accept malleable role in Prime Minister. Davutoglu 
did not intend to be caretaker, rather often attempted to act autonomously without 
informing President such as on the issue of refugee crisis deal with the EU. Five months 
after losing majority government in June 2015 general elections, Davutoglu’s AKP has 
comeback with victory in November 2015 snap elections. After victories of consecutive 
elections in 2002, 2007, 2011, June 2015 elections were the first AKP’s failure to 
control majority of seats in TGNA. The high-stakes vote, took place in a climate of 
mounting tension and violence following an inconclusive June poll in which the 
conservative, Islamic-leaning AKP failed to secure an outright majority for the first 
time since coming to power in 2002 (Henley & Shaheen, 02.11.2015). In five months 
between two elections Turkey has shocked with hundreds of deaths in modern and 
Western part of the country. Bombings of PKK terror groups and Islamic terror groups, 
namely ISIS, intensified clashes with PKK in southeast part of Turkey and end of 
Kurdish Solution Process shook Turkish politics fundamentally and left more than 
thousand people dead. Under these circumstances, AKP regained the majority in 
TGNA, swept back to single party government again. Despite the electoral victory of 
AKP under the management of Davutoğlu, tension between these two politicians 
intensified as Davutoglu did not gave his full backing for Erdoğan’s plan to replace 
parliamentary system of government with a presidential one. In May 2016, Davutoğlu 
was forced departure from power with the demand of Erdoğan himself. Davutoğlu 
hinted in his speech “the fact that my term lasted far shorter than four years is not a 
decision of mine but a necessity,” (Malsin, 05.05.2016).  
After replacement of Davutoğlu with Binali Yıldırım, the clashes between Gülen 
movement and the government has intensified. The party had teamed with the Islamist 
network founded by Fethullah Gülen in hopes of outmaneuvering the Kemalists once 
and for all (Esen & Gümüşçü, 2017, p. 60). In a summer night of 15 July 2016, a small 
group of mid-level ranks of Turkish military attempted a coup against the civilian 
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government. Tanks and soldiers were on the roads to control strategic places and seizing 
the General Staff Headquarters, Special Forces Headquarters, Boğaziçi Bridge, Atatürk 
and Sabiha Gökçen airports, state owned TRT TV channel, police headquarters, 
municipalities and some of public places. Erdoğan, via using Facetime application, 
aired on live TV, called for people on the streets to take back and resist against coup 
makers. Erdoğan, implied that a minority group in Turkish military loyal to Fethullah 
Gülen movement is behind the coup. Later of the same night, it was understood that the 
Chief of Staff did not support the coup, rather midlevel ranks of staff were dominantly 
behind the coup attempt. These two were missing in this attempt. Then, the news of 
General Hulusi Akar is being held in captive by coup makers is televised. The 
declaration of Peace at the Home, the name of junta among the military, is televised in 
TRT. Declaration was criticized AKP for undermining the Republican ideals, 
democracy, rule of law and constitution. However, the most important element that 
failed the coup was the mobilization of citizens for resisting the coup. People began to 
pour into the streets, resist against tanks and soldiers. Citizens were killed by soldiers, 
tanks ran over to civilians and led to 248 deaths and more than 2400 wounded (Sabah, 
07.10.2015). Putschists’ aim to assassinate Erdoğan has failed. By early morning of July 
16, it was apparent that the bulk of the Turkish armed forces were not behind the coup, 
and that popular resistance was too intense and widespread to overcome (Esen & 
Gümüşçü, 2017, p. 62). The denial of Hulusi Akar to join the attempt and sign to the 
declaration played crucial role for personnel mobilization of non-Gülen military 
personnel. After the failed coup, it was clear that the most of midlevel putschists were 
promoted in 2013, 2014 and 2015 mostly from Turkish Air Force and Gendarmerie in 
the aftermath of Ergenekon and Sledgehammer Operations. 
According to military analyst and ex-military major, Metin Gürcan, the putschist 
forces were mostly Gülenists, with joining of several secular and pragmatic anti-
Erdogan officers incorporated (Gürcan, 17.07.2016). In 21 July 2016, TGNA passed the 
emergency law which has been extended 5 times since that day. Even the Presidential 
referendum passed under the condition of martial law. The coup failed because the 
putschists first lost the media battle and then decisively lost the momentum, once people 
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took to the streets en masse (Esen & Gümüşçü, 2017, p.63). The weak internal 
organization of the putschist was another factor for the failure. They predicted that the 
bulk of military personnel would join them, but, only 1.5% of military personnel, 
mostly in Ankara & İstanbul, were behind the organization (NTV, 27.07.2016) Media, 
Directorate of Religious Affairs, the party’s access to public and private resources 
helped AKP and the mobilization of party grass roots contributed to the failure of coup 
attempt (Esen & Gümüşçü, 2017). 
After curbing the political power of military, Erdoğan articulated his ambition to 
rebuild the system in favor of Presidency, urge AKP to introduce 21-article 
constitutional amendment that enhanced the power of the head of state and officially 
replace the existing parliamentary system with the presidential one. Erdoğan aimed to 
legalize what he called “de-facto situation” in Turkish politics through constitutional 
change. In fact, after 15 July coup attempt, Turkey was governing through decrees and 
executive orders in the state of emergency that bypasses the parliamentary processes. In 
the Turkish parliamentary political system, President was the head of state. With the 
new system, the president will have strong executive power rather than a ceremonial 
one. According to the adopted presidential system, the role of prime ministers would be 
eliminated and the president will be the single head of the executive, presidents will 
introduce law, be member of a political party, can stay at most two terms tenure in 
office, appoint ministers and public officials, two-thirds of senior judges, can declare 
state of emergency. 
After the 2014 presidential elections, Erdoğan was seeking to transfer executive 
power from prime minister to president and legally consolidate his de-facto presidency. 
For that reason, introduction of 21-article constitutional amendment was the final step 
for transformation of ceremonial presidency to powerful and de jure presidentialism. 
According to Erdoğan, the new system would make Turkey’s government stronger and 
more decisive and better able to defend the country against external threats like 
terrorism and internal threats like the Kurdish insurgency and coup plots (Sanchez, 
31.03.2017). AKP has passed the draft bill from commission and sent 18 new articles 
amendment for parliamentary vote.  
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After tense debates in TGNA, Turkish people went to ballot box on 15th April. 
AKP and conservative groups together with nationalists party MHP championed “Yes” 
while secular RPP and Kurdish nationalist HDP backing “No” in the referendum. The 
“Yes” campaign had won 51.3% share of vote against 48.6% vote for “No”. However, 
the decision of Supreme Election Council of accepting unstamped ballot papers as valid 
unless proven otherwise (BBC, 16.04.2017), together with the irregularities over invalid 
votes raised concern about the accuracy of results. With this result, Erdoğan regained 
the control of his party since the amendment allowed president to be member of party. 
These constitutional modifications except partisanship will come into effect in 2019. 
Until then, Erdoğan will serve as a popularly elected president. 
4.2 Turkey: General Overview  
4.2.1 Civil Society: Persistently Weak Phenomena  
Turkish political system has a strong “state tradition” inherited from Ottoman Empire.8 
(Mardin, 1975, p. 178). Many of Turkish Republican institutions, political and cultural 
traditions inherited from Ottoman Empire continued to function in Turkish Republic. 
Country has a long-lived legacy of strong state tradition. Founders of Turkish Republic 
were the members of Ottoman military and administrative class. In many areas, 
traditions, institutions and practices continued to be implemented by newly founded 
Turkish Republic. Some of these historical practices and institutions would affect the 
future political and sociological practices. 
The association between economic and political power in Turkish society and 
the structure of the political organization was the reverse of the sociological and 
                                                 
8 There were not any intermediary institutions in Ottoman state tradition to link the state and the public. Sultan and 
military class were at the center of Ottoman Empire, eliminated all rival centers of power which in turn resulted with 
a situation called absence of civil society (Özbudun, 1988, 38). Power and the state were all belonged to the Sultan. 
People were the subjects of Sultans, properties and the belongings of the Ottoman Sultans. Any kind of power 
concentration outside of the palace was eliminated directly by the state itself. State has been at the center of Turkish 
politics, a strong, heavy-handed, and arbitrary one, suspicious of its subject and any challenging and opponent 
concentration of power. Legacy of Sultanistic regime of Ottomans and positivist, Republican single party period 
heritage of Kemalists led scholars to focus more on state power as the cause of weak civil society. 
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historical structure of Western Europe. Instead of economic power (ownership of the 
means of production) leading to political power, political power (a high position in the 
state bureaucracy) provided access to material wealth (Özbudun, 2000, p. 126). Neither 
religious classes nor city guilds had played an intermediary role between political 
authority and society. For that reason, it is plausible to claim that there was no legacy of 
autonomous and independent intermediary body between the state and the public in 
Turkish political structure until the foundation of Turkish Republic. 
Proliferation of civil society depends on many factors. A civic political culture, 
absence or existence of centralized state tradition9, the level of stateness10, pluralism, 
the scope of the concentration of decision-making processes, socialization process of 
citizens, associability level, or socio-economic modernization of a country are 
determinants of a strong and autonomous civil society.  
The 1980s in Turkey have hardly been conducive to the flourishing of pluralistic 
or corporatist interest group politics (Heper, 1991, p. 12). 1970s conflictual political 
atmosphere, unreconciled ideological views, increasing death tolls created by the left 
and right political violence created situation which Turkish military was displeased of. 
According to Turkish military, political parties must protect the national unity, national 
interest and the unitary character of the Turkish state. This fear forced them to ban all 
interest groups that are linked with political parties or organizations that are pursuing 
political aims after 1980 military coup d'etat. Articles that ban direct linkage between 
parties and civil society institutions were abolished in mid-1990s (1982 Constitution, 
                                                 
9 The Ottoman society was fragmented into two poles between the rulers, askeri and the ruled reaya. Which, created a 
big political and cultural gap between the center and the periphery; the ruler and. the ruled; the state and the 
community. Center-periphery debate was the most historical cleavage that shaped the Turkish politics until the 
transition to multiparty politics of 1950s from Tanzimat period. It is argued to be still critical in the Turkish party 
system. It is obvious that this kind political structure is not a conducive environment for pluralism which civil society 
needs to proliferate. 
10 There is a marked statist orientation (etatism) in Turkey, which stresses community over its members, uniformity 
rather than diversity, and an understanding of law that emphasizes collective reason instead of the will of 
membership (Heper, 1985, p. 8). State was the only power to determine who will rise or fall within state bureaucracy 
or in business circles. The fate of people belonged to two lips of the mighty Sultan which created an immense 
uncertainty in the political system through his arbitrary rule. States’ power over the determination of the economic 
and political power can be destructive. Having close relationship with the state bureaucracy can be risky yet 
benevolent to any subjects in Ottoman country at the same time. Cases of confiscations can be seen in many times if 
state considered a bureaucrats or a merchant as dangerous political subject. 
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Article 33, 52, 69, 135, and 171). All interest groups were forced to live under the 
monist decision making processes governed by military or civilian executive, under the 
highly centralized and bureaucratized political system of Turkey.11 
In Turkish, "interest groups", have a pejorative meaning. “Interest” means as if 
they are only seeking to maximize their profit. Interest groups are seen as defenders of 
their particularistic and individualistic demands. As Robert Bianchi wisely argues; 
“Throughout the multiparty era, much of the political elite has continued to share a 
lingering fear that unless partitive interests are repressed, closely regulated, or prudently 
harmonized, divisions along such lines as class, religion, and region will threaten both 
the unity of the nation and authority of the state. (Özbudun, 2000, p. 129). Civil society 
requires plural society, which Turkish politics was lacking during 1980s. According to 
high ranks of Turkish armed forces, problems of pre-1980 period can only be solved 
through the elimination of particularistic, interest seeker behaviors and corrupt, rent 
seeking politicians and organizations (Turan, 1984). Armed Forces’ stress for a strong 
state and strong executive, deep suspicion about party politics and interest seeking 
behaviors made the atmosphere compelling and even dangerous for Turkish civil 
society institutions which traditionally considered as “weak”.  
In 1980, military’s decisions on new economic strategy of industrialization such 
as export orientation economy policies were welcomed by Turkish capital groups. A 
new economic alliance was set forth between the state and capital groups. Increase in 
workers’ wages were  repressed, activities of unions prohibited, prices liberated, state 
economic enterprises aimed to privatized, subsidizes were abolished throughout 1980s 
until 1988 (Yeldan, 2009, p. 121-125). With the help of these factors, capital 
accumulation levels rose through 1980s which helps Turkish industrialists to invest 
more and paid less for workers. This new alliance between military and capital groups 
had been consolidated after the victory of Turgut Özal’s neoliberal Motherland Party in 
their first elections. State, after 1980 military coup came to help Turkish capitalists and 
industrial groups to compensate what they lost during the 1970s because of the low 
                                                 
11 One of the leading Turkish scholars Heper describes this dominant mode of interest representation as “lingering 
monism” (Heper, 1991, p.163-176). 
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level of growth that are stemmed from political unrest and violence, strikes and the 
rising number of demand from working class (Yeldan, 2009, p. 121-125). 
The accession process of Turkey with European Union also has an impact on the 
state-civil society relations. EU has impacted civil society development in Turkey 
through its membership conditionality regime, funding policies and mechanisms, the 
networks fostered between Turkish and European civil society actors and by 
legitimizing civil society activity (Rumelili & Bosnak, 2015, p. 1). EU has coerced 
significant modifications on the legal framework of civil society through several 
mechanisms. Another contribution of EU to Turkish civil society organization is its 
funding programme. Wide range of facilities has been offered by EU, increased the 
capacity, operations and autonomy of civil society organizations that have limited ones. 
EU conditionality regime also contributes to building between Turkish civil society 
organizations with its EU counterparts; increase the chances of organizing common 
campaigns and create new channels and networks. The EU has not only shaped the legal 
environment and the activities of NGOs but also empowered the civil society vis-à-vis 
the state, nevertheless, the EU’s transformative impact on civil society has largely been 
limited to issue-based NGOs (Rumelili & Bosnak, 2015, p. 18). 
Single party government of AKP has been in power since 14 years. In these 14 
years, one can observe the fluctuations between the relationship of NGO’s and the 
government. Number of civil society organizations affiliated with AKP such as 
KADEM and TÜRGEV began to rise. These civil society organizations acted like 
grass-root organizations, a tool for mobilizing supporters especially women. However, 
the effect of these organizations to policy formation is weak as the overall decision-
making processes of AKP stayed centralized through the same period. The ties between 
Turkish political parties and associations have always been weak as Özbudun (2000) 
pointed out. Low political efficacy of interest groups is the result of the absence of 
strong ties between them and political parties, the link often remain weak and tenuous 
(Özbudun, 2000, p. 137). AKP tried to change this balance to a somehow a bit complex 
one. Party benefited from the close relationship of loyal and submissive civil society 
organizations. While on the other side, organizations enjoyed the aids and resources that 
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offered by the party in return to political support total loyalty for the government 
policies. Their activism and mobilization power can increase their chances for gaining 
political positions. AKP used several strategies to control civil society organizations 
that are specialized in different areas. These strategies can help us to understand the new 
structure of relationship between the state and civil society. 
Party’s support for civil society organizations depends more on the 
organizations’ support to the policies of AKP especially at the grass root level (Mehveş 
& Doğan, 14.10.2016). In one of his speeches, Erdoğan said that state institutions and 
civic organizations now worked hand in hand for the good of the people; “coalescence 
of the state and the nation.” (HurriyetDailyNews, 22.06.2016). Same old rhetoric of 
“national unity” and “reason of state” once again came to stage for curbing and limiting 
the power of civil society in Turkey. All interest groups must work within the 
framework of strong state tradition and extensively centralize decision-making 
mechanisms (Özbudun, 2000, p. 137), which in turn caused low political efficacy of 
interest groups in Turkey.  
Turkish state is selective on its relationship with associations. Those who 
challenge the regime and the unity of state on the basis of the ethnic and religious 
motivations are mostly closed down by legal sanctions. For example, in 2016, with a 
government decree, 375 civil society organizations, most of whom had ties to Kurdish 
political movements were closed (Birgün, 22.11.2016). Those operating on the Kurdish 
issue, refugees problem, civil rights and liberties tightly controlled by the state after a 
short liberal period before 2010. 
2016 Civic Freedom Report of Turkey by the International Center for Not-for-
Profit Law also referred the same points; 
   “Civil society has also been affected by a number of destabilizing pressures, 
including renewed tensions over the Kurdish conflict, instability spilling over 
from neighboring Syria, a series of terrorist attacks by ISIL, the increasing flow 
of refugees, political deadlocks, an economic decline and a failed coup attempt. 
All of this has happened in the context of political instability that has paved way 
for a state of constant readiness to curb basic freedoms, including the freedoms 
of association, assembly and expression, for the sake of the preserving “national 
 90 
security” or “public order” (Freedom House, Freedom of the World: Turkey, 
2016).  
Other unfavorable conditions of Turkish civil society can be inferred from the 
numbers of associations and their structure. According to up to date numbers pointed by 
Ersen (2016); 
   “Turkey’s population is approaching 80 million. That means one association 
for every 750 people, or 13 percent. In Scandinavian countries, there is 10 
associations for each person. We are not really on an advanced scale; in fact we 
are far behind the developed world. We also see that the administrative members 
of associations and foundations are mostly male, upper middle-aged and 
relatively educated. The number of women members is very low – just 4 
percent. The membership numbers among youth are equally very low. But 
numbers don’t show everything. Of the 110,000 associations, 25 percent are 
associations to construct and sustain a mosque” (Yinanç & Ersen, 21.03.2016). 
As Ersin Kalaycıoğlu pointed out, most of the Turkish civil society institutions 
consist of charitable organizations that focus on building mosques, sport and education 
facilities, both in numbers and its composition. These are far from its European 
equivalents. Most associations remain deeply influenced by primordial bonds which are 
established around religious affinities, blood ties, local and regional solidarity, as well 
as economic interests (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002, p. 259-260). The composition and number of 
civil society institutions did not help us to be optimistic about the future of Turkish civil 
society. 
Turkey seems to suffer from lack of social capital and society shows no signs of 
establishing or sustaining social and political partnership between each other. As Table 
1 shows, interpersonal trust and tolerance level is one of the lowest in world. Lack of 
social capital undermines the development of civil society, civil activism and initiative, 
primordial ties and associations based on blood, territory and religious solidarity 
disables cross-cultural organizations from being established and maintained in the 
democratic regime of Turkey (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2009, p. 118). 
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TABLE 1: Intolerance towards People 
Criminals 80.9 Christians 54.7 Homosexual 91.7 
Another Race 34.0 Alcoholic 87.1 Jewish 59.4 
Extreme Leftist 70.3 Large Family 40.7 AIDS  88.5 
Extreme Right 71.1 Foreigner 28.3     
Source: Çarkoğlu, Ali and Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin, The rising tide of conservatism in 
Turkey, New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009. 
Turkish civil society is a weak and fragile one. As I made it obvious above, there 
are several alternative explanations for this phenomenon. First one is, refers to a strong 
state tradition of Turkish society. However, according to the results of Ersin 
Kalaycıoğlu’s study in (2002), which measures the state strengths with the help of 
factor analysis, the overall state strength for Turkey turns out to be relatively weak, 
where he concluded that it is highly dubious that the level of strengths of the state could 
be considered as a major factor inhibiting civil society in Turkey (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002, p. 
70). Turkish state’s tendency to use force, heavy-handed interventions against any 
challenging and opponent concentration of power might be the reason that hinders the 
proliferation of the civil society. These interventions can be military coups or legal acts 
that prohibit specific political groups or associations from politics, martial law, purge or 
high number of turnover rate of civil servants from state institutions. Rigorous 
interventions to political, economic and societal life led to interruptions which in turn 
impedes the consolidation and institutionalization of procedures, process and operation 
of these areas. For example, government's approach to the Gezi Parkı protests in 2013 
or Turkish military’s intervention to long-lasting conflict of Kurdish problem can be 
example of this kind of heavy handed use of state power. 
Parallel to the findings of Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu (2009), on the societal level, 
low level of interpersonal trust and self-esteem, intolerance against other people from 
different ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds; the culture of distrust among 
people; lack of social capital; cynicism and political apathy; dogmatic and traditional 
system of values seems still prevailing in the Turkish society. Transformation of 
Turkish society through migration from rural areas to urban cities constituted another 
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deep wave that turned the Turkish society to a more complex structure. Urban values do 
not seem established among newly migrated part of Turkish society. Normlessness is 
becoming common norm for Turkish society, where the rules, procedures, values are 
eroding (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2009). However, it seems that the conventional 
political structure especially political participation began to be changed as Gezi Parkı 
protests presents. Even if the emergence of new type of participation and civic activism 
potentials are weak in Turkey Gezi Parkı protests emerges as an exception. The overall 
number of associations is increasing but most of them founded for charity rather than 
supporting civic activism. These civil society institutions mainly established on the 
basis of primordial ties (lineage, regional bonds, kinship etc.) rather than partnership 
and cooperation. People who share same ethnic or religious roots or same political 
views tend to be gather together for civil society organizations. 
4.2.1.1 Business Associations  
The relationship between state and economic civil society organizations needs to 
be detailed. Relationship between capital groups and the state was mutually beneficent 
for both sides. It is cooperative yet sometimes repressive. State is a risk factor for 
businessmen that should be considered. Once they know, Turkish businessmen can able 
to internalize how to gain public procurements, utilize privatizations, exports licenses 
that they needed to grow. In Kalaycıoğlu (1995), two representatives and the Turkish 
business community defined the same effect: 
   “Since the days of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish private sector has always 
been nurtured by the state and obtains its power and nectar from the state. Even 
today a businessman is under the command of the bureaucrats in Ankara….Most 
Turkish businessmen make more money from the decisions of Ankara than they 
do by production of some items… Most Turkish businessmen make more money 
from the decisions of Ankara then they do by production of some 
items…Regardless of the circumstances, the business community must be on 
very good terms with the government because they always need the support and 
protection of the state” (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995, p. 81-82). 
Personal trust between businessmen and bureaucracy matters in reaching out the 
economic advantages that state can propose for Turkish businessmen. Infrastructure 
 93 
investments for innovation, production of new goods were expensive method than 
capital accumulation through having close relationship with the state. Political 
connections with the government have always been at the center of the game. Boards of 
chambers played an important role in establishing these connections for businessmen. 
State, in turn used these chambers as tools for constituting a more complex and 
harmonized economic policies. During the post-1980 period, the chambers functioned 
as before, that is quasi bureaucratic arms of government (Heper, 1991, p. 15). This 
mutually beneficent relationship between the government and the chambers and 
economic interest groups lead to government interventions to internal affairs of 
chambers, their elections, decisions and ideas on economic policies. Through this way, 
Turkish governments had a chance to harmonize the general economic strategy, made 
chambers inactive to challenge economic policies of government. On the other side, 
chambers and business groups had chances of gaining export licenses, credits with low 
interest rates or even travelling with the prime ministers and cabinet members to 
neighboring countries for forming new trade agreements or personal networks for state 
procurements. With the help of this, clashes between the government and economic 
interest groups on the overall economy policies alleviated and controlled by the 
government. Interest groups were not involved in policy formations on the issues of 
economy, rather was in totally submissive positions vis a vis the government. 
Turkish state was the sources of wealth for these businesspeople. For Republican 
elite, economic independence was crucial and must be fulfilled following the political 
independence. The relationship between business people and Republic was not different 
at all; continued within limits. Two major problems were seen in the republican policy, 
one was the heavy state intervention in the economy which prevented economic 
efficiency and a healthy development process and the other was secularist 
modernization as a process lead by authoritarian intervention in socio-cultural relations 
(Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014, p. 29). State can create new business areas yet can impose 
new regularities and uncertainty for entrepreneur. Close relationship between these two 
groups can be both beneficial and too dangerous. Ayşe Buğra, a prominent Turkish 
scholar, offers some generalizable observations about this kind of relationship between 
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the economic and political leaders of Turkish society. The codependence of Turkish 
businessmen with the Turkish state, the lack of self-confidence and prestige that the 
economic activity has, lack of professional management bodies of big corporate rather 
than managing by family members, economic alliances between similar economic 
groups rather than representation of business interest though economic interest group 
bodies were all general properties of Turkey observed by Buğra (1994, p. 1-33). Turkish 
businessmen try to maximize the opportunities and avoid risks that stem from the policy 
process, relying more on relationships of personal trust than on their professional 
organizations to overcome their difficulties (Buğra, 1994, p. 196). Lack of 
entrepreneurship, omnipotent state power on regulations, and in deciding who will rise 
and fall in the system and dependence on state incentives to create new business areas 
create a sense of precarious and uncertain conditions to act in for businessmen. 
According to Buğra, Turkish businesspeople tried of not to work without the limit and 
interventions of Turkish state. Especially after 1990s, export oriented growth plan and 
EU anchors to Turkish politics together with transformation of TUSİAD’s priorities 
toward democratization as Bayer & Öniş (2010) posits, started to change the view. 
After 1990, Turkish big business companies and business elites have become pro 
democratic rather than pro authoritarian. The support of EU for democratization process 
of Turkey coincided with regional, domestic and transnational parameters and the 
effects globalism led to changing the perspective of Turkish big businesses toward 
democracy. EU was and still is the biggest trade partner of Turkey and members of 
TUSİAD are the core exporter of this organization. Many of TUSİAD members are 
commercial partners of European corporations in their operations in Turkey. As the 
TUSIAD incorporated more in transnational trade, organization got more pro-
democratic stance in politics started from 1990s to today. As a result of cost-benefit 
analysis of big corporations and business elites, they decided to opt for democratization 
of Turkey and started to act and work accordingly (Özel, 2013, p. 1104-1105). As the 
prospect of EU membership materializes, the Turkish elite businesses’ perception 
towards the cost of authoritarianism has changed. According to the same study, at the 
beginning of 2000s, big business perceived that democratization was believed to tie up 
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the state’s hands, hence, thwarting arbitrary interventionism and EU can limit the 
arbitrary power of state, can eradicate the political role of Turkish military, can 
undertake legal and political reforms (Özel, 2013, p. 1104-1105). Considering the big 
business groups, challenged by these new domestic rivalries -namely MÜSİAD, 
TUSKON- and intensifying international and domestic competition, big businesses 
gradually came to an understanding that a deﬁcient democracy would aggravate 
uncertainties at the national level, endanger its international competitiveness, diminish 
the credibility of the country, obstruct capital in-ﬂows and thwart potential opportunities 
for collaboration with foreign capital (Özel, 2013, p. 1106). As a result of strategic 
thinking, TUSİAD evolved to become one of the significant pro-democratic civil 
society organizations in Turkey. 
Turkish capitalist business class is not homogeneous. Differentiation of Turkish 
business associations like TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD, ASKON, TİM etc. is significant in 
understanding the role of business association in economy. The rise of business 
associations very much depends on incumbent governments and the association they are 
close to. These associations have different cultural identities, political inclinations and 
positions, representing different types of capital accumulations. TÜSİAD was the result 
of aiming to create Turkish bourgeoisie project. They were seen as Republican 
secularist and developmentalist policies of Kemalist state in private sectors. This 
heritage made TÜSİAD as the advocate of EU accession after 1990s, and significant 
economic partner of Western corporations in Turkey. Their main economic proliferation 
coincided with the adoption of import substitution model of industrialization after 
agriculture led growth policies of 1950s, which helped capital accumulation for 
production of export goods. 
TUSİAD is generally known for its strong economic ties with European 
countries and the supporter of EU integration process, rule of law and democratic liberal 
values (TÜSİAD, 1999). Organization represents the big corporations, large 
conglomerates and holding companies of Turkey, approximately 600 individual 
members that controlling more than 2500 corporations, is the significant organization in 
Turkey. Its political importance, on the other hand, originates from its signiﬁcant role in 
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shaping up the public opinion, as well as its inﬂuence on policy-making (Özel, 2013, p. 
1082). Since the late1980s, TUSIAD has been publishing reports on political and 
economic issues for publicizing its views. From the late 1990s onwards, big business 
has emerged as one of the main supporters of Turkish democratization (Bayer & Öniş, 
2010, p. 181). This was partly because of TUSİAD’s liberal and pro-democratic 
political views. Before 2010 Referendum, Erdoğan criticized the TUSIAD on its “silent 
stance” on Referendum. Erdoğan said ‘Those who choose to remain impartial today, 
will find themselves excluded later’ (Milliyet, 18.08.2010). Recently, the relationship 
between the TUSİAD and AKP was tense. As AKP started to show plebiscitarian and 
authoritarian tendencies through restricting the civil rights and freedoms and erosion of 
institutions, the number of critics from TUSİAD have risen. However, AKP 
governments’ comments and declarations have targeted the board of members, which 
even led to resignation of Muharrem Yılmaz, former president of TUSİAD (Akyarlı 
Güven, 2014). On the other side, TOBB (The Unions of Chambers and Commodity 
Exchanges of Turkey) remained silent through 2010s, agreed to take a more submissive 
position against government policies. TOBB is generally known with its support for 
local city industrialists, tradesman and guilds. Elections of this body is not absent from 
party politics, where the each political party aimed to replace its candidate for the 
presidency of local chambers.  
In 1990, MÜSİAD was founded, consisted mainly by conservative, small and 
medium sized enterprises (SME) mostly voted for parties of renowned Islamists 
Necmettin Erbakan. AKP government seemed to have close relationship with 
government supported interest groups and tried to keep them under control.12 Their first 
strategy was to control the board of chambers that are traditionally consisted from 
prominent affiliates of industrialist and traders of cities. Candidates that have strong 
connections with the party organization are openly supported by the local party 
                                                 
12 In 1990s, class based understanding of politics died where cultural characteristic such as ethnicity and religiosity 
emerged to dominate in Turkish politics (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005, p. 10). Parties claimed to represent interest of ethnic, 
religious and conservative part of society started to attract more share of votes in elections such as Virtue Party, 
Justice and Development Party and Democratic Society Party. Islamism especially with the success of AKP even 
become the prominent political force in Turkish politics with its 16 years of single party government. Foundation of 
MÜSİAD can be seen as one of the signals of Islamic revivalism in Turkish politics in 1990s. MÜSİAD was 
affiliated with Welfare Party and conservative business groups. 
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organizations. For example, in December 2016, relatives of President Erdoğan’s wife 
and the son of Ankara mayor Melih Gökçek competed for the elections of Ankara 
Board of Chambers (Demir, 2016). AKP was active in these elections. Party members 
encouraged to be members of boards of chambers. These management positions of 
Chambers are so significant that two of main candidates were both from relatives of 
AKP. This was also an advantage for the candidate since the party mobilizes 
businessmen to vote for that specific candidate. Resources and facilities that are serving 
by the AKP government to party affiliated candidates was another motivation for people 
to support. By that way, AKP not only had loyal allies in each districts of Turkey, but 
also increases the chances of reaching capital groups and business classes. 
Chambers are a source of political recruitments. Being a member of chambers 
was a school for businessmen before entering to the politics. Being a candidate for 
general elections and elected for TGNA many times requires wealth and money, which 
means power. Reaching more people by media, flyers, banners etc., increase the 
chances of gaining votes and electing. The close relationship with party and chambers 
might support networking and founding of political connections. Licenses, public 
procurement and credits can be getting by a harmonized support for AKP policies. 
However, the role of economic interest groups and chambers on the policy formation 
over issues relating to economy was very weak. The situation was much more of like 
what Ersin Kalaycığlu defined in 2002, as the role of commercial interest groups in the 
economy policy making process of the government is an either minimal or non-existent. 
Major decisions concerning the Turkish economy are mainly resolved by the 
government, overly centralized especially during the reign of AKP. The role of the 
chambers and civil society organizations were redefined and limited by the party as the 
control of government on civil society organizations have increased. 
4.2.2 General Overview of Turkish Political Culture 
The set of attitudes, beliefs, and feelings people hold about politics in a society 
constitutes the political culture of that society (Almond and Powell, 1978, p. 25). These 
attitudes, beliefs and sentiments can be shaped in history, wars, politicians or 
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sociological structure. Frederick Frey (1966) argued that Turkish politics was shaping 
by elite politics. The political drama was limited to elite actors, elite institutions and 
elite urban settings and mass elements of society was excluded by the nature of culture, 
distribution of resources and design of the rulers (Frey, 1975, p. 42).  
Political culture of Turkey deeply rooted from the political and historical structure of 
Ottoman Empire. Elite culture found its basis in the great palace culture of Ottomans. 
Among many things inherited from Ottoman political atmosphere to Republican era 
was center-periphery debate13 . Struggle against low, mass culture of the periphery 
shaped the framework of elite culture. Being educated, working for state, “knowing the 
Ottoman way” was always considered as being an elite. Papa state tradition, religion 
based identity and intolerance to opposition, killing for political reasons -siyaseten katl-, 
social engineering were all inherited from Ottoman political culture to the Republican 
era (Heper, 1985). 
The most striking characteristic of Turkish elite political culture is in-group vs. 
out-group orientations, an inclination to see the things as “us against them” (Frey, 
1975). In this framework, any kind of criticism considered as fitne-fücur by the political 
elites. Those who criticize any issue in politics can easily become an enemy, düşman, 
fitneci in Turkish context. This problem can only be solved through total loyalty, 
subordination and solidarity, which are highly valued among Turkish society. For that 
reason, Turkish political elites are prone to elevate group’s interests over the individuals 
                                                 
13 Mardin (1975) associates contention between center and periphery with the centralization and modernization 
process of Ottoman state (Mardin, 1975). There wasn’t any dimension as such state and church, labor-bourgeoisie, 
nation builders and localists, but the major confrontational was uni-dimensional, always clash between the center and 
the periphery (Mardin, 1975, p. 170). During and after the War of Independence center and periphery duality once 
again emerged within the GNA, between secularist and statist Kemalists and the faction called “second groups” 
(Demirel, 2015) consisted from local notables and pious ex-Ottoman officials. Modern educational institutions had 
further exacerbated pre modern, cultural cleavage between the center and the periphery rather than reduce it and 
complicated two irreconcilable image of good society (Mardin, 1975, p. 178; Kalaycıoğlu, 2005, p. 50). Adoption of 
Western ideas laws produced another cycle to contention between those who favor Westernization and those who 
oppose it, mainly religious and old military officials (Özbudun, 1988, p. 7). In 1946, with transition to multiparty 
politics, the intensity of the debate reduced In the post-1945 period through multiparty politics, rapid social 
mobilization, industrialization and urbanization. After conservative AKP’s success in 2002, center-periphery debate 
started to alleviate gradually with the help of multiparty politics and transformed into a different structure called 
kulturkamph by Kalaycıoğlu (2010). A debate modified into kulturkamph framework which two sides of debate has 
different “image of good society” (Kalaycıoğlu, 2010, p. 2). Secular image of good society comprise of secular ideas 
with embracing science and rationality, whereas conservative image of good society involve traditional and religious 
sentiments. Secular- Sunni Muslim, Alevi-Sunni, Turkish-Kurdish ethnic nationalism are cross-cutting deep running 
dimensions shaping modern Turkish politics. These fault lines separated Turkish population into several blocs whose 
lifestyles, values, attitudes and political behaviors differ sharply along these fault lines (Kalaycıoğlu, 2012, p. 7). 
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(Frey, 1975). This leads to overemphasizing of hierarchy, loyalty, and sense of duty 
among group members. Leaning to see world as friend versus foe, in-group versus out-
group, us against them easily turned to “no holds barred war” in which aggravate 
compromises over political issues between political elites (Frey, 2975). Beside this, cost 
of being out of power really is high for political leaders which easily turned politics into 
a war between political elites for certain office positions. 
Courage culture and national pride are the two attributes that Turkish people are 
sensitive about. Exaggerated uses of power against others, in turn create a sense of 
revanchism and hostility against others. This situation dragged politics into an area of 
conflict where demand for revenge becomes actors’ main motivation (Frey, 1975). 
Since, cost of being out of power is high Turkish politics; actors are aiming to stay in 
power as long as they can. Therefore, those who are failed to play political game, 
politics became an area for revanchism. 
Turks, culturally showing their commitment to democratic practices such as 
voting in elections but not shares its core values like tolerance, compromise and respect 
for individuality as we can see above (Özbudun, 1988, p. 1). Compromising on political 
issues is an exceptional situation in Turkish politics not only in political party leaders’ 
level but also among public.14 Tolerance for different lifestyle, ethnic and religious 
identities or ideologies and thoughts is problematic among Turkish public as well. Low 
level of interpersonal trust and associability level is far from reaching the level of 
European consolidated democracies (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008, p. 275). In Turkey, the 
majority of people over 18 year old, nearly 90% of Turkish society says that they cannot 
trust people they do not know, they must be approached with caution to other people, 
because people will try to take advantage of others when they have the opportunity, and 
                                                 
14  Secular- Sunni Muslim, Alevi-Sunni, Turkish-Kurdish ethnic nationalism are cross-cutting deep running 
dimensions shaping modern Turkish politics. These fault lines separated Turkish population into several blocs whose 
lifestyles, values, attitudes and political behaviors differ sharply along these fault lines (Kalaycıoğlu, 2012, p. 7). As 
Kalaycıoğlu (2012), Birtek & Toprak (1993) show two camp can tolerate each other only if one accept its subordinate 
position which where religious-conservative camp encroach domain of the modernist secularist camp, invading 
political discourse of politics with Islamic terminology (Kalaycıoğlu, 2012, p. 174). AKP was really successful in 
using these fault lines for deriving votes from conservatives by creating the sense of “us vs. them” dichotomy. The 
large scale infrastructure investments are compared with Ottoman times, historical projects of Ottoman ruler, named 
as “crazy projects” accomplished by AKP (Srivastava & Harvey, 6.12.2014). The Ottoman language, which uses the 
Arabic scripts, lessons becomes as a selective course in high schools. 
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they often say that people are not helping each other. According to the data of World 
Values Survey, the interpersonal trust level of Turkey was 9.8% in 1990, 6.5% in 1996, 
7.3% in 2006 and 11.8% in 2007. In 2007, Turkey could only pass Brazil among the 
countries in the survey data, in which Norway has the highest interpersonal trust score 
with 60.3% (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008, p. 254). 
Although several negative cultural characteristics that can be seen, there are also 
several traits in Turkish political culture that can make one hopeful about the future of 
Turkish democracy. It is plausible to suggest that Turkish political culture has 
ingredients that both undermine and advance the consolidation of democracy 
(Kalaycıoğlu, 2012, p. 179). Among many, the most striking feature of Turkish political 
culture is a deep democratic impulse (Frey, 1975, p. 71). This impulse is generally 
reflected in participation to elections. 
Participation in elections is generally higher in Turkey than its European 
counterparties. There is a widespread belief among the Turkish electorate that their 
participation in elections matters in political life. Turkey seems fitting the general 
framework of Latin American countries in terms of political efficacy (Kalaycioglu, 
2008). Result of the study indicates that, there is not enough evidence to think that there 
is a relatively common political indifference and political alienation in Turkish society 
(Kalaycıoğlu, 2008, p. 262). Considering the result, existence of a majority who think 
that they can succeed in influencing political authorities and institutions is a positive 
factor for Turkish democracy. 
Trust for the democratic institutions is also worth noting. According to the 
survey data, Turkish military 84.4%, religious institutions 65.4%, police forces 64.2%, 
courts 63.2% are the most trusted institutions for Turkish society whereas newspapers 
60.1%, TVs 58.7% and European Union 51.8% are the least trusted ones (Kalaycıoğlu, 
2008, p. 270). Turkish government and deputies do not seem having widespread trust by 
Turkish society, which can be serious signal for the democratic institutions of Turkey. 
Voting turnout has always been consistently high in Turkey considering its 
Southern European counterparts. As the Table 2 shows, from 1987 to 2015 November 
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general elections, participation rate has never fallen under the level of 80% except 2002. 
After 2000, voter turnout rates oscillated between 75,2% and 83,7% in Italy, between 
68,9% and 75,7% in Spain and in Greece between 62,5% and 76,7%. 
TABLE 2: Participation to General Elections from 1987 to 2015 
Election Years 1987 1991 199
5 
199
9 
200
2 
200
7 
201
1 
2015
H 
2015
K 
Turnout Rate 
(%) 
93.2 83.9 85.2 87.0 79.0 84.1 87.1 86.4 87.4 
Source: Supreme Election Council Dataset, 1987-2015. 
Participation in elections and public debates for the intention to find solutions of 
public problems are relatively important for Turkish voters (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008, p. 270). 
Unconventional political participation (petitioning, protest) lack effectiveness, in 
comparison to personalized contacts through networks built on primordial bonds 
(Kalaycıoğlu, 2001, p. 58). Especially conservative and more religious part of Turkish 
society more inclined to show their preferences and discontent through conventional 
way of political participation, rather than protesting or petitioning. In the turbulent times 
of socioeconomic transformation in Turkey, voters love to flex their muscles at the 
polls, whether national or local elections, or even referenda (Kalaycıoğlu, 2012, p. 177). 
Participation to political processes through voting in the elections is the most common 
type of political participation in Turkey, which is also the least risky one. Conversely, 
unconventional political participation is uncommon, unreliable and dangerous one in 
the eyes of Turkish people. Turkish voters believe that unconventional political 
participation (petitioning, protest) lack effectiveness, in comparison to personalized 
contacts through networks built on primordial bonds (Kalaycıoğlu, 2001, p. 58). Gezi 
Parkı protests in 2013 seem to signal the changes in general perception of Turkish 
people against the unconventional political participation especially for Turkish youth. 
AKP government’s shopping mall projects to at the heart of Istanbul with a small 
number of trees turned to clashes after intervention by the police. According to 
Amnesty International (2013) more than 2.5 million people in 79 of 81 provinces 
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participated the Gezi Parkı protests. Anti-authoritarian and pro-democratic political 
motivations of protesters gathered them in the streets, these protesters were mainly have 
white and blue collar proletarian background, rather than high professionals who had 
greater representative power during protests (Yörük & Yüksel, 2014, 121-122). The 
Gezi Park protests were a manifestation of the conflicts between the ruling AKP 
political elite and a newly emerging pro-democracy movement (Tuğal, 2013), and was a 
result of deep political polarization between different sections of Turkish society. The 
AKP elite and media accused the Gezi protesters of serving the intelligence services of 
foreign countries and held that their demands for good governance were part of a global 
conspiracy against Turkey (Özpek & Yaşar, 2017, p. 8). Common use of social media 
platforms, independent and individual participation to the protests, and evident visibility 
of environmentalist, LGBT, student and minority activism, solidarity of Kurdish protest 
movements with mainstream Turkish political movements, party-less participation has 
shaped Gezi Parkı protests. In terms of changes in the youth perception of 
unconventional political participation, Erdoğan & Semerci (2017) indicates that there is 
a difference between conventional and unconventional participation levels between 
young and older citizens (69). However, gender, economic status and living in urban or 
rural areas play more important roles where different politicized collective identities do 
make a change to the way people participate, and self-claimed ‘we’ness does play a 
more important role in the way people participate (Erdoğan & Semerci, 2017, p. 69). 
Evolving youth perception for political participation can be more significant in future 
political developments. Democracies are evolving institutions and should reproduce 
itself. Political participation of youth and those who are excluded from society and 
politics would be reason to make optimistic predictions about the future of Turkish 
democracy. 
There can be many reasons behind this generational difference in terms of 
political participation. First reason can be using elections for eliminating the domination 
of elites in political arena. Voters can only punish them through elections during the 
times of bad governance, economic crises, times of political deadlocks etc. Second 
reason can be a more individualistic one. Gaining material benefits through voting is the 
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rule of the game in Turkish multiparty politics as in the world. The popular image of 
democracy in Turkey has been tilted toward an understanding that democracy allows 
people greater access to the resources of the “State” through the help of political parties 
(Kalaycıoğlu, 2001, p. 62). In the absence of protectionist economy and public goods; 
politics began to be meant as sources of favoritism, clientelism and nepotism according 
to voters (Kalaycıoğlu, 2012, p. 171-182). The convergence of primordial factors as 
regional solidarity, blood relation, material benefits seem to have created support for 
democratic regime in Turkey (Kalaycıoğlu, 2001, p. 66). This crucial motivation to 
participate electoral processes will be continued as long as the party provides benefits 
for ordinary voters through the network of religion, kinship or any other types of 
primordial factors. Majority of these voters believe in the importance of voting and 
found political parties useful especially as channels of communication with government 
(Özbudun, 1988, p. 35). Getting material benefits in return to voting, namely, patronage 
creates a poisonous atmosphere in politics as well. As patronage started to emerge in all 
part of politics, Turkish urban middle classes started to alienate from democracy since 
they do not have any chance of connecting to those primordial relationships for gaining 
benefits (Kalaycıoğlu, 2001, p. 64; Kalaycıoğlu, 2005, p. 68). This led to the weakening 
of rule of law in Turkey as favoritism, nepotism, patronage and normlessness became 
the rules of the political game. 
The relationship between patron and client provides grass-root support for 
political parties especially in newly emerged shanty-towns of metropolitans, which in 
turn increases the chances of re-election of deputy or party. For that reason, demands 
such as job application, promotion, transfers or caseworks or demand for preserving 
certain commercial and financial interests of interest groups in the legislative took most 
time of deputies (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008, p. 212-213; Kalaycıoğlu, 1995, p. 48). This 
composition has changed over time; MPs began to follow strategic behaviors in 
engaging with their constituents rather than purely focus on pork and barrel politics. If 
MP’s believe that party leadership has the most influence in candidate selection, they 
are more likely to ask PQs than spending time for solving problems of their 
constituency. On the other hand, constituency-minded representatives frequently engage 
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in activities increasing their public visibility among the constituents (Çiftçi & Yıldırım, 
2017, p. 2). This type of strategic behaviors is mostly applied by opposition MPs. Even 
if this kind of political engagement is beneficial for constituency, it is also detrimental 
for politics. Patronage networks provide support for Turkish democracy yet undermine 
the rule of law and legislative processes. Turkish voters seem to enjoy participation to 
conventional politics but do not like unconventional ones. 
4.2.3 Rule of Law and Tutelary Powers 
Rule of law is defined by the UN Secretary Office as “a principle of governance in 
which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself 
are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and 
independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights 
norms and standards (UN Secretary General, 2016). As defined by UN Secretary 
General, the definition of rule of law emphasizes the importance of equality under the 
law and accountability before the law, together with the protection and advancement of 
human dignity. Human rights, norms and standards constitute a normative basis for rule 
of law to be operated in. For that reason, we oblige to analyze the existing situation of 
Turkish courts and conditions of human rights and liberties such as freedom of media, 
expressions and conscience. 
In 1983, after 3 years of military rule, executive power has been transmitted 
from military government to new civilian government. Military intervention to politics 
in 1980 was much more a consequence of political deadlocks, violence, terror and 
economic deteriorations. TGNA could not been able to elect a president together with 
increasing level of sectarian and political unrest and terror. Therefore, coup makers 
aimed to create a stable, foreseeable and well-ordered political structure with strong 
executive.  
1982 Constitution was a reflection of the 1980 military coup, a statist, restrictive 
and tutelary constitution with a strong suspicion towards civilian politicians. As a result 
of this 1982 Constitution aimed to limit as much as possible political areas in order to 
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control politicians. Exclusivist characteristics of constitution shaped the Turkish politics 
after 1980. 1982 Constitution was even less trustful than its predecessor of the national 
will elected assemblies, parties and leaders (Özbudun, 2000, p. 58). Hence, 1982 
Constitution create several institutions and reserved domains for controlling and 
supervising the political parties and politicians to maintain military’s influence in 
politics.  
Among several tutelary powers, 1982 Constitution established an omnipotent, 
unaccountable and legally and politically irresponsible President of Republic. 
According to coup makers, presidential office should be the representative of the 
national interest, guardian of secularist, nationalist and Republican Turkish State, away 
from partisan politics, a moderator between civilian governments and military through 
National Security Council. President was given power to appoint the chairman and 
some members of the Board on Higher Education (YÖK) and the university rectors, 
some of the members of Constitutional Court, Supreme Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors, Courts of Accounts (Sayıştay) and the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Court 
of Cassation (Yargıtay) (Özbudun, 2012, p. 42). This power of appointment gave 
president to sustain the protection of Republican elite, especially in the judicial branch 
of the government. Beside these, president also seen as guarantor of the republic and a 
strong ally of military in the National Security Council, which can be considered as an 
exit guarantee. In the judicial area, Constitutional Court, Sayıştay, Yargıtay, High 
Military Courts, HSYK (Higher Council of Judges and Prosecutors) together with Bar 
Associations seen as the first line of defense against any legal acts that can be harmful 
against republican state and values. 
In order to have a strong government, coup makers help create a political 
structure that gave excessive power to executive branch of the government. Military 
government concerned about pre-coup conditions of sectarian, ethnic and religious 
divide. Their main aim was to create a stable and strong state that meet with the public 
demand for law and order. For that reason, National Security Council, composition of 
military and government established and endowed with an enormous political power. 
Under these conditions, TGNA has turned to be what Weinbaum (1975) called as 
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“subordinate” type of legislature (Weinbaum, 1975, p. 211), in which legislative organ 
of state tightly controlled and intervened by the executive branch of the governments.15 
TGNA dragged into a weak position vis-à-vis the executive branch of the government. 
Yet, the subordination depends on internal party politics of country, since the 
parliament has the power to bring down government. Therefore, the emergence of 
strong majority government in TGNA, may subordinate the body to the executive 
branch. Power of executive branch of government and the presidential office was also 
given new powers (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008, p. 17). Rules of procedures of TGNA have 
changed many times because of partisan claims, which undermined institutionalization 
of the standard functioning of TGNA. Coup makers introduced proportional 
representation with 10% national threshold and banned pre coup political parties and 
their leaders, planned to protect political system from coalitions and extreme ideological 
parties. Ministry of Justice was given a membership in the body of The Supreme 
Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK). This act inhibited the formation of 
independent judiciary rather than judiciary controlled by executive. 
1982 Constitution introduced another problematic political innovation; 
proportional representation with 10% national threshold. The main aim was to protect 
political party system and TGNA from coalitions and extremely ideological parties. 
Nearly all mainstream political parties -25 political parties- and politicians were banned 
from politics after military coup. Trade unions, voluntary associations, foundations, 
public professional organizations, and cooperative societies were not allowed to support 
or received support from political parties or to engage in joint action among themselves 
(Özbudun, 2012, p. 41). Electoral threshold mainly targeted Islamic, Kurdish and 
extreme leftist parties, excluding them from the seats of TGNA. This new electoral law 
was in favor of the rural and agricultural interest of the country by assigning at least one 
seat per province, irrespective of the size of its population (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005, p. 133). 
For that reason, conservative and nationalist parties that traditionally have voter base 
from rural areas and small towns of Anatolia overrepresented in TGNA. New electoral 
                                                 
15  TGNA has always been at the center of politics even in the War of Liberation. Assembly was the body, 
representing the Turkish nation. Therefore, its historical legacy was immense, yet its power curtailed in 1982 
Constitution. 1983 even if TGNA was given authorities, political order favors and defined immense power to 
executive branch which can be summarized as de jure legislative supremacy-de facto executive supremacy. 
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system also favors front runner. This situation leads to domination of conservative 
deputies in the assembly and also representation of traditional and conservative values 
and political agenda. 
1982 Constitution created a new regime that gave immense power to executive 
branch of the government, established tutelary powers above civilian governments and 
offers exit guarantees for military including amnesty to check the acts of politicians. 
Kalaycıoğlu (2008) named this new regime as Neo-Hamidianism, an old style rule by 
executive fiat in democratic guise, an authoritarian style of rule with democratic façade 
which TGNA dragged into a weak position vis-à-vis the executive branch of the 
government (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008, p. 23). The motto of this new regime was de jure 
legislative supremacy but de facto executive supremacy. After the new constitution, 
TGNA has turned to what Weinbaum (1975) called as “subordinate” type of legislature 
(Weinbaum, 1975, p. 211). The power and might of TGNA got another blow during the 
reign of AKP as the party executive becoming more centralized and personalized. 
One of the articles in constitutional amendments in 2008 was to abolish 
headscarf ban in the universities together with other serious modifications. Headscarf 
ban was a historical challenge of conservative masses to the Kemalist state. According 
to the Article 10 of 1982 Constitution, on equality adding the phrase “in the utilization 
of all kinds of public services,” and adding a new paragraph to Article 42 on the right to 
education that runs as follows: “No one shall be deprived of his/her right to higher 
education for any reason not explicitly specified by law (Özbudun, 2012, p. 45). The 
amendment was brought to Constitutional Court by Republican People’s Party of its 
constitutionality and its contradictions with the first three unamenable articles of 1982 
Constitution. However, Constitutional Court rejects the case. 
From 2007 to 2010, AKP strategically focused on Constitutional Court and 
HSYK. In March 2008, AKP faced up party closure case. The Chief Public Prosecutor 
of the Court of Cassation accused AKP to become the center for anti-secular activities 
against Republic. Therefore, the Party focused on making the party closure cases more 
complicated.  
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After a case of party ban, AKP blamed and demonized Constitutional Court, 
HSYK and Bar Associations as being member of Republican elite. Changing the 
structure of HSYK and Constitutional Court became the first and foremost issue for the 
party. Even if there was a several articles that might foster democratization process of 
Turkish democracy such as right to apply Constitutional Court individually and 
introduction of public ombudsman, amendment package perceived as a step for the 
elimination of Republican dominance in the structure of judiciary. AKP introduced a 
reform package in 2010 Referendum for aiming to restructure the body of HSYK. 
Constitutional Amendment that aimed to change 24 articles, offered to vote for the 
citizens. The most controversial amendment among 24 was the one that aimed radically 
change the structure of HSYK. The Minister of Justice and Undersecretary of the 
Ministry of Justice preserved their positions in the HSYK, which was many times 
criticized by politicians and academics as it is an intervention to judicial independence. 
According to the amendments, the president can elect 4 members of HSYK. 
Constitutional change was intended to break the monopolistic domination of the two 
high courts over the Council, and to make it more representative of the judiciary as a 
whole by allowing the judges and public prosecutors of the ‘first-degree’ courts to be 
strongly represented in the Council (Özbudun, 2012, p. 48).  
The number of Constitutional Court members also increased from 11 to 17 with 
the Referendum and 4 of them can be elected by the President. Beside this, President 
can also choose 3 members that nominated by YÖK among 3 candidates for each seats. 
The selective nomination role of the President consolidated as the President chooses 1 
by the High Military Administrative Court, 2 members nominated by Council of State, 
1 members nominated by the Military Court of Cassation and 3 members nominated by 
the Court of Cassation. The amendment got 58% of support from Turkish voters and 
approved. President Abdullah Gül’s nominations to HSYK and Constitutional Court 
have changed the composition of each body. Concerns about the judicial independence 
and rule of law triggered the discussions about the future of Turkish regimes as 
democracy.  
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Rule of law has always been problematic in Turkey. Turkey has always at the 
top of ECHR (European Court of Human Rights), one of the most sued country 
regarding the human rights cases. According to data as of 2014, Turkey was the 
champion of all member country both in terms of violations and applications even 
before Russia (Özalp, 31.01.2015). Turkey ratified the European Convention on Human 
Rights in 1954. From then on, the number of cases about Turkey has been increasing 
especially on the violations of human rights. During the AKP rule, the numbers of cases 
continued to increase. In 2013, the number of applications allocated to a judicial 
formation reached its peak exceeded the threshold of ten thousand. The most sued cases 
generally concentrate on the fair trials and security and freedoms topics. There are 
major and serious problems in Turkish judiciary that are worsening the quality of 
judicial processes. 
TABLE 3: Number of Cases in ECHR on Turkey 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Total Case 1097 2830 3706 4474 5821 8668 9098 10931 9488 8446 
Source: European Court of Human Rights, Statistics, Applications allocated to a 
judicial formation. 
According to Susan Corke, Freedom House Director of Euresia Programs; 
   “There are major and well-documented shortcomings in Turkish judicial 
proceedings and procedural code relating to the transparency of proceedings, the 
access of defense to the case file, the use of classified evidence without access 
for the defense, and the inexcusable abuse of so-called “provisional detention” to 
keep some individuals in jail for years before they are even tried. These 
shortcomings have been clearly evident in the cases of numerous journalists, as 
well as in the Ergenekon proceedings. The upcoming fourth judicial reform 
package has a lot of work to do to resolve these issues, and it is worth noting that 
previous judicial reforms, including just last year, have not taken adequate steps 
to fix the problems. And while we are talking about this issue in terms of 
journalism and freedom of expression, we have to note this is something that 
affects Turkey’s entire judicial system” (Corke et. al., 2013). 
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Rule of Law Index is a quantitative assessment aiming to measure countries’ quality of 
rule of law in practice. Constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open 
government, fundamental rights order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice 
and criminal justice are the determinants of measurement of the rule of law score that a 
country has. Amalgamation of these three characteristics constitutes a country score 
range from 0 to 1 (with 1 indicating strongest adherence to the rule of law). Scoring is 
based on answers drawn from a representative sample of 1,000 respondents in the three 
largest cities per country and a set of in-country legal practitioners and academics (The 
World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index, 2005-2016). Turkey ranked 99th 
among 113 countries with the score of 0.43, stepped down from 82nd out of 102 
countries. Score of Turkey was 0.46 in 2015 and 0.5 in 2014. 
Erosion of rule of law during the reign of AKP can be seen in Transparency 
International Corruption Perception Index as well. According to the measurement of the 
Index, corruption, transparency, freedom of expressions are highly correlated and tied to 
rule of law. According to index of 2015, the rank of Turkey deteriorated from previous 
years. Turkey ranked 66 among 168 countries -the rank of countries determines their 
positions relative to other countries- and the score of country indicates public 
perceptions on public sector corruption where 0 means highly corrupted to 100. 
According to 2015 report, Anne Koch, Director for Europe and Central Asia warns 
“Also very worrying is the marked deterioration in countries like Hungary, FYR of 
Macedonia, Spain and Turkey where we’re seeing corruption grow, while civil society 
space and democracy shrink. Corruption won’t be tackled until laws and regulations are 
put into action and civil society and the media are genuinely free.” (Corruption 
Perception Index Report, 2015).  
With some fluctuations over time, Turkey got the highest score in the year of 
2013, where the 17th and 25th December Corruption scandals has blown up. 52 people 
detained and 3 Turkish ministers’ sons arrested for the probe of corruption and bribery. 
Direct aggressions of Gülen movement related police officials to government quickly 
turned against them. Officials were dismissed and corruption case was dropped and 
former ally of AKP, Gülen Movement named as “parallel state”. As the scores of index 
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makes it obvious, there is a marked tendency of increasing in the corruption perception 
among Turkish citizens. 
TABLE 4: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, 
Turkey in 2005-2015. 
Years 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Rank 65 60 64 58 61 56 61 54 53 64 66 
Score 35 38 41 46 44 44 42 49 50 45 42 
Source: Corruption Perceptions Index, 2005-2015. 
Bribe Payers Index of Transparency International can be another indicator to 
observe the rule of law in a country. The main purpose of the index is to measure the 
perceived tendency of companies to pay bribe in foreign countries. It scores and ranks 
countries on a scale of 0 to 10, where a maximum score of 10 corresponds with a view 
that companies from that country never engage in bribery when doing business abroad 
(Bribe Payers Index Report, 2011, p. 4). Business executives were asked for each of the 
28 countries with which they have a business relationship with (for example as supplier, 
client, partner or competitor), ‘how often do firms headquarters in that country engages 
in bribery in this country?’ (Bribe Payers Index Report, 2011, p. 5). According to 
dataset the average of the 28 countries are 7.8 where Turkey ranked 19th in 2011 with 
the score of 7.5. In 2006, Turkey was in Cluster 4 with Russia, China and India and 
ranked 27th out of 30 countries. The reason of this improvement in the score was 
probably the signature of Turkey in enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, which may transposed in national law and forced by the government, yet, 
Bribe Payers Reports of 2011 Turkey indicated that showed little or no enforcement for 
the Convention. But there was still an improvement in today in comparison with the 
period of 2008-2010. 
Voice and Accountability Index captures perceptions of the extent to which a 
country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as 
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freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media (Voice and 
Accountability Dataset, 2014). Index operationalizes from several indexes such as civil 
society, democracy index, political rights or freedom of press with combining survey 
data catching the perceptions of citizens of countries with those are able to participate in 
choosing their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
and a free media. Score of the index range from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). According 
to the scores from 2005 to 2014, there is a marked evidence of deterioration among 
aforementioned areas in Turkey. Especially, as of the year 2010 where the composition 
of Constitutional Court and HSYK, changed by the referendum, the score of Turkey 
tended to decrease tremendously. Before that, Turkey was in lower than -0.1 threshold. 
In 2014, the score of Turkey was the lowest and two times doubled from the year of 
2008. 
TABLE 5: World Bank Voice and Accountability Index: Turkey in 2005-
2014. 
Years 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Rank 96 102 100 100 101 103 105 109 110 117 
Score -0.04 -0.11 -0,09 -0,08 -0,08 -0,12 -0,16 -0,23 -0.26 -0,32 
 Source: Voice and Accountability Index, World Bank, 2005-2014. 
World Bank defines judicial independence with three characteristics. Judicial 
independence has three characteristic in which judicial decisions must be impartial, 
respected and when the judiciary is free from interference (World Bank, 2016). The rule 
of law and its components such as human rights, bribery, public perceptions of 
corruption, judicial independence are all linked to each other. As several indexes 
revealed that they are deteriorated in the post-2010 period. 
Apparently, some of critical sufficient conditions of democracy such as rule of 
law, horizontal accountability and judicial independence are losing ground in Turkey. 
Transparency, freedom of expression, legal rights and freedoms are weakening while 
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electoralism is rising on the mouth of the populist politicians. Vertical accountability 
through elections is the only type of accountability for the AKP that can be taken 
seriously. Both the judicial and legislative branch of the government rendered to be 
dysfunctional as the executive power, authoritarian and plebiscitarian type of politics 
turned to be a growing power. Anomaly, amoral individualism, exploitation of state 
resources, nepotism, favoritism and patronage started to shape political system of 
Turkey. The more respect and effectiveness democratic governments develop through 
distributing favors, the more erosion occurs in the rule of law of the country 
(Kalaycıoğlu, 2005, p. 174). Patronage undermines law enforcement and erodes the rule 
of law and works at the expense of the rule of law in a country (Kalaycıoğlu, 2001, p. 
63). Patronage is also detrimental to the legislative process and political institutions; 
poisoned its reputation in media and produce backdrop for political corruption. 
The chance of transition from tutelary judiciary to independent courts had a low 
potential. In 2010, Constitutional Referendum passed with significant margin. 
Referendum was the causes of dramatic changes in the structure of HSYK. For 
opposition, AKP’s main motivation was controlling the body of HSYK, eliminate 
secular/Kemalist judges and prosecutors and to capture the third branch of government. 
For the supporters of the modifications, HSYK will be more independent and 
democratic as a result of the bill. According to Tombus (2013) AKP’s plan to 
restructure the HSYK has nothing to do with the establishment of independent judiciary 
since the bill instead of making the HSYK independent of the executive power; the bill 
has retained the Minister of Justice as a member of the HSYK (Tombus, 2013, p. 322). 
Supervision of Minister of Justice in the board of HSYK means continuation of the 
potential political interventions to judicial branch of the government. However, in 2014, 
political atmosphere has changed after graft investigation operations against AKP 
government by Gülenist police forces. Gülen movement was mainly concentrated in 
judiciary and police forces and HSYK was their main target to control. Judges and 
prosecutors related with Gülen movement infiltrated to the HSYK body either through 
elections or by appointments. Thus, elections for 10 regular and 6 substitute new 
members for the Board of HSYK turned to a battlefield for two sides. In the October 
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candidates that are supported by the government captured 8 out of 10 position of the 
Board. Politics was too much integrated into the standard elections for Board of HSYK. 
For the supporters of Referendum, idea of changing the structure of HSYK out of 
executive encroachments seemed to fail in October 2014 elections. Looking back at the 
intense debate surrounding the 2010 reforms, perhaps no one was right. The newly-
composed HSYK did not become an agent of the AKP nor did it represent a more 
pluralist body enhancing judicial independence (Yeğen, 2014). 
Past adverse scenarios of Turkey with the restructuring the judiciary may be 
intensified if the country involved in its long running request for a new Constitution. All 
parties in TGNA were coalescing for the necessity of forming a new Constitution. 
However, deep political polarization and the lack of tolerance and culture of 
reconciliation between parties would make constitution writing process a battleground 
for political war. Exclusion of significant political or societal groups, civil societies, or a 
political party would be reason for questioning the legitimacy of Constitution in future. 
Thus, negotiation period of Constitution writing must be inclusive. Comparing the 
Constitution drafting process of Chile and Turkey, Yeğen & Heiss (2014) put forward 
the differences between two countries where Turkey failed to attempt at constitutional 
modification. According to writers, Turkish constitutional drafting is without first 
setting the debate on the procedure of making a new constitution whether the TGNA or 
the commission had the original constituent power to write a new constitution (Yeğen & 
Heiss, 2014). At the beginning, some even questions the authority of constitution 
drafting commission because of its ad hoc characteristic. Considering the 10% national 
threshold that limits the representation of small political groups, number political 
groups representing their views could not be involved into the process. As Yeğen & 
Heiss reiterate, the commission planned to get the reviews, drafts and feedback of social 
organizations and individuals about the new Constitution via e-mails and through 
websites. Constitution drafting Commission dissolved while having consensus over 60 
articles and the ruling party could not find any partner supporting for the amendments. 
Turkish experience with Constitution drafting process has failed because of 
several reasons that some of are embedded in the political characteristic of Turkey. The 
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roadmap of making a new constitution must be clear and must receive the support of the 
political actors involved; must be shielded from daily politics that can jeopardize 
compromise; must have procedural legitimacy; thus curtailing the possibility that the 
process will be disorganized or delegitimized (Yeğen & Heiss, 2014). Considering the 
elements proposes by Yeğen, political parties, civil society organizations, business and 
political institutions should get into a process of discussion, coalescing and compromise 
which is hardly to find in Turkish political culture.  
4.2.4 Media and Freedom of Expression  
Independent and neutral media is one of pillars of democracies. It is the area that is 
typically manipulated and controlled by authoritarian leaders. The scope, methods can 
vary from leaders to leaders, time to time and regime to regime but conventional and 
social media always at the center of populist leaders. 
Turkish broadcasting framework has been organized by Radio and Television 
High Council (RTÜK). Members of RTÜK are elected by the parliament. Thus, 
composition of Council has been determined by the composition of seats in the TGNA. 
RTÜK has the authority to sanction on broadcastings and its contents. If broadcaster are 
not comply with the law or broadcasting principles of Council, they can be fined or 
limited by broadcasting. Another serious problem for the freedom of expression was 
TCK 301 amendment throughout 2000s. Almost 300 journalists and writers were 
prosecuted for “insulting Turkishness” under the provision, and they were also subject 
to threats from nationalist groups (Freedom of Press Reports, 2006). Nobel awarded 
writer Orhan Pamuk and Armenian journalist Hrant Dink faced with serious 
prosecutions because of this amendment, even before the AKP government, but 
prosecuted under AKP government. 
Another important property of Turkish media is the role of state owned media. 
Turkish state is controlling 16 TV also one of the biggest with its number of TV 
broadcast, agencies and budget. AKP has been benefited from this composition as the 
government has chance to control state media group, TRT. For example, in presidential 
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elections of 2014, among candidates, TRT dominantly presented Erdoğan more than 
other candidates. In 2014, 4 July, Erdoğan broadcasted for 1 hour and 20 minutes while 
opposition candidate Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu got 1 minute and while Kurdish politician 
Selahattin Demirtaş got no minutes (T24, 09.08.2014). 
In Turkey, media are highly concentrated in the property of few large private 
holding companies. Media operations are small percentages of budget of these large 
conglomerates. For that reason, editors and journalists of mainstream newspapers and 
publishers are turning to a tool in the hands of private companies; representing the 
interests of their patrons. Because of this, journalist might restrain themselves from 
reporting the critical news, such as corruptions, commercial or illegal activities of 
politicians that will harm their business interests. Censorship is not explicit, but editors 
and journalists practice self-censorship out of fear of violating legal restrictions; 
Turkish press freedom advocates contend that self-censorship has become even more 
prevalent as a result of the onslaught of prosecutions under the new penal code in 2007 
(Freedom of Press Reports, 2007). This could include avoiding criticism of the 
government or potential advertisers, both of which could have contracts with other arms 
of the companies (Freedom of Press Reports, 2005). The government continued to use 
the financial and other leverage it holds over media owners to influence coverage of 
politically sensitive issues (Freedom of the Press, 2015).  
Public procurement decisions of governments are strong financial resources for 
these large private holding companies. Ministers that are responsible for defense 
procurements, housing and construction and infrastructure projects are controlling 
serious assets through distribution of procurement contracts. In one of the most flagrant 
examples of the use of economic leverage to shape media ownership, wiretap recordings 
leaked in December 2013 indicated that the government dictated which holding 
companies would purchase the Sabah-ATV media group in exchange for a multibillion-
dollar contract to build Istanbul’s third airport (Freedom of the Press, 2015). Another 
strategy of the party in supporting the party affiliated media groups was state’s 
television advertisement. For example, in the first half of 2014, 60% of the television 
advertising budget of the public sector went to pro-government channels, whereas 
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critical outlets received virtually no funding (Taş, 2015: 786). Together with 
distribution of media outlets controlled by The Savings Deposit and Insurance Fund 
(TMSF) to a holding group close to AKP government, AKP created media groups 
predominantly loyal to the policies of AKP which control the majority of Turkish media 
outlets. Incumbent party successfully used “carrot and stick” policy against these large 
holding companies. “Old” structure of media has changed as time goes by under the 
AKP rule through state tenders and advertisements have been used as stick and carrot in 
favor of the government (Yanatma, 2016). 
TABLE 6: The World Press Freedom Index, 2007-2017  
20-.. 06 07 08 09 10 11-12 13 14 15 16 17 
Rank 100 101 102 122 138 148 154 154 149 151 155 
Score 25 31.2 22.7 38.2 49.2 70 46.5 45.8 44.1 50.7 52.9 
Source: The World Press Freedom Index Reports, Reporters Without Borders, 2006-
2017. 
World Press Freedom Index ranks 180 countries of according to the level of 
freedom of reporters. Index calculates freedom of media via evaluating the overall 
performances of safety of working environment for journalists, legal framework of 
journalism and independence of media that a country has. Index is compiled by pooling 
the responses of experts of a country to a questionnaire, combined with quantitative data 
focuses on acts of violence against journalist. The criteria used in the questionnaire are 
pluralism, media independence, media environment and self-censorship, legislative 
framework, transparency, and the quality of the infrastructure that supports the 
production of news and information (The World Freedom Index, 2017). In 2017, 
Turkey ranks 155 out of 180 countries in the list, dropped from 151 in 2016. Report 
defines the existing situation in journalism as a witch-hunt waged by President Erdogan. 
According to the report, authorities have used their fight against “terrorism” as grounds 
for an unprecedented purge, eliminate dozens of media outlets, reducing pluralism to a 
handful of low-circulation publications, imprison journalists without trial and 
 118 
censorship of online social networks has also reached unprecedented levels (The World 
Press Freedom Index: Turkey 2017). 
In 2002, Turkey had the worst score for a country aiming to join EU where 
media covers are censored in the South East part of Turkey. Kurdish issues have always 
been at the center of censorship because of ethnic cleavage and terror organization and 
clashes between PKK and Turkish military. From 2002 to 2008 Turkey ranked between 
98 and 115, even showed some improvement in Freedom of Press Index especially 
between 2005-2008 years. In 2007, Hrant Dink, the editor of Agos, one of the 
newspapers of country’s Armenian minority, is murdered by a young nationalist Turk. 
In 2010, Turkey experienced historically low rankings with 138 which will be worsened 
in upcoming years. These declines can be explained, as far as Turkey is concerned, by 
the frenzied proliferation of lawsuits, incarcerations, and court sentencing targeting 
journalists and censorship of media that represent minorities and the control of 
government, armed forces and judiciary’s control over coverage of matters of general 
interest (The World Press Freedom Index Report, 2009-2010). From that year on, 
country has never surpassed rankings lower than 150. 
It is unfortunately clear that many of the world’s leaders are developing a form of 
paranoia about legitimate journalism says RSF secretary-general Christophe Deloire 
(The World Freedom Index Report, 2016). Turkey is one of these countries under AKP 
government threaten journalist in public addresses, creating a sense of paranoia as if 
media is manipulating the public views against AKP government. Several journalists, 
pundits are also jailed in Ergenekon trials accused for involving in a coup plot against 
AKP government. Erdoğan started to target newspapers –Cumhuriyet, Sözcü-, Doğan 
Media Group- and journalists –Can Dündar, Ahmet Şık- with public blaming, suing for 
damages and on the basis of slander, defamation and organizing a plot against his 
government (Cumhuriyet, 31.05.2015). After 2013, another line of defense, a new 
strategy is invented by AKP by threatening journalist with imprisonment and blaming 
them as becoming the threat to national security of Turkey. In 2014, The World 
Freedom Index Reports defined Turkey as the one of the world’s biggest prisons for 
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media personnel with more than 60 imprisoned journalists. In 2016, Turkey has one of 
the biggest declines after Poland with fall -5 ranks.  
Reforms considering Turkish media have passed especially under the EU 
conditionality regime. In order to fulfill the EU criteria, in 2004, Turkey passed new 
press code, in 2005 country even has simple improvements in freedom of press. The 
new code, which was due to take effect in April 2005, reduced the minimum sentence 
for defamation and replace prison sentence with fines. The government removed the 
military member of the Supreme Council of Radio and Television (RTUK), the 
broadcast regulatory authority, state television and radio began limited broadcasting in 
minority languages, including Kurdish (Freedom of Press Report, 2005). This was one 
of the significant steps for freedom of expression in Turkey. In upcoming years, number 
of Kurdish broadcasting TVs have increased, even TRT, state-owned TV channel 
started to broadcast in Kurdish. However, not all developments were positive. In 2009, 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, threatened the Doğan Media Group for covering 
a corruption scandal involving a Turkish charity that had allegedly channeled funds to 
certain individuals and companies (Freedom of Press Report, 2009). 
TABLE 7: Freedom of Press Reports, 2007-2017 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Rank 105 - 101 106 112 117 120 134 142 - - 
Score 49 51 50 51 54 56 62 65 65 71 76 
Source: Freedom of Press Reports, Freedom House, 2007-2017. 
According to Global Freedom of Press Report, from 2009 to 2017, freedom 
available for Turkish media has been declining steadily. Number of censorship and 
blocking of websites are growing. The power and authority of Telecommunication 
Authority (TİB) expanded for blocking websites mainly for national security, privacy, 
propaganda of terrorist activities without prior court approvals. The authorities 
continued to aggressively use the penal code, criminal defamation laws, and the 
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antiterrorism law to crack down on journalists and media outlets especially restricting 
reporting on corruption and national security issues (Freedom of the Press Report, 
2015). In April 2015, the Law Amending the Law on State Intelligence Services and the 
National Intelligence Organization has passed under severe dissidence by opposition 
parties, granted the MİT much greater powers, including the ability to access any 
personal data without a court order (Freedom of the Press Report, 2015). 
In 2017, Turkey was one the countries that experienced largest decline in 
Freedom of the Press Report of 2017. Attempted Coup plot deepened the decline in the 
Freedom of the Press score of Turkey. Increasing authoritarian tendencies of AKP 
government and global decline in the freedom score of the press coincided in 2017 
where global press freedom declined to its lowest point in 13 years in 2016. Even major 
consolidated democracies, critics, blaming, threatening of journalists have been 
generally applied by leaders. 
The AKP could easily represent its opponents as collaborators of the Western 
states by using its gigantic media machine (Özpek & Yaşar, 2017, p. 13). Media is not 
only playing a crucial role in legitimatizing the policies of AKP, but also forming and 
shaping the policies of opposition parties. With the help of strong support of AKP 
controlled media, party has no difficulty in shaping the public opinion. It is important to 
understand the role of media in shaping the public opinion of Turkish voters. 
4.2.5 Populism 
Populism has variants. Literature of populism creates diminished subtypes of populism 
that differ from each other. In each study, scholars create number of types of populism 
in order to conceptualize phenomena such as left/right wing populism, authoritarian 
populism, economic populism, military populism, rentier populism, exclusionary 
populism etc. However, today we have enough literature to conceptualize the minimal 
definition of populism and its general properties.  
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Panizza (2013) argues that the populism consists of a discursive core which 
comprises speaking like the people, speaking for the people, the politics of antagonism 
and politics of redemption (Selçuk, 2016, p. 573). Personalistic leadership created an 
unmediated or weakly institutionalized relationship between the leader and public, 
discourse of “us versus them” and mistrust of democratic institutions which would limit 
the power of the leader (Carrión, 2009). Weyland (2001) focuses on the methods and 
instruments of winning and exercising power; emphasizes domination over 
redistribution and projection of power through elections, plebiscites, mass 
demonstrations and public opinion polls (Selçuk, 2016, p. 573). Barr defines populism 
as a mass movement led by an outsider or maverick seeking to gain or maintain power 
by using anti-establishment appeals and plebiscitarian linkages (Barr 2009, p. 38). 
Conniff (2012) stresses the charismatic appeal to the common people and the 
significance attached to winning elections (Selçuk, 2016, p. 573). Wejnert & Woods 
(2014) conceptualize populism as is more locally grounded and context specific, refers 
to ‘the people’ for legitimacy; it is rooted in anti-elite feelings; it constructs an ‘us vs. 
them’ dichotomy with an exclusion strategy; and it forges mass mobilization (Özpek & 
Yaşar, 2017, p. 6). 
Considering the commonalities of conceptualization of populists, few things are 
distinguished. First conceptualization defines a personalistic leadership and its 
discourse. The role of leader is core in populism. His discourse, appeals to the 
situations, replacing himself to the position of “mouth of the people, man of the people” 
as speaking for the people, with the people creates a sense of equation between the 
masses and the leader. His charismatic stance and appeal can be result of many things 
but help build the political aura around him which attracts common people around him. 
Populism is methodology, a style of communication for leaders for reaching out the 
people. Second conceptualization focuses on being us versus them. For sure, politics 
itself have a sense of being “in and out” of the “sides”, being advocate of an ideology, 
class, politics or a party. However in populism leaders place himself to the position of a 
“big redeemer” of the people from others. This “others” can be many things; elites, 
opposition party, military, class, minority or religious group. Elites versus poor masses, 
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national and versus foreigners (enemies), loyal people versus rebels; such binary moral 
dimensions are benefited by leaders for mobilization of masses at the expense of 
increasing the political polarization. Through that way, populist leader not only tighten 
their network/ranks and guarantee the unification of his people, but also create a sense 
of hatred, opposition and hostility against others. Populist leader can divert this 
antagonism against democratic institutions, opposition parties or specific hostile 
political concentration of power. As Carrión (2009) indicates above, leader can see any 
of these political power centers as a counter which would limit the power capacity of 
populist leader. Strategy of populists to limit the power of democratic institutions can 
also be founded over the antiestablishment discourse, either aim to change the existing 
political order, or seeking to gain or maintain power. The most important general 
property of populist leaders is their specific importance attached to winning elections 
and referendums. Plebiscitarian approach of populist leaders makes the politics only 
attach significance to the vertical accountability, only care about the elections. It is a 
methodology can be adapted to different political ends. World political history is full of 
populist leaders from right or left, fascist or socialist, secularist or Islamist political 
poles trying to reach people as being “one of them” or “the people”. 
In Turkish politics, leaders have always been the core elements of politics. 
Starting from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, İnönü, Menderes, Demirel, Turgut Özal and 
lastly Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have deeply influenced the country’s politics. Different 
patterns of populism are applied by these leaders from the very early Republican period 
to the modern Turkey. However, context, discourse and political conditions were 
different in each of these leaders and their period. In 2002, with the victory of AKP in 
general elections Turkey started to experience a new form of populism by Erdoğan. 
Party’s leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was a prominent figure for conservatives of 
Turkey, began his political life in the most populated city of Turkey in 1994 as mayor 
of Istanbul metropolitan municipality. 1994 local elections, Islamist Welfare Party had 
won 4 out of 5 metropolitan municipality of Turkey, which was signaling the major 
electoral shift in party politics and also the victory of party in 1995 general elections.  
 123 
28th February 1997 was turned to a milestone in the victimization of 
conservative narratives of Islamists. The atmosphere created by military has also 
affected the life of Erdoğan. During his term as the mayor of Istanbul, he was charged 
for inciting religious hatred when reciting a poem in a mass rally (Selçuk, 2016, p. 575). 
Erdoğan served four months in prison in 1999 which he was sentenced to 10. After 3 
years from his arrest, Erdoğan’s AKP was able to get victory in 2002 general election 
with 34% share of votes. In the repercussion of the devastating 2001 economic crisis 
which had affected all sectors of society (Öniş, 2012, p. 138-139), the AKP emerged as 
the winner of the 2002 elections as the electorate retrospectively voted out all 
mainstream parties of the 1990s (Özbudun, 2013). Thanks to 10% national threshold, 
party managed to control the majority of seats in TGNA, thus formed single party 
government. Hence, the road to the dominant party regimes has been set up in 2002. 
In its first period, AKP efficiently exploited the EU conditionality regime, 
introduced several reforms on behalf of the advancement in the chapters of EU 
accession process. Some of these chapters had involved the reforms in the structure of 
civil military relationship. For example, membership process had required the 
allegiance of Chief of General Staff to Ministry of Defense. Through these reforms 
AKP was trying to curb the political and tutelary power of military and had made them 
subordinated to civilians. The military was depicted as the guardian of elitism, 
bureaucratic autonomy, Istanbul business circles and media bodies that often criticized 
civilian governments in order to keep the military strong (Özpek & Yaşar, 2017, p. 10). 
Mainstream media, business elites –mainly TUSİAD-, opposition party CHP and 
Kemalist bureaucratic elites flocked in judiciary, HSYK and in some of ministerial seats 
was seen as a coalition invited military to the politics and help maintain its political 
power. In a populist way, through blaming these forces as the “winners”, self-seeking 
elements of existing political order, a privileged elite living in luxury, benefited from 
public procurements and derived economic power under the guardianship of military. 
AKP successfully exploited this structure and turned the politics in “us vs. them” 
dichotomy. 
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With strong electoral support of Turkish voters in 2002 and 2007 AKP 
maintained to stay in power with the single party government. Turning back to the 
conventional wisdom that I mentioned above, together with the positive effect of 
democratic reforms for EU accession process and populist policies, AKP was able to 
weaken the coalition of guardians of the regime. AKP pragmatically exploited the 
liberalization and democratic reforms conditioned to the accession of EU, while party 
leaders several times expressed their dedication to democracy, its values, reform agenda 
and democratization. However, the destruction of the Kemalist order has not been 
accompanied by the construction of a political system based on constitutional checks 
and balances, autonomous institutions, the rule of law, or a vibrant civil society and 
media. (Park, 2017, p. 3). Without having a strong checks and balance system by 
democratic institutions; playing field began to skew in favoring AKP. 
AKP abandoned previously dedicated democratic reforms especially after 2010 
Referendum. There were several reasons behind this political shift. Özbudun argues that 
the AKP has consolidated its power by eliminating the secular guardians of state and 
started to pursue a more markedly conservative and majoritarian (even plebiscitarian) 
style of rule (Özbudun, 2014, p. 155). Absence of strong autonomous civil society 
organizations, political culture far-fetched from possessing democratic civic culture 
characteristics and increasing level of populist discourse and practices created suitable 
conditions for AKP to consolidate its power and seeking to follow populist-
authoritarian policies. The historical legacy of Turkey attributed specific role to military 
which gave it immense political role and reserved domains. The tutelary power of 
military led to concentration to the role of military in politics in the studies of 
democracy and democratization of Turkey. For some, the role of military in politics was 
the main barrier to completion of Turkish democracy. This presupposed that the 
elimination of political power of Turkish military will facilitate further democratization 
therefore finalize with the completion of Turkish democracy. 
The backsliding of Turkey into authoritarianism by executive brings old 
questions to the ground. The view of AKP had masked its illiberal practices before its 
authoritarian tendencies were revealed (Özpek & Yaşar, 2017, p. 9) somehow implies 
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that the AKP has never been a fully democratic party; that internalize the democratic 
institutions, procedures, norms and values. Rather, party was aiming to consolidate its 
power through covering the real intentions of its ideology, the so called Islamist 
policies. Some of Republican academics, pundits and intellectuals have never believed 
the democratization of Turkey in the hands of AKP, rather masked their authoritarian 
tendencies through the Islamic concept taqiyya, which means denial of religious beliefs 
and practices under the condition of persecution. On the other side, Turkish liberals who 
were sensitive about the military’s role in politics and opposed to the secular 
characteristic of military was source of support for AKP governments.16 Even before 
the protests, despite openings in the Kurdish peace process which many liberals had 
advocated, they were increasingly targeted and isolated by Erdoğan, removing them 
from pro-AKP media outlets in order to prevent any criticism of his government from 
reaching his core base of support (Waldman & Calışkan, 2017). In one of his speech, 
Aziz Babuşcu, AKP’s branch head of Istanbul, clarified their relationship with the 
liberals several months before the Gezi Park. Babuşcu comments that liberals had 
worked with AKP for the past ten years they would not be with them in the future 
(Waldman & Calışkan, 2017). Since the devout conservative masses continued to 
support the party weak support base of liberals can be neglected by the party.  
The policies and style of rule of AKP after 2010 Referendum and to 2013 Gezi 
Parkı protests are signaled markedly the shift in the AKP's majoritarian policies. In the 
domestic realm, the AKP has centralized power by undermining democratic institutions 
and silencing alternative voices while it has adopted an Islamist discourse and policy 
toward the external world (Özpek & Yaşar, 2017, p. 2). At this point, I should underline 
that AKP’s discourse carried populist elements from the very beginning. However, the 
degree and context of populism were Islamicized more after Gezi Park protests.  
Withdrawal of the military from politics helped the party to turn back its Islamic 
discourse which became one of the pillars of the populist agenda of the party. In these 
new periods, Erdoğan signaled his plebiscitarian tendencies. In Gezi Parkı protests, 
                                                 
16 Even if liberals were a small group of people, they have significant amount of visibility in academia, media and 
publishing which contributes to convince EU officials and centre-right people for the so called conservative democrat 
characteristic of the party. Gezi Parkı protests in 2013 create a shift in the relationship between liberals and the party. 
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Erdoğan call the protestors, invite them to organize a plebiscite for deciding the future 
of Gezi Parkı, whether to stay as green space or become as shopping mall as he 
projected (Birgün, 19.11.2014). Erdoğan subscribes to a plebiscitary view of democracy 
in which people can express their support to him not only through frequent elections 
and referenda but also in crowded mass rallies and public opinion polls. ‘The Respect to 
the National Will Rallies’ (Milli İrade’ye Saygı Mitingleri) organized in the aftermath 
of the 2013 Gezi Park protests are a good example of this tendency where Erdoğan 
demonstrated strength in a moment of crisis (Selçuk, 2016, p. 577). In the eyes of the 
Erdoğan, he personally only takes the elections serious. Due to its capability to mobilize 
the majority through populist policies, Erdoğan was believing of his capability and 
strong grass root organization of AKP. Erdoğan views ‘the “ballot box” as the only 
legitimate instrument of democratic accountability and describes anti-government 
demonstrations as an attempt by the minority to impose its will on the majority by 
unlawful means (Özbudun, 2014, p. 163). Democratic institutions that serves 
significantly important service named “horizontal accountability”, does not seem 
attached importance for the AKP and Erdoğan. Rather, as a strategy, AKP throughout 
its rule, aimed to weaken the power and authority of the TGNA and the independence of 
Supreme Court, High Council of Electorate and Constitutional Court. 
The “cult” of Erdoğan had transformed during these period. Erdoğan began to be 
presented as a redeemer, and as a “man of the people”, the only protector of the interests 
of deprived ones, embodying the nation. His titles started to become more important 
and referring different aspects of him, approached in numerous situations. ‘The Chief ’ 
(Reis) referring to his paternalistic leadership, ‘the Tall Man’ (Uzun Adam) referring to 
his height; ‘the Conqueror of Davos’ (Davos Fatihi) referring to his bold stance against 
Israel during the 2009 World Economic Forum, and ‘the Master’ (Usta) referring his 
political skills (Türk, 2014). 
Another major shift has been realized in foreign policy. Richard Rosecrance, in 
his Action and Reaction book, argued that, populists leaders are often seeking to solve 
their domestic problems with getting diplomatic or military victories abroad. AKP 
might have pragmatically exploited Islamism in foreign policy to enhance its power 
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inside Turkey (Özpek & Yaşar, 2017, p. 3). Considering the weakening power of 
Turkish military, in AKP’s first period, through National Security Council Turkish 
military acted as a tutelary power that limit the AKP’s intention of changing the foreign 
policy paradigm of Kemalist establishment. The NATO ties and ongoing EU accession 
processes were other institutional linkages that hold the paradigm shift at some degree.  
Renowned Islamist and the architecture of AKP foreign policy vision, Ahmet 
Davutoğlu was behind the shift of foreign policy paradigm of Turkey. Behlül Özkan, 
after reading nearly 300 publications of Davutoğlu, concludes that the foreign minister 
has a pan-Islamist vision, which rejects the Arab nationalism and secularism (Özkan, 
2014, 119-120). His ambition and vision was aiming to make Turkey as being a 
regional power that has “zero problems with neighbors”. After withdrawal of military 
from politics, together with Arab Spring and repercussions of the discussion of Erdoğan 
and Israeli President Simon Peres, brought new opportunities for AKP for building 
Islamic discourse. Neo-Islamic discourse building around the unity of Islamic countries 
especially against Israel, more effective policies from Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation and lastly Neo-Ottomanism that helped building ambition of becoming the 
regional power in Middle East. Ottoman symbols, writings and even TV series became 
popular after AKP’s intensified discourse of Ottomanism and Islamism. Anti-Israel 
discourse and pro-Palestinian politics helps AKP to reach out the streets of Arabian 
Peninsula. Turkey earned the acclamation of the Arab street not due to Islam per se but 
due to its rhetoric against with Israel and support of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
(Öniş, 2013, p. 214). 
Shift in foreign policy paradigm also reflects in domestic politics. Neo-Islamic 
and Neo-Ottoman rhetoric of AKP leaders are welcomed by conservative segments of 
Turkish society. However, widespread use of Ottoman and Islamic rhetoric did not 
please all sectors of society. Turkish society is divided along historical cleavages. Turk-
Kurd, Alevi-Sunni, Secular-Conservative cleavages are embedded in Turkish politics. 
For that reason, increasing use of Ottoman and Islamic rhetoric displeased for the 
secular part of society together with Kurdish political movements and Alevis. In order 
to consolidate its conservative support base, with this strategy, AKP was not only 
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maintains its electoral support and also turned politics into “us vs. them” dichotomy 
again. According to Tuğal, this “us vs. them” dichotomy can be reflected in who would 
be included or excluded. Islam is not a tool for populist leaders but a structure that build 
the framework of populism. Tuğal suggest that Islam actively shapes this populism and 
imposes a certain form on it. Specifically, it decides the boundaries of inclusion and 
exclusion, and determines who should be participating in this politics (Tuğal, 2002, p. 
95). 
4.3 Illusion of Democratic Consolidation 
4.3.1 Discussion of Democratic Consolidation 
Democratic consolidation is a “nebulous concept” (Pridham, 1990, p. 8). The 
definition of the term seemed a bit vague and ambiguous for some part of researchers. 
Conceptual confusion about the definition and denotations of the term had an effect on 
the studies focus on the phenomenon as well. Conceptual framework about the term has 
been shaped by many studies. Yet, these studies refer varied number of meanings for 
the terms of consolidation. Even if there have been aggregations between the studies 
that attributed to the same meanings on democratic consolidation, "no clear consensus 
has emerged for the definition of democratic consolidation" (Gunther et. al., 1995, p. 5).  
Any talk about democratic consolidation presupposes that a democratic regime 
exists from the beginning to the end of the process (Schedler, 1997, p. 6). This premises 
that democratic consolidation can only be realized in democracies where democratic 
transition successfully completed. Therefore; the term democratic consolidation is not 
applied to the regimes that are not completed their transition period. Because, 
completion of transition obliges to the foundation of procedural minimum of 
democracy. Consolidation of democracy realm is constrained by democracies that at 
least meet with the minimum standard of democratic institutions. Therefore, as Schedler 
pointed, this proposition implies that “mixed regimes” fall outside the realm of 
democratic consolidation unless we classify them as subtypes of democracy and not as 
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subtypes of authoritarianism (Schedler, 1997, p. 6). The structure of studies, whether a 
study applied “conceptual stretching” or not, maybe, exacerbated the ambiguity of the 
term democratic consolidation, since they applied the term that fall in the gray zone 
between democracy and autocracy. 
The meaning we ascribe to the notion of democratic consolidation depends on 
where we stand our empirical viewpoints and where we look to (our normative 
horizons); it varies according to the contexts and the goals of our research (Schedler, 
1997, p. 4). Those who look from liberal democracies and advanced democracies to 
authoritarianism equate democratic consolidation with preventing from authoritarian 
pushbacks; for those who look from electoral or liberal democracies to advanced 
democracies equate democratic consolidation with democratic deepening; those who 
look from liberal democracies to electoral democracies equate democratic consolidation 
with avoiding from a “slow death of democracy”; those who look from electoral 
democracies to liberal democracies equate democratic consolidation with completing 
democracy (Schedler, 1997, p. 10). Before we get into detail it would be better if we 
define the electoral and advanced democracy definitions according to the study of 
Schedler. Author defines electoral democracies that are somewhat different than 
conventional meaning, rather a diminished subtype of democracy. In literature electoral 
democracies are those somewhat have inclusive and competitive elections but fail to 
provide civil rights, freedoms and liberties to its citizens. “Advanced democracies” 
presumptively possess some positive traits over and above the minimal defining criteria 
of liberal democracy, and therefore rank higher in terms of democratic quality than 
many new democracies (Schedler, 1998, p. 93). Schedler equates polyarchies with 
liberal democracies. 
In this section, on the basis of the Schedler’s typologies of democratic 
consolidation, study will examine the democratic consolidation literature and locate 
scholarly studies on these typologies. 
Avoiding Democratic Breakdown 
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According to Schedler’s typologies, political elites’ main aim is to protect what 
they have maintaining the democratic institutions and securing from the possibility of 
breakdown. Preventing from potential authoritarian regressions and achieved to gain 
political stability to the endpoint of where there is no reason to be feared. Military coups 
or illegal attempts by other state elites, anti-system political or military actors, and 
disenchantment of citizens from democratic processes may pose danger for this branch 
of consolidation, and then led to the “quick death of democracy”. In near future, 
democracy will be in secure, and prevented from the quick death of democracy. 
Therefore, this branch of consolidation will focus on the resilience, persistence, 
endurance and sustainability of their democracy. 
Avoiding Democratic Erosion 
Incremental power of undemocratic forces may lead to erosion of the democratic 
institutions. Corrupt or populist leaders that are seeking to maintain in power, 
hegemonic parties or populist leader aim to subvert democratic institutions through 
manipulating democratic institutions or can cause gradual weakening of democratic 
institutions. Therefore the liberal democratic system –polarchy- can degrade to a form 
of a hybrid regime. This branch of consolidation denotes avoiding from the decline of 
liberal democracy to an electoral one. According to Schedler, there is clear difference 
between the “avoiding democratic breakdown” and “avoiding democratic erosion”. The 
former implies sudden and dramatic interventions like coup politics while the latter 
referring to gradual decay in the political system. 
Completing Democracy 
While “avoiding democratic breakdown” and “avoiding democratic erosion” 
refer to a consolidation that preventing from authoritarian regression, completing 
democracy implies advancement from electoral democracy to meet with the polyarchy 
criteria. Form diminished subtypes of democracy to a completed democracy. Thus, this 
type of consolidation tends to focus more on forward and advancement towards a more 
qualified democracy. This situation also implied that the threat of authoritarianism is a 
low potential. Valenzuela (1992)’s consolidation definition proposes the abolishing of 
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“tutelary powers,” “reserved domains,” and “major discriminations” in the electoral law 
appeared as necessary ingredients of democratic of this branch of consolidation 
(Schedler, 1998, p. 98). 
O’Donnell (1992)’s “second transition” –from democratic government to 
democratic regime- definition begins with the formation of democratic government until 
the endpoint of the establishment of a consolidated democratic regime. Linz & Stepan’s 
(1996) “constitutionally consolidated” regimes conditioned to resolving of conflicts 
according to established norms, and that violations of these norms are likely to be both 
ineffective and costly (O’Donnell, 1992, p.15-16).  
Deepening Democracy 
Deepening democracy refer to pushing of the liberal democracy further; to a 
more advanced level of democracy. A stage of democracy, which the long –term 
persistence of the regimes are guaranteed. The bulk of studies on democratic 
consolidation mostly think about this type of consolidation. Liberal democracies meets 
with the procedural minima and guarantee the civil liberties therefore further 
democratization will end up with consolidation of democracy. 
Gunther et. al. (1995) and Linz & Stepan’s (1996)’s “behaviorally and 
attitudinally consolidated” democracy is the only game in town, where there will be no 
serious political groups seriously attempt to overthrow the democratic regime or secede 
from the state and support the democratic methods (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 5). Parallel 
to Linz & Stepan (1996), Przeworski (1991) argues that democratic consolidation 
occurs when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions (Linz & 
Stepan, 1996, p.26). These two definitions of consolidation refer to behavioral, 
psychological internalization of democratic norms and procedures while approving that 
the chances of authoritarian regressions seen as low potential. On the same line, 
Haggard & Kaufman (1995) and Diamond (1994) proposes that consolidation is the 
process by which democracy become so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its 
citizens that is very unlikely to break down (Diamond, 1994, p. 15) 
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Organizing Democracy 
Schedler offers “organizing democracy” as an uneasy intermediate position, a 
“neutral” usage of democratic consolidation, which comprehends democratic 
consolidation as the “organization” of democracy, where democratic consolidation 
demands establishing democracy’s specific rules and organizations (Schedler, 1998: p. 
100). This branch of consolidation conceptualization requires re-organization and re-
constructing of institutions for liberal democracy’s institutions such as electoral system 
judicial system. 
Schedler’s typologies are bringing the empirical viewpoints, regime types to the 
discussion of consolidation. Thus, authors aim to decrease the conceptual confusion of 
the term which many ascribe number of meanings to the same word. The most 
important reason of the conceptual confusion was scholars aim to use most appropriate 
definition and regime type for their studies. Even if using the same word, the 
circumstances in which their studies were trying to explain were different. There has 
been a framework about the concept of consolidation, but as in the Schedler’s study, 
there was a separation between the "positive" and "negative" connotations of the 
concept. When negative and positive trends came into the analysis his study capture the 
“endurance, resilience, persistence” line of definitions. Also, positive trends towards 
advanced or liberal democracies from liberal or electoral democracy contributes his 
analysis for not to neglect the “advancement toward a more developed democracy” line 
of studies.  
In terms of democratic backsliding, Schedler’s types of avoiding democratic 
breakdown and avoiding democratic erosion are suitable examples for backsliding 
discussions. These two typologies prevent from threats, destabilizing factors, 
regressions that have potentials to breakdown of democracy or erosion of its democratic 
institutions. Main motivations of political decision makers of these regimes are to build 
resilient democratic institutions which can confront in either slow or quick death of 
democracy. In avoiding democratic breakdown classic military coup d’états even if 
their numbers declined today comparing the 1960s, can be reason that lead to 
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breakdown of democracies. Promissionary coups in which ouster of an elected 
government for protecting the Constitution followed by open-ended intervention 
therefore causes democratic breakdown. Self-coups, autogolpes, executives’ aim to 
subvert constitution and suspending parliament in democratic erosion process are what 
public and elites aimed to object. This dramatic intervention to politics finalize with 
slow death of democracy. Same for executive aggrandizement; in which erosion of 
democracy is realized at a slow pace, without existence of executive replacement. 
Weakening of democratic institutions and checks and balance system by elected 
government as long as executive holds the majority of citizens’ support causes slow 
death of democracy in these cases. The pace of erosion and the mechanism that led to 
backsliding determines the type of backsliding of democracy. Consolidation of regimes 
what Schedler (1998) defines as avoiding democratic breakdown and avoiding 
democratic erosion are those which was strong enough to prevent from retreat of 
democracy in their country. 
Consolidation is not possible if the democratic transition fulfilled and 
completed. Therefore, rather than using the democratic concept of erosion of 
democracy, I would rather prefer to apply for Bermeo’s executive aggrandizement 
model. Turkish democracy, under AKP rule, experienced what Nancy Bermeo (2016) 
called “executive aggrandizement model of backsliding”; failed to become resilient 
against authoritarian regressions at a slower pace without the replacement of executive 
government as Bermeo outlined in her study. In terms of consolidation, Turkish case 
failed to pushback slow death of democracy.  
One can ask, at this point, what were the mechanisms used by AKP to erode 
Turkish democracy in favor of itself? In next section, I will focus on how Turkey failed 
to prevent from backsliding into authoritarianism and how Turkish public intellectuals’ 
failed on their evaluations about AKP? 
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4.3.2 Backsliding of Turkish Democracy  
Intentions of dividing the AKP’s 15 years of single party government into two 
periods implied that the party’s ruling styles has changed over time. Pro-western, pro-
NATO addresses of the party leaders, party’s aim to advance in EU accession talks, 
their comparison of AKP with the Christian democrat parties of EU and leaders’ main 
motivation of limiting the political power of tutelary institutions of Turkey praised and 
supported domestic foreign actors. Especially, withdrawal of the political power of 
military is supported by the EU as the conditionality regime requires civilian control 
over military (Repucci, 2007). Turkey described as a model country among Islamic 
countries, where democracy is functioning in a dominantly Islamic society.  
There was a widely belief argument that the withdrawal of tutelary powers 
would bring consolidation of Turkish democracy. Many began to focus on the struggle 
between the party and military forces. The declaration of military before the expiration 
of term of President Ahmet Necdet Sezer at the office for undermining the candidacy of 
Abdullah Gül for presidency strongly defeated by the party in early elections with 
46.6% share of vote. Following that, Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases against some 
of Turkish military personnel with accusations of organizing coup attempt against 
civilian government supported by a large coalition of political groups. AKP received 
50% of the total votes in the national elections of 2011; the military’s tutelage over 
politics vanished following the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases (Özpek & Yaşar, 
2017: 2). Expectations of public intellectuals from AKP to return back to its reform 
agenda, EU accession talks and policies that expand civil rights and liberties have been 
failed. The ongoing process of solution to Kurdish question in order to end the conflict 
was retained people from early critics of AKP. However, the strong answer of AKP to 
the Gezi Parkı protests with securitization of the protesters and organization of big 
rallies in Ankara and İstanbul and increasing Islamic discourse, and Erdoğan’s 
insistence for introduction of Presidential system create a discussion about the regime 
type of Turkey and growing authoritarian tendencies of Erdoğan. In this section, study 
will focus on to understand what was problematic in the literature that predicted 
democratic consolidation when tutelary powers were eliminated. 
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There seems two general reason lead to optimistic evaluations for the future of 
Turkish democracy under AKP rule. For some of the liberal intellectuals AKP’s aim to 
solve the Kurdish question was a huge step that would contribute to deepening of 
democracy through the recognition of Kurdish identity, giving more voice and rights to 
minorities and aiming to end up military conflict with Kurdish terrorist organizations. 
There are several mechanisms offered by intellectuals on how the solution would 
contribute to Turkish democracy. First, the Kurdish separatist movement was advocate 
of independence –later federalism- attacked the national unity of the Turkish state 
which the main political actors such as military, political parties and dominant part of 
Turkish society were against. And this situation was hindering the liberalization in 
many areas such as Kurdish identity, language, national security and civil rights and 
liberties. The idea of liberalization in these areas may weaken political and military 
struggle against terrorism was the main argument against those demanded liberalism. 
Political solution via negotiations with PKK or Kurdish nationalist Democratic Society 
Party may broaden the scope of civil right and liberties for the Kurds and the rest of 
society. Second, the militarization of the Kurdish question was source for creating 
political space for military. Kurdish question was a historical question, managed by the 
security forces and the effect of civilian politicians to the issue was limited. 
Securitization of the Kurdish question gave immense power to the military at the 
expense of civilian politicians of weak coalition governments throughout 1990s. In its 
second term in office, AKP was trying to solve the question through “political 
solutions” while still holding the strong electoral support after 2007 elections. Erdoğan 
says “he was against the regional terrorist activities but can contribute to advance 
cultural rights and pluralism” (Sabah, 17.12.2005). 
Tutelary power of Turkish military was seen as the main hindrance in the 
Turkish democracy for further democratizations. Through several mechanisms, AKP 
reduced the political power of military. By implementing legal reforms that reduced the 
institutional power of the military in decision making; through the political de-
legitimization of the military’s extra-legal interventions in politics; and by criminalizing 
such interventions AKP curbed the political space available for the military. The 
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military officers’ seats in some of democratic institutions such as RTUK and Higher 
Education Council were abolished. The last blow for the military was the Ergenekon 
and Sledgehammer Cases which shuffled the high command rank of that even led to 
sentencing of the ex-Chief of General Staff İlker Başbuğ. 
Another source of optimism about the future of Turkish democracy was the 
ongoing process for becoming a member of EU. Turkey under AKP rule opened some 
of negotiations for chapters of the accession process. Conditionality regime of EU was 
forcing liberalization and approval of civil liberties in some areas such as the 
subordination of military to civilian government. AKP while showing his intentions for 
reforms and civil rights and liberties was careful enough not to startle the secular 
coalition of the country before consolidation of its power. For these scholars, the 
elimination of tutelary powers of Turkish democracy may have strengthened the 
commitment of conservative part of society to democracy since they thought that 
citizens will be reflected in TGNA and executive since there is no tutelary powers 
above politics. Bulk of EU reports on the progress made in the implementation of EU-
Turkey statements were civil-military relationship, civil rights and liberties and 
judiciary until the EU conditionality regime was effective in promoting democratization 
of Turkey. In terms of civil-military relationship, significant reforms were centered on 
the framework and authority of National Security Council. With EU implementations, 
in between 1999-2010, the authority of National Security Council constrained, 
frequency of meetings lowered to one in two months, the scope of “advisory role” of the 
NSC was defined in the Constitution while number of civilian member of NSC 
increased, control of Parliament on military budget increased, the authority of Military 
Courts limited to ‘military service and duties”, “EMASYA Protocol” that gave a 
military personnel right of military operations without civilian permission was 
abolished as such. After 2010, number of reforms on civil-military relationship has been 
curtailed. Gürsoy (2015) and Sarigil (2015) claimed that violation of defendant rights of 
Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases’ led to polarization among public and therefore has 
been adversely affected democratic consolidation of Turkey (Aydın Düzgit, 2015, p. 69-
70). There have also been serious improvements on torture under custody, detention 
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period, freedom of expression and right of assembly, freedom of associations via 
reforms. However, difficulties, including disputes with Cyprus and skepticism among 
some EU leaders and citizens about Turkish membership, slowed down the process, 
while the support of Turkish people to the membership was falling (Freedom in the 
World: Turkey, 2013).  
For some, ongoing political process for the solution of Kurdish conflict may 
contribute to pluralism, social diversity and loyalty of Kurdish to the state and 
democracy. There have been number of improvements on Kurdish issue by the EU 
implementation process. Ban on opening courses in Kurdish language and 
broadcastings and naming children in Kurdısh language was abolished before 2005. 
Efegil (2011) hoped that AKP’s aim to resolve the historical Kurdish question will 
contribute to the democratization of Turkey. Efegil claimed that the existing 
government sees cultural pluralism in terms of richness and it describes social diversity 
as a connective ingredient. It assumes that giving more democratic, cultural rights to 
minorities will not damage the unified structure of Turkey (Efegil, 2011, p. 31). The 
disarmament process of PKK, bargaining with its leader Abdullah Öcalan, economic 
and social improvements in the southeast part of Turkey, liberalization of Kurdish 
language through newspapers and TV channels and a new constitution that capture the 
demands of all sectors of society was AKP’s plan to solve the question. According to 
Minister Bülent Arınç, the unitary structure of Turkey will be empowered rather than 
damaged and secondly the loyalty and the trust of the citizens to the state will be 
strengthened (Radikal, 30.08.2009). Similarly, intellectuals such as Baskın Oran, Fuat 
Keyman and Can Paker very much predict that same claimed that the political solution 
to Kurdish question that would strengthened the loyalty of Kurdish citizens to the state. 
Ahmet İnsel and Ali Bayramoğlu suggest finding a solution through negotiations and 
political contacts and to finalize the democratization process (Efegil, 2011, p. 34). 
Possibility of the potential success of the Solution process fostered the belief of the 
disarmament of PKK and a new constitution that guaranteed the political and cultural 
rights of Kurdish citizens. According to the party, Kurds were one of the deprived 
groups of Turkey, parts of “others” excluded from the system. Party was trying to 
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integrate its claim of “Party of Turkey”, for Erdoğan “man of nation”, with the Kurds, 
intent to incorporate Kurds into party’s populist discourse. The Solution process was 
one of elements in AKP’s “normalization process“. For some these liberal intellectuals, 
AKP is the chance for the “normalization” of Turkish politics in civil military 
relationship and for the exit from authoritarian 1982 Regime. According to İnsel, the 
formation of majority government after 2002 election served as an opportunity for a 
mild but radical exit from the regime created in September 12, 1980 by the movement 
like AKP, which Westernizing-statist elites regard with suspicion (İnsel, 01.02.2004).  
İhsan Dağı (2008) claimed that, despite its political background, by seeking 
integration into the EU, the AKP is pushing for a structural transformation of Turkey 
that means turning away from Islamization rather, the party is moving away from 
Islamization to the path of globalization and Europeanization, through broadening 
democratic participation, enhancing freedom of expression, and improving civilian 
control over the military with the help of EU’s approval by enacting reforms (Dağı, 
2008, p. 28). During its very early period, Erdoğan has rejected the label of “Islamist 
party”, preferring instead to call their ideological position as a “conservative democrat”. 
The “denial of being an Islamic party” by Erdoğan himself at the beginning of 2000s 
was welcomed by many, led to positive comments that the party will not intent to 
polarize through secular-conservative cleavage. According to Ahmet Yıldız (2004) 
supporting of rigid ideological position and applying of identity politics played a 
significant role in the failure of consolidation of democracy and political stability of 
Turkey (p. 5). Therefore, as Dağı claimed that ideological position of AKP is far away 
from being described as Islamist. Therefore he claimed that there was a possibility 
having of pro-European and pro-democrat AKP.  
The full membership to the EU would finalize this transformation, and eliminate 
the possibility of a foundation of Islamic regime in Turkey. Dağı’s claim about 
elimination of Islamization of the party and Turkey very much depends of condition to 
the EU membership. Dağı was too hasty for claiming that the party does not motivated 
by the Islamic sentiments. However, the bulk of the party leaders were started politics in 
Islamic and conservative Refah Party and the Özal’s Motherland Party. Dağı’s 
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arguments were very much of the result of voter composition of AKP in 2002 and 2007 
elections. The 2006 TESEV report on religiosity showed that 95 of Turkish people was 
not in favor of state based Sharia and the party received votes from electors who had 
voted for different political parties in previous elections in 2007 (Dağı, 2008, p. 29). 
However, being a non-Islamic or non-pro-Sharia rule does not necessarily mean 
democratic. 
A socialization process under the management of Hilmi Özkök the relationship 
between the AKP and the military was moving closer to liberal-democratic model, 
where the military grants that the civilian government has the last word on political 
matters (Heper, 2005, p. 227). Heper was optimistic about the civil-military relations on 
the basis of continuing internal transformation both in the military and in the 
conservative political movements, namely AKP. Therefore, Heper believes that the 
Turkish military may not become a barrier for the Turkey’s EU membership. Heper 
claimed that transformation of civil-military relationship is inevitable for Turkey, 
considering the ongoing process for becoming the full membership of EU and military 
is very much aware of this possibility. Modernization along Western lines, military’s 
awareness that the EU will help improvements in Turkish economy and military 
capability, and strategic analysis of high command regarding to the past and present can 
be the reason for the military in order not to stand on the road of EU membership. In 
terms of the government, Heper argues that government has not only been successful in 
the management of the economy and the conduct of foreign policy, it has also been 
quite skillful in its approach towards the military (Heper, 2005, p. 228).  
Heper’s analysis of AKP in power was mostly focus on the party’s quite skillful 
approach towards the military, the ongoing liberal socialization of military under the 
Chief of Staff General Hilmi Özkök and the EU’s regulatory modifications regarding 
the military-government which forced curb the role of military –especially NSC- to the 
civilian authorities. Heper do not forget to reiterate that his notes are based on the 
assumptions that AKP was not engaged with taqiyya, that I briefly explained above. 
Therefore, the dramatic changes in the policies of AKP from the early 2000s to post-
2013 period falsified the arguments of Heper. Heper’s analysis based on that Erdoğan 
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and those are in the higher echelons of the AKP do not have the “ulterior motives” such 
as taqiyya. As noted, the bulk of the Turkish intelligentsia was a highly optimistic about 
the political projects of the party. However, Heper did not seem propose strong 
evidences for this claim. Therefore, his expectations and analysis from the beginning of 
AKP rule seems falsified. The socialization process of military also failed in 15th July 
coup attempt. Therefore, non-democratic elites failed to be successful in socialization 
process.  
Considering the studies of Efegil (2011), Heper (2005), Dağı (2008), and their 
optimistic arguments on conservative democrat AKP was omitting several general 
properties of Turkish politics. First of all, they did not foresee the stagnation of 
accession process of EU-Turkey relationship. However, as Senem Aydın Düzgit (2015) 
posits from reports, implementation of EU reforms has been slowed down especially 
after 2010. There was too much focus on anchor of the conditionality regime of EU. 
The possibility of authoritarian regression or backsliding of democratic institutions was 
seen as impossible under the anchor of EU. Therefore, people did not focus on other 
areas such as problems of political culture, weak institutionalized check and balances on 
executive and the weakness of democratic institutions. In terms of Solution Process, as I 
indicated above with reference from Heiss & Yeğen (2015), dramatic political changes, 
crafting institutions such as Constitution making requires compromise. Contributions of 
opposition parties and civil society organizations were limited throughout the process. 
TGNA remained out of the process for a long time. Opposition parties were briefed 
only few times about the process. The management of process was not democratic that 
therefore its chances of resolving social conflict among citizens were a low potential. 
Inconsistence of the management process with nature of democratic resolving did not 
identified by many observers, therefore dramatic abandonment of the Solution Process 
ended up with a high pressure against HDP, end of conversation with Öcalan and 
detentions of HDP leaders. 
So, why the party shift to Islamic discourse and authoritarian tendencies as I 
show below in Table 8, Freedom House Freedom of the World Turkey Reports. 
According to Etyen Mahçupyan, the advisor of ex-prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, 
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criticized that the conventional opinion about the AKP’s future was the prediction that 
the party will place itself to the center of political spectrum. However, according to 
Mahçupyan, AKP is the new hegemonic power of Turkish politics which is redefining 
the political “center” and has no historical connection with centre-right political parties 
(Mahçupyan, 17.03.2014). The conflict with Gülen movement was the first serious 
challenge after the elimination of military from politics. According to Mahçupyan the 
military coup in Egypt and civil war in Syria and left no room for AKP except to 
consolidate its power. According to Mahçupyan, these conditions create “ground” for 
increasing the “authoritarian” and “conservative” tendencies of the party (Mahçupyan, 
17.03.2014). Consolidating power through the support of the people in elections is not 
an “authoritarian” act, but AKP’s solution to aforementioned crisis intensified the critics 
against party as becoming more authoritarian. 
AKP’s reaction towards the Gezi Parkı protests through gathering of million 
people in Milli İrade’ye Saygı Mitingi in major cities was exacerbated the “increasing 
authoritarianism” critics against the party. The mutual aversion between the EU and 
AKP, EU’s implicit support to the military coup in Egypt and Gezi Parkı protests were 
intensified the mutual distrust between two actors. Erdoğan was blaming EU as being 
agent and support of protestors hence undermining the political order of the country. 
Mahçupyan’s analysis sees the AKP’s increasing authoritarian tendencies as a 
deterioration in the “image” of the party. Domestic and international political 
developments forced them to take serious measures in order to deal with the intense 
political turmoil and instability. For maintaining its power in the office Erdoğan had to 
apply to the support of the people both in meetings and in elections. But, Mahçupyan’s 
analysis omits the alternative democratic mechanism for dealing with political danger 
and opponents. Mahçupyan thought as if the policies that the party applied were their 
only choice, while claiming that these policies intensified the authoritarian image of the 
country.  
AKP was showing centripetal tendencies until the withdrawal of Turkish 
military. The abandoning of political power of Turkish military and the absence of 
checks and balance mechanisms of democracy coincided with intense use of Islamic 
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discourse. We can argue that the secular coalition of business, judiciary and military 
was forcing the party to refrain from giving anti-establishment statements, Islamic 
political maneuvers. 
TABLE 8: Freedom in the World Reports 2009-2017 
  Freedom 
Ratings 
Civil Liberties Political 
Rights 
2009-2012 Partly Free 3/7 3/7 3/7 
2013 Partly Free 3.5/7 4/7 3/7 
2014 Partly Free 3.5/7 4/7 3/7 
2015 Partly Free 3.5/7 3/7 4/7 
2016 Partly Free 3.5/7 3/7 4/7 
2017 Partly Free 4.5/7 4/7 5/7 
Source: Freedom in the World Reports, Freedom House, 2009-2012. 
After initially passing some liberalizing reforms, the government has shown 
decreasing respect for political rights and civil liberties, especially in the past five years 
(Freedom in the World: Turkey, 2017). While calculating the overall condition and 
outlook of Turkish democracy, Report indicates the continued downturn trend from 
2010 to 2015. In 2013, as the Table 8 shows Turkey’s freedom rating decreased from 
3/7 to 3.5/7. The decline in the civil liberties was due to detentions of Kurdish 
politicians, journalists (especially journalists Nedim Şener – Ahmet Şık Case), and 
military officers. While some observers hailed the case as a breakthrough for civilian 
oversight of the military, others expressed concern about the rule of law and warned 
that the government was using the coup trials and KCK arrests to silence legitimate 
critics (Freedom in the World: Turkey, 2013). Country had decline in freedom score 
with political polarization, anticorruption scandals and political interference to judicial 
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processes in 17-25 December 2014 corruption scandal. Country continued to have 
downward trend with the collapse of Kurdish Solution Process and bombings in the 
metropolitan cities, arrest of journalists and Kurdish oriented HDP mayors, the seizure 
of critical newspapers owned by Gülen movements were formed the background of the 
attempted coup. 
The conventional wisdom of the intellectuals and scholars have failed in their 
expectations from the “conservative democrat” AKP. The highly competitive nature of 
Turkish party politics, and, until recent years, the successful conduct of free and fair 
elections in the context of a vibrant and partially free media, gave the impression that 
Turkey had already accomplished a transition to democracy and that its main challenges 
were those of democratic consolidation (Somer, 2016, p. 487). How, this happened. 
First, there were a huge optimism and expectations from the party. Party was claiming 
that they are no longer an Islamic Party, a conservative democrat as its counterparts in 
EU, Christian Democrat Parties. Leaders were repeatedly announced their allegiance to 
the EU accession process and loyalty to the NATO. They were against the military 
interventions to politics which welcomed by the liberal institutions both in Turkey and 
EU that are sensitive about the topic. The problems of Turkish political regime create 
fertile ground for the policy shifts and majoritarian tendencies of the Party.  
The expansion of civil right and liberties due to meeting with the EU 
conditionality regime and the good economic performance of the party especially in 
decline of interest rate and inflation helped build its legitimacy in the eyes of the 
citizens. These optimistic expectations are somehow related with the pre AKP period 
but especially with the political structure of 1990s. Weak coalition governments were 
far away from finding solutions to economic and political turmoil of Turkey, 28 
February postmodern military intervention to RP-DYP coalition, the economic crises in 
1995 and 2001, intensified clashes with the PKK terrorist organization and the rising of 
Islamic parties that are challenging the secular foundation of the country gave immense 
reasons for new generations of Islamic politicians to exploit the failures of the past. As I 
indicate in the populism section of this paper, Erdoğan has been attacking to these 
failures through various mechanisms, placed himself and the party against illiberal 
 144 
policies of the past. Somer defined the same situation as failure of AKP to overcome 
old-authoritarianism. A major reason for this failure might be that Turkish Islamists 
have for historical-institutional reasons developed a mental- ideological prioritization of 
‘conquering rather than democratizing’ state institutions (Somer, 2016, p. 486). 
Reforms and liberalization in some of these areas led many to expect the 
potential democratizations with the help of conservative democrat party refusing its 
Islamic heritage of Erbakan’s RP, since the party holds vast majority of support in the 
elections. Therefore, the elimination of tutelary powers in the politics while continuing 
the EU accession talks, Erdoğan famous Diyarbakır speech in 2005 that implied the 
potential recognition of Kurdish identity and his intention to start the Kurdish Solution 
Process and party’s support to Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases against alleged coup 
attempt in 2003 led many to be optimistic about the democratization of Turkish 
democracy as in the writings of Heper, Efegil, Mahçupyan, İnsel, Bayramoğlu and Oran 
shows. This significant support for AKP outside of the party ranks was important, since 
these groups of intellectuals are linked with some of EU civil society institutions. The 
pragmatic relationship between the AKP for curbing the political power of military has 
been successful. Yet this process left no barrier in the political order that would limit the 
power of dominant political party. By the help of its popularity, the AKP has been able 
to undermine the domestic institutions and silence alternative voices and reinforced its 
autonomy on behalf of the majority. (Özpek & Yaşar, 2017, p. 14). 
Conclusion 
1983 democratic transition was a formal one. 1983 elections were not a free and 
fair elections because of the strict supervision and pressure of military. The tutelary 
power of military functioned until the AKP curbed the military’s political power and 
started to limit the dominance of Republican coalition in politics. Thus, democratization 
process after 2002 with the anchor of EU, solution to Kurdish question, successful 
economic policies and curbing the political power of Turkish military from politics led 
to the presupposition of “democratic consolidation” in a near future. However, under 
heavy handed use of state power, weak civil society, skewed media freedom and 
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restrictions on journalism, lack of independent institutions, political culture far away 
from the characteristics of civic culture, lack of moderation, tolerance, compromise in 
politics undermine transparency and accountability of the regime. For that reason, the 
"second transition" -becoming democratic regime from democratic government- failed 
to prevail in Turkey. The AKP’s strength in parliamentary is helped build expansion to 
the other branches of government. Judicial autonomy and independent state institutions 
could not prevent from executive interventions. Therefore, the presupposition that the 
withdrawal of tutelary institutions would bring democracy is failed without the 
existence of concrete check and balance system that holds the executive accountable. 
The authoritarian drift of AKP has become so clear. Turkey has no longer meets with 
the eight criteria proposed by Dahl’s for polyarchy. Failure of Turkish democracy to 
become resilient against authoritarian regressions led to slow death of democracy.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Due to the tutelary power of Turkish military and judiciary, problems in civil rights and 
liberties, freedom of expression and media, weak civil society and strong statist 
orientations, unfavorable properties of political culture Turkish regime was far away 
from meeting the minimum criteria of democracy. Problems of democratic transition 
such as reserved domains and tutelary power of omnipotent Turkish military shaped the 
post-transition period. The role of military in politics was seen as the most serious 
destabilizing factor in Turkish politics as in the assumption of democratic consolidation 
literature. Turkish Military was above the law, could be the source of potential 
authoritarian regression considering its legacy of military interventions to politics. The 
tutelary power of military led to concentration to the role of military in politics in the 
studies of democracy and democratization of Turkey. For some, the role of military in 
politics was the main barrier to completion of Turkish democracy. This presupposed 
that the elimination of political power of Turkish military would facilitate further 
democratization therefore finalizing the completion of Turkish democracy. This 
assumption was compatible with the arguments of democratic transition and 
consolidation, based on the role of military in politics. Tutelary powers, reserved 
domains and exist guarantees were seen as facilitating factors to convince political elites 
of previous regime in order to compromise for potential democratic transition. Once 
democratic governments established, the elimination of these concessions turned to be 
the main goal for the completion of these democracies. The aim was to make 
diminished subtypes of democracies to a completed democracy. For some of scholars in 
democratic consolidation literature, consolidation of democracy requires the elimination 
of authoritarian regressions and destabilizing factors that could produce acts outside of 
democratic practices. Thus, assumed that consolidated democracies are those where 
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there will be no possibility for authoritarian regressions. Therefore, it would be 
misleading to discuss the issue of democratic consolidation, if the transition from any 
kind of authoritarian regimes to a democracy is not completed. 
Curbing the tutelary power of Turkish military and judiciary did not cause the 
completion of Turkish democracy. Scholars and pundits were so much concentrated on 
the political role of military and dominant secular characteristic of the political order 
that they could not foresee the weak checks and balance system, unfavorable properties 
of Turkish political culture and problems in civil society and media. Reforms for the 
accession to the EU led to restructuring of the military-civilian relationships, and 
liberalization in some of democratic institutions. Delegitimization of military in 
Ergenekon and Sledgehammer Case, (de)securitization of Kurdish question together 
with the modifications in civil-military relations are subordinated the Turkish military 
somehow to civilian control. Yet, the decline of political power of military coincided 
with the rise of populist-authoritarian practices of AKP especially after 2013 with Gezi 
Parkı protests. The assumption of transition paradigm that the elimination of tutelary 
powers after democratic transition would bring completion of democratization is failed 
in Turkish case. Under the conditions of weak checks and balance system and 
democratic institutions and unfavorable political cultural traits, after curbing the 
political space available for tutelary powers, Turkish democracy experienced 
backsliding into authoritarianism by democratically elected government. The 
assumptions of potential democratization or even the possibility of democratic 
consolidation in the first period of AKP government have failed. Without strong 
democratic institutions persisting against populist-authoritarian regressions, weak 
checks and balances system, political culture that can easily manipulate for inclination 
towards authoritarian tendencies, fragile civil society institutions and judiciary organ 
which is far-fetched from judicial independence, Turkish democracy became an 
example for democratic backsliding than democratic completion. 
Turkish democracy, especially after 2013 failed to become resilient against 
authoritarian regressions. Turkish case failed to pushback the slow death of democracy 
in the hands of executive government. The triumphs of incumbent party in consecutive 
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elections contributed to government to skew the playing field; in areas such as in 
judiciary favoring the party, access to media and state institutions, unfair elections, 
violations of civil rights and liberties. Strong electoral mandate and weak institutions 
and unfavorable cultural, economic and social conditions are generated an immense 
power for AKP to create a political order that favors the party. 
Public’s orientation toward the political system is significant, it's inclination 
determines that it can help promote the resilience of the political system or can lead to 
authoritarian pushbacks. Democracy requires compromise, diversity, consensus, and 
tolerance for others, solidarity, moderation of different ideas within the system. These 
factors may supply facilitating conditions for the creation of intermediary groups that 
can act together to conserve democracy. Turkish political culture lacks many of these 
factors for a resilient democracy. Interpersonal trust and tolerance is low in Turkey, 
which may lead to suspicion towards others, blaming dissidents as agents of foreigners 
and may impede common acts and solidarity for certain goal. Perceiving the politics in 
the angle of Manichean worldview “us vs. them”, in-group vs. out-group orientation is 
common in Turkish politics, creates a sense of revanchism for the dissidents. 
Considering the lack of compromise and tolerance, strong courage culture and national 
pride; Turkish political culture does not seem generating facilitating elements for the 
resolution of societal, religious, sectarian and ethnic fault lines which polarizes Turkish 
citizens into several groups that have different national goals.  
Turkish political culture is unlikely to meet with the traits of “civic culture”. For 
the Turkish people, the most trustful democratic institution is Turkish military, where 
the media is the least. However, Turkish people many times show their commitment to 
democracy in conventional political participation such as in elections. Their 
participation ratio is significantly higher than European counterparts. Electoral 
participation is the only political participation that is commonly shared by most of the 
public. Protests, petitioning or forming organizations for a specific goal is not shared by 
large sectors of society. 
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Turkish civil society organizations are weak and fragile. Monist and strong state 
tradition is a part of this condition, but not represent the full picture. The state's attitude 
towards civil society organizations is oscillated between cooperation and repression, 
thus create a sense of insecurity and reciprocal mistrust. One of the core properties of 
Turkish politics is its absence of strong civil society structure, due to historical legacy 
of weak intermediary institutions. Strong state orientation may impede proliferation of 
intermediary institutions between state and society. Skepticism against the activities of 
interest groups may cause of exclusion of interest groups from political decision making 
processes. Highly centralized decision making processes and bureaucratized political 
system led to absence of involvement of civil society organization into these processes.  
State is the source of wealth. Even if its role in economy is shrinking via 
privatization process after 1980, it is still crucial in terms of capital accumulation via 
distribution of big amount of procurements and tenders. Therefore, codependence of 
business groups and state is limiting the ties between civil society organizations and 
strong business groups that are in need of state tenders. Legacy of undermining the 
formation of any kind of concentration of power except from state, has impeded 
institution of strong autonomous intermediary groups. The connection between civil 
society and political parties are also weak except for the new developments such as 
between AKP and TÜRGEV, SETA and KADEM. Due to EU anchor process in early 
2000s coincided with the expansion of civil society organization both in number and in 
terms of issue based numbers. EU conditionality regime contributed to legitimization of 
civil society institutions, provided funds and human capital and introduced legal 
framework for the organization. However, the bulk of Turkish civil society 
organizations are consisted from hemşehri, mosque and village organizations. Such 
structure is far-fetched from generation of civic culture, rather promotes protection of 
primordial ties and traditionalism. Preponderance of community over individual, 
uniformity over diversity is not conducive for generation of pluralism in Turkish 
society. Low level of social capital and trust and socio-religious tolerance is inhibiting 
the proliferation of facilitating conditions for civic culture. 
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Turkish civil society organizations are far-fetched from meeting with the civil 
society structure of consolidated democracies. Autonomous organizations that limits 
and controls the abuses of state, promotes civic competence and duties and solidarity 
among people, moderation of extreme views and trust do not seem dominant in Turkey. 
Considering the crucial role of civil society in linking the ties between the rule of law 
and media, it would be wisely to claim that, one of the pillars of condition for the 
stability of democratic regimes is neglected in Turkish political system. 
Civil society can function only within the legal framework and protections 
provided by judicial independence. Independent judicial institutions are crucial in 
protection of civil rights and liberties, freedom of expression and media, democratic 
norms, procedures and institutions. Constitutional monitoring is essential in 
conservation of Constitution and law enforcement in these regimes. Review and control 
agencies help promote transparency and horizontal accountability of the political 
system.  
Turkish judiciary was not independent from the inauguration of government 
after formal transition to government. Turkish courts were seen as the agent of secular 
coalition, a tutelary power. Therefore, judiciary criticized as being a tutelary power, a 
subordinated organ of the state. Party prohibition cases are contributed to propagation 
of this perception. Party prohibition cases were generally concentrated towards Islamic 
and Kurdish parties, which were seen as dissidents against secular characteristics of the 
state. Yet, the probability of transition from tutelary judiciary to independent courts has 
failed in 2010 Referendum. Referendum failed to generate more plural body. Rather, 
post-Referendum structure of HSYK body turned to a conflict zone between the judges 
and prosecutors, supported either government or Fethullah Gülen movement. Instead of 
transforming the composition of HSYK to a more democratic and plural body, post-
Referendum structure generated judiciary organ which is far-fetched from fostering 
judicial independence, more politicized and more weakened against the estrangements 
of incumbent party. Turkish courts especially after 2013 lost their grounds for judicial 
independence as I indicated from several measurements of rule of law indexes as well 
as deterioration in corruption and bribe. After the 15 July attempted coup, the situation 
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worsened with the emergency law and executive decrees. Constitutional Court declined 
to review executive decrees passed under the martial law. Incumbent benefited from this 
condition by targeting dissidents of the government. 
 Dependence of capital owners of Turkish media to the state tenders and 
advertisements is the main reason for the problems of Turkish media. Revenues from 
media operations are the small part of main budget of these big companies. Power of 
media is stemming from its capacity to shaping the public opinions. Newspapers, 
websites, and TV channels represents the interests of patrons and corporations. 
Therefore, for preventing from criticism and punishment of governments, such as tax 
penalties, exclusion from state procurements; media had become subordinated to 
incumbent party, which successfully gained support in consecutive elections. “Carrot 
and stick” policy and the codependence of business corporations to state procurements 
is exploited by the AKP government to control media as like in the example of the 
aforementioned business association-government relationship. AKP government 
continued to use the financial leverages to control media outlets. The illiberal practices 
and structure of pre-AKP periods facilitates the conditions for AKP.  
Press freedom indexes captured the deterioration especially after 2010. Freedom 
of expression and media had showed certain improvements due to the reforms 
necessitated for the EU accession process. EU anchor contributed to the developments 
in legal framework such as in the case of Article 301. The increasing number of cases 
and detentions against journalist, violations in civil rights and liberties in Ergenekon 
and Sledgehammer Operations, Nedim Şener-Ahmet Şık Case and self and explicit 
censorship together with the ownership structure of media, however led to decline in 
number of press freedom indexes especially after 2010 contrary to the improvements in 
first years of AKP government. 
Turkish regime is absent conditions such as rule of law autonomous from 
executive interventions, independent media and freedom of expressions, autonomous 
and strong civil society, and favorable political culture properties, which are critical 
conditions for avoiding the democratic erosion. These institutions are pillars of checks 
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and balance system that could hinder the populist-authoritarian regressions. They can 
provide basis for accountability and transparency of political system; can hold 
politicians accountable for democratic institutions and for electorate, can protect civil 
liberties and rights, can provide law enforcement. The success of this system very much 
depends on factors such as civic political culture, which is far-fetched from the existing 
general properties of Turkish political culture. However, the general composition of 
these attributes are absent in Turkish political order. Therefore, while maintaining the 
strong support of electorate, AKP successfully achieved to create uneven playing field 
and started to follow populist-authoritarian agenda in order stay in power especially 
after Gezi Parkı Protests. Considering the strong electoral mandate of AKP and the 
foundation of political order favoring the party, ongoing emergency law and executive 
decrees absent from constitutional review, it is possible that the erosion of democracy 
would evolve to another degree.  
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 1: Intolerance towards People 
Criminals 80.9 Christians 54.7 Homosexual 91.7 
Another Race 34.0 Alcoholic 87.1 Jewish 59.4 
Extreme Leftist 70.3 Large Family 40.7 AIDS  88.5 
Extreme Right 71.1 Foreigner 28.3     
 
TABLE 2: Participation to General Elections, 1987-2015 
Election Years 1987 1991 199
5 
199
9 
200
2 
200
7 
201
1 
2015
H 
2015
K 
Turnout Rate 
(%) 
93.2 83.9 85.2 87.0 79.0 84.1 87.1 86.4 87.4 
 
TABLE 3: Number of Cases in ECHR on Turkey 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Total Case 1097 2830 3706 4474 5821 8668 9098 10931 9488 8446 
 
TABLE 4: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, 
Turkey 2005-2015 
Years 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Rank 65 60 64 58 61 56 61 54 53 64 66 
Score 35 38 41 46 44 44 42 49 50 45 42 
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TABLE 5: World Bank Voice and Accountability Index: Turkey in 2005-
2014 
Years 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Rank 96 102 100 100 101 103 105 109 110 117 
Score -0.04 -0.11 -0,09 -0,08 -0,08 -0,12 -0,16 -0,23 -0.26 -0,32 
 
TABLE 6: The World Press Freedom Index, 2007-2017  
20-.. 06 07 08 09 10 11-12 13 14 15 16 17 
Rank 100 101 102 122 138 148 154 154 149 151 155 
Score 25 31.2 22.7 38.2 49.2 70 46.5 45.8 44.1 50.7 52.9 
 
TABLE 7: Freedom of Press Reports, 2007-2017 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Rank 105 - 101 106 112 117 120 134 142 - - 
Score 49 51 50 51 54 56 62 65 65 71 76 
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TABLE 8: Freedom in the World Reports 2009-2017 
  Freedom 
Ratings 
Civil Liberties Political 
Rights 
2009-2012 Partly Free 3/7 3/7 3/7 
2013 Partly Free 3.5/7 4/7 3/7 
2014 Partly Free 3.5/7 4/7 3/7 
2015 Partly Free 3.5/7 3/7 4/7 
2016 Partly Free 3.5/7 3/7 4/7 
2017 Partly Free 4.5/7 4/7 5/7 
 
 
 
